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New Zealand Human Rights Commission Submissions |
Last Updated: 4 September 2016
Submission to the Social Services
Committee on the Social Security
Legislation Rewrite Bill
22 June 2016
Contact Person:
John Hancock
Senior Legal Adviser
Submission of the Human Rights Commission on Social Security Legislation Rewrite
Bill
To: Social Services Committee
22 June 2016
Introduction
1. The Human Rights Commission (‘the Commission’) welcomes the
opportunity to provide this submission to the Social
Services Committee on the
Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill (‘the Bill’).
2. As its title indicates, the Bill rewrites the incumbent Social Security
Act 1964 (‘the Act’) in order to make it more
accessible and
cohesive. The Commission notes that the Bill is intended to be largely neutral
in terms of its impact on current policy.
Nevertheless, the Bill introduces some
policy reform, including:
• Amending the principles of the Act to introduce a principle concerning support for investing in better long-term outcomes, thus providing legislative expression to the Government’s “investment approach” policy.
• Amending and renaming the orphans benefit, the unsupported
child’s benefit and
the emergency benefit.
• Introducing a new power to make regulations to specify groups of
beneficiaries whose benefit instalments can be redirected
without
consent.
Summary of the Commission’s positions and
recommendations
3. The Commission supports the intention of the Bill and agrees with the Explanatory Note’s description of the current Act as “awkward, disjointed and incoherent” due to its age and frequent amendments. Overall, the Commission considers that the Bill is a considerable improvement on the Act in terms of clarity and accessibility. For this reason, the Commission also supports the Bill’s shifting of the provisions regarding residential care and disability support services and the artificial limb service into separate legislation.
4. The Bill is also being introduced against the backdrop of the significant
substantive reforms of New Zealand’s social security
system that have
occurred following the 2011 report of the Welfare Working Group
(‘WWG’). The Commission has provided
the Committee with submissions
on the human rights implications of many of the Social Security Amendment Bills
that have been introduced
in the wake of the WWG report1.
5. As it currently stands, the Bill does not update the legislative
framework to reflect the developments in human rights policy
and law that have
occurred during the Act’s tenure. The Commission considers that the
opportunity to do so should not be missed.
Social security policy and service
provision, in its various forms and machinations, directly impacts upon the
human rights of people
whose welfare and economic well- being is dependent on a
benefit, either directly or indirectly.
6. Just as the re-write of the Act provides an opportunity to include the
investment approach policy within the Act’s principles,
it provides a
similarly significant opportunity to ensure that the primary legislative
framework is applied in a human rights consistent
way. Furthermore, the
alignment of the Act’s legislative purpose and framework with human rights
principles enables a greater
degree of policy congruence with the
Government’s commitment to measure its progress towards meeting the 2030
targets set by
the UN Sustainable Development Goals, in particular those
regarding the reduction of poverty2 and
inequality3.
7. In this submission, the Commission has made a number of recommendations
aimed at enhancing the human rights consistency of the
Act. A summary of the
Commission’s recommendations is set out below:
a. The Commission recommends that Clause 3(a) of the Bill is amended to
include a new clause 3(a)(iv) that provides that a purpose
of the Act is
to
1 These include submissions on the Social Security (Youth Support and Work Focus) Amendment Bill (12 April
2012), Social Security (Benefit Categories and Work Focus) Amendment Bill (1 November 2012), Social Security (Fraud Measures and Debt Recovery) Amendment Bill (10 October 2013), Support for Children in Hardship Bill (8 July 2015), Social Security (Extension of Young Persons Services and Remedial Matters) Amendment Bill (9
September 2015).
2 The UN SDG targets on poverty include reduction, at least by half, in the proportion of men, women and
children living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national dimensions. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/
3 The UN SDG targets on reducing inequality include progressively and sustainable increasing the income
growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population at a rate higher than the national average by 2030; and promoting and empowering the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status by 2030; http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/inequality/
protect and progressively realise the Government’s human rights obligations, including (but not limited to):
(i) The reduction and alleviation of hardship due to income poverty and material deprivation.
(ii) The promotion of social inclusion.
b. The Commission recommends that Clause 4 of the Bill is amended to
include a new clause 4(f) in order to establish a requirement
that any person
performing or exercising a duty, function, or power under this Act must have
regard to the Government’s human
rights obligations, including the welfare
and best interests of any child or vulnerable adult who may be affected,
directly or indirectly,
by the exercise of a duty, power or function under the
Act.
c. The Commission recommends that the Social Services Committee reviews
whether the qualifying criteria for the Supported Living
Payment under
clause 34 of the Bill adequately reflects the “reasonable
accommodation” requirements of the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities.
d. In light of the historical issues regarding the treatment of New
Zealand residents with overseas pensions under s 70 of the Act,
the Commission
recommends that the Social Services Committee considers the equity and fairness
of the current policy settings reflected
in clause 173-175 of the
Bill.
e. The Commission recommends that the Committee reviews clause 421 and
considers the extent to which redirection provisions ought
to be included in
primary legislation, given the human rights implications.
f. The Commission recommends that the phrase “without good
cause” is deleted from clause 421(2)(a). The Commission
notes that the
RIS does not appear to identify or analyse any circumstance where the use of
redirection without good cause can be
justified.
Human rights implications
8. Reform of social security legislation has inherent human rights implications. The rights to social security and an adequate standard of living are enshrined in human rights
treaties that the New Zealand Government has ratified, notably the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights4
(‘ICESCR’), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child5
(‘UNCROC’) and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities6 (‘UNCRPD’).
9. International human rights principles provide that social security
benefits are crucial public policy mechanisms for enabling
all people to enjoy
their right to an adequate standard of living. In its General Comment 19 on the
right to social security7, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights made a number of observations which are instructive when
assessing the
social security policy. These include the following:
a. The right to social security includes the right not to be subject to arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions of existing social security coverage.8
b. Social security policy should be treated as a social good, not a subset of financial or economic policy.9
c. Family and child benefits are crucial mechanisms in enabling the protective functions of Article 9 and 10 of ICESCR (and by association Article 27 of UNCROC).10
d. Benefits must be of adequate value (both cash and in kind) to enable the realisation of, inter alia, the right to an adequate standard of living; and be accessible.11
e. Qualifying criteria must be reasonable, proportionate and transparent. Sanctions should be circumscribed, reasonable and subject to due process protections.12
f. Special attention should be given to enabling vulnerable groups to
realise their right
to social security.13
4 Articles 9-11 – NOTE: The right to social security is a long standing international human right, recognised in
the Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 and later incorporated in the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(Art. 22)
5 Articles 26 and 27
6 Article 28
7 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19 on the right to social security, 4
February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19. General Comments are interpretations of aspects of treaties by the international body responsible for monitoring their implementation. As such they are regarded as the most authoritative legal interpretation of how a treaty should be implemented and indicate the requirements and standards that must be satisfied to ensure a State does not breach its international commitments
8 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19 on the right to social security, 4
February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, para 9
9 Ibid para 10
10 Ibid para 18
11 Ibid para 22,23
12 Ibid para 24
13 Ibid para 30
g. There is a strong presumption against the adoption or introduction of retrogressive measures.14
h. Any persons who have experienced a violation of their right to social
security have access to effective judicial recourse or other
appropriate
remedial avenues.15
10. The Commission notes that both the Bill’s Regulatory Impact Statement (‘RIS’) and Explanatory Note acknowledge the nexus between social security policy and human rights16. The RIS states that “protection of human rights is fundamental to our democratic social system.”17 The Explanatory Note appears to reflect this statement of principle, stating that the rewrite has been drafted in such a way so as to ensure that
“matters relating to human rights and freedoms” and
“provisions that confer economic rights”, among other
things, are
included in primary legislation.
11. However, this policy-level acknowledgment of the importance of human
rights in the social security system is not expressly reflected
in the
provisions of the Bill (clauses 3 and 4) that establish its purposes and
principles.
Clause 3 – the legislative purpose
12. Clause 3 of the Bill establishes the legislative purpose and is virtually
identical to incumbent s 1A. Clauses 3(a) and (b) set
out statements related to
the fundamental purpose of a social security system – that is, to provide
financial support to people
(and their dependents) who are not in employment,
are unable to work due to illness, sickness, disability or care
responsibilities,
or who are suffering financial hardship. These clauses can be
characterised as broadly consistent with, yet narrower in scope, than
Article 9
of ICESCR, which provides for a universal right to social security.
13. However, clause 3 of the Bill does not contain an additional purposive
statement reflective of the human rights obligations upon
the state to provide,
among other things, an adequate standard of living to all persons18,
the widest possible protection and assistance accorded to the
family19, and special measures of protection and
assistance
14 Ibid para 42
15 Ibid para 78
16 Ministry of Social Development, Regulatory Impact Statement: Policy changes proposed as a part of the
rewrite of the Social Security Act 1964 (hereafter ‘RIS’), Part 1, p 8-15
17 Ibid at para 25, p 9
18 ICESCR Article 11.1
19 ICESCR Article 10.1
on behalf of all children, without discrimination for reasons of parentage or
other conditions20.
Clause 4 – legislative principles
14. Clause 4 of the Bill goes on to set out the principles that a person must
have regard to when exercising a function under the
Act. This is identical to
the incumbent s 1B, but for an additional “investment approach”
principle regarding the provision
of additional assistance, support and services
for people who have been identified as being at risk of long-term welfare
dependency.
15. Clause 4 is particularly significant as it governs the operation of the
Act, through the mandatory application of its principles
in decision-making by
MSD officials, Work and Income case managers and case officers, and other
persons with statutory functions.
However, clause 4 does not provide for any
express obligation upon those decision- makers to take into account human rights
principles
in the course of exercising their legislative functions.
16. Such obligations include an obligation on the State to ensure that the
best interests of the child are taken into account as a
primary consideration in
decision-making processes that affect them21. This includes the
operation of the reforms to the Act’s sanctions regime introduced by the
Social Security Amendment Act 2012,
insofar as they apply to beneficiary parents
and caregivers of dependent children.22
17. The Expert Advisory Group on Solutions to Child Poverty (“EAG”) recognised that the social security policy must be implemented in a manner consistent with the welfare and best interests of the child, if child poverty is to be effectively alleviated in New Zealand. The EAG considered that it was imperative that New Zealand’s social security legislation ensured that the best interests of the child were applied in all decision- making procedures that impacted upon the household income of beneficiary
households with children.
20 ICESCR Article 10.3, UNCROC Article 26
21 UNCROC Article 3.1
22 Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) has raised concerns regarding a lack of transparency regarding the use of
sanctions, particularly in respect of the impact of sanctions on the well-being of affected children, see CPAG (2013) Benefit Sanctions: Creating an invisible underclass of children p 15-16, http://www.cpag.org.nz/assets/Backgrounders/2-
0%2028509%20Benefit%20Sanctions%20Report%20Sept%202013.pdf
18. The EAG accordingly recommended that section 1B of the Social Security
Act be amended to include a requirement that all persons
carrying out functions
under the Act give primary consideration to the best interests of the child when
doing so23, a position supported by the Commission in previous
submissions to this Committee.
Predictive risk modelling
19. Furthermore, the human rights implications of social security policy
extend beyond income-related economic and social rights.
Evolving technology is
leading to the introduction of new information-based service delivery
mechanisms, such as predictive risk
modelling, in the social sector. For
example, the draft Approved Information Sharing Agreement (AISA) released by MSD
for public
consultation earlier this year seeks to enable the use of predictive
risk modelling techniques designed to underpin the expanded
Youth Service
programme 24.
20. The use of AISAs (which override the standard protections set out in the
Information Privacy Principles of the Privacy Act) to
enable predictive risk
modelling in the social security sector raises human rights considerations
regarding both the right to privacy
and the right to social security. UN treaty
bodies have held that:
a. Individuals have the right to ascertain what information is being held by public authorities, for what purpose, and have the right to correct or eliminate incorrect information held by those authorities.25
b. Qualifying criteria must be reasonable, proportionate and
transparent.26
21. In addition to its human rights implications, predictive risk modelling
raises important ethical considerations in terms of its
implementation and
use27. In the case of the draft
23 EAG (2012) Working Paper 10: Reforms to the tax, benefit and active employment system to reduce child poverty, Recommendation 3, p 7, http://www.occ.org.nz/assets/Uploads/EAG/Working-papers/No-10-Reforms-to-tax-benefit-and- employment-system.pdf
24 introduced by the Social Security (Extension of Young Persons Services and Remedial Matters) Amendment
Bill 2015 – the Bill extends the Youth Service programme from current its application to 16 and 17 year olds to
all 19 year-old beneficiaries with children and 18 and 19-year old beneficiaries without children who are considered at significant risk of long term welfare dependency
25 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 16 on the right to privacy (8 April 1988), para 11
26 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19 on the right to social security
(4 February 2008), para 24
27 Centre for Applied Research in Economics (2012) Vulnerable Children: Can administrative data be used to
identify children at risk of adverse outcomes? Department of Economics, University of Auckland – this research
was commissioned by MSD to investigate the use of predictive risk modelling in targeting early intervention
Youth Services AISA, there was no indication as to whether any ethical
evaluation of the risk modelling mechanism would take place,
nor was there any
indication of whether an ethical framework will be developed to guide agencies
in their assessment of risk scores
and subsequent
responses28.
22. The Commission notes that MSD has recently stated in its response to the
List of Issues prepared by the UN Committee on the Rights
of the Child for the
Government’s upcoming 5th periodic UNCROC review, that it is
developing a “Privacy, Human Rights and Ethics Framework” that will
govern its operational
use of predictive modelling.29
23. The Commission welcomes this development. However, the example of
predictive risk modelling illustrates the desirability of having
human rights
principles reflected in the purposive provisions of primary legislation, so that
human rights compliant policy and practice
occurs as a matter of course, rather
than through ad hoc responses.
24. The Commission accordingly recommends that:
a. Clause 3(a) of the Bill is amended to include a new clause 3(a)(iv)
that provides that a purpose of the Act is to protect and
progressively realise
the Government’s human rights obligations, including (but not limited
to):
(i) The reduction and alleviation of hardship due to income poverty and material deprivation.
(ii) The promotion of social inclusion.
b. Clause 4 of the Bill is amended to include a new clause 4(f) in order
to establish a requirement that any person performing or
exercising a duty,
function, or power under this Act must have regard to the Government’s
human rights obligations, including
the welfare and best interests of
any
and reducing child and neglect. CARE found that, in that case, implementation should be subject to a full ethical evaluation, development of an ethical framework to guide agencies in how they should respond to risk scores, strong engagement from front-line providers and staff and careful, deliberate and phased implementation
28 The Human Rights Commission pointed this omission out in its email submission to MSD dated 6 May 2016.
The Commission also recommended that the AISA include a clause mandating the development of an ethical framework for agencies.
29 MSD, New Zealand Government response to the list of issues in relation to the Fifth Periodic Report under the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, June 2016, para 63
child or vulnerable adult who may be affected, directly or indirectly, by
the exercise of a duty, power or function under the Act.
Human rights implications – discrimination
Attorney-General’s report – Supported Living
Payment
25. In his report on the consistency of the Bill with the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA), the Attorney-General states
that “eligibility
for benefits, and obligations on beneficiaries are inherently discriminatory as
they are drawing distinctions
on a number of grounds of prohibited
discrimination.”30
26. However, while eligibility requirements require distinctions to be made,
it should be emphasised that the overall purpose of a
social security system is
redistributive and aimed at alleviating poverty and achieving social inclusion,
as the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has held
31. The Committee has described the right to social security as being
of central importance in guaranteeing human dignity for all persons
when they
are faced with circumstances that deprive them of their capacity to fully
realise their economic, social and cultural rights32.
27. The Attorney-General characterises the purpose of New Zealand’s
social security legislation in somewhat different terms,
yet concludes that in
order to meet this overarching purpose, the distinctions contained in the Bill
are justifiable for the purposes
of NZBORA, with one exception. That exception
regards clause 33 of the Bill which provides that those who have a restricted
work
capacity, due to injury, health or disability, or who are totally
blind.
28. The Attorney-General finds that clause 33 constitutes advantageous treatment for people who are totally blind as compared to other people with disabilities, thereby constituting unlawful discrimination under a 19 of NZBORA in such a way that is not justifiable.33 People who are totally blind qualify for the SLP as of right and are entitled to receive the SLP in full, without abatement as a result of other income, as well as an
additional allowance known as the blind subsidy.
30 Report of the Attorney General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act on the Social Security Legislation
Rewrite Bill, 8 March 2016 (hereafter ‘AG report’ para 10, p 2
31 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19 on the right to social security,
para 3
32 Ibid para 1
33 AG report, paras 12, 19, 28
29. Part of the rationale for this finding is that, due to advances in
technology and support mechanisms, there is no longer any
“needs-based”
justification for distinguishing the eligibility of
totally blind people34, as compared to other people with disabilities
- who must be able to prove, among other things, a severe restriction to their
capacity
to work which necessitates that they are unable to work for more than
15 hours per week. The Attorney-General’s report refers
to an estimate
from MSD that 60 percent of the 1049 totally blind people currently in receipt
of the SLP would no longer be eligible
for the SLP if their distinctive
eligibility criteria did not exist.35
30. Given that one of the human rights elements of a social security system
is to promote social inclusion, the Commission considers
the main human rights
issue with the SLP criteria is not so much about the nature of the entitlements
for blind people and whether
these are unduly advantageous, it is about whether
the SLP is consistent with the principle of reasonable accommodation under the
UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD) in the way that it applies
to all people with disabilities.
31. The UNCPRD defines reasonable accommodation as “necessary and
appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate
or
undue burden...to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise
on an equal basis with others of all human rights
and fundamental
freedoms.”36.
32. Article 5.3 of the CRPD goes on to provide that in order to promote
equality and eliminate discrimination State Parties “shall
take all
appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.”
Article 28 of the CRPD further provides that
States Parties have an obligation
to ensure that people with disabilities realise their rights to social
protection and an adequate
standards of living, without discrimination, thus
implicitly incorporating the principle of reasonable accommodation.
33. The rigid eligibility criteria of the SLP under clause 34 of the Bill does not reflect the principle of reasonable accommodation under the UNCRPD. There is no provision for any administrative discretion to make the “necessary and appropriate modifications and adjustments” that are required to ensure that people with disabilities are accorded their right to social security. “Bright line” policies, such the 15-hour threshold under
clause 34(3), may be more expeditious for a government to implement and
administer,
34 AG report, para 26-28; also see the RIS at para 31
35 Para 16
36 CRPD Art 2
but may be problematic when assessed against the reasonable accommodation
principle.
34. The Commission notes MSDs position that the SLP policy regarding people
who are totally blind is an “anomaly” and
its recommendation that it
be removed. The Commission further notes MSDs indication that any change is
intended to be introduced
following future revisions to the Disability Action
Plan.37.
35. Given this context, the Commission would encourage the Social Services
Committee to approach the issues raised by the Attorney-General
and the RIS
about the SLP through the lens of reasonable accommodation under the CRPD.
Retrogressive measures are clearly undesirable
and are inconsistent with human
rights standards as regards social security policy. Accordingly, consideration
ought to be given
to whether the current policy is sufficiently designed and
nuanced to enable full consistency with the Government’s human rights
obligations under the CRPD.
36. The Commission accordingly recommends that the Social Services
Committee reviews whether the qualifying criteria for the SLP under
clause 34 of
the Bill adequately reflects the “reasonable accommodation”
requirements of the CRPD.
Overseas pensions – s 70
37. Over the years, the Commission has received numerous discrimination
complaints regarding the effect of s 70 of the Social Security
Act on the
superannuation entitlements of New Zealand residents who have an overseas
pension, with 86 complaints received from
29 May 2000 to 29 May 2016.38
Section 70 provides that such persons shall have their superannuation
entitlements reduced by the amount of the overseas pension,
or an amount
determined by MSD.
38. In practice, section 70 applies to government-administered schemes, other than
Government Occupational Pensions (where the person has worked for, or been in
the service of, an overseas government) including those
where the pension
comprises
37 RIS, paras 62 and 63
38 In addition, the Office of Human Rights Proceedings is currently providing representation to a number of
people for the purposes of bringing a claim in respect to whether the spousal deductions clause under s 7 0 constitutes unlawful discrimination under the Human Rights Act. The matter is currently at a preliminary stage, with proceedings yet to be filed in the Human Rights Review Tribunal.
purely of monies contributed by the individual. It does not apply to
privately managed schemes.
39. The Courts have held that whether or not an overseas government has
contributed to the funding of a pension scheme is irrelevant
to a s 70
enquiry39 although they have also noted that it “might be seen
as an unhappy policy choice that a self-funded scheme administered by a
foreign
Government is treated one way, and a self-funded scheme administered by a
private body is treated another...Parliament evidently
has remained content with
its choice.”40
40. In addition, in its report Human Rights in New Zealand 2010, the
Commission noted that “concerns had been raised about inequities and
anomalies resulting from s 70 of the Social Security
Act”41 and
has previously made submissions to the Social Services Committee on its
effect.42
41. The Commission notes that clauses 173-175 of the Bill updates the current
scheme under s 70 of the Act and, while the new clauses
do not introduce
substantive changes, they are considerably clearer.
42. Clause 413 of the Bill also provides that regulations may be issued that
prescribe categories of overseas pensioners with whom
MSD may enter into
arrangements. The development of new regulations under this clause will provide,
among other things, an opportunity
to address some of the current anomalies and
inequities that the Commission and the Courts have commented on, including the
evident
inequity between the treatment of people who have self-funded their
overseas pensions privately or through a government-administered
scheme.
43. Given the ongoing complaints the Commission receives regarding the
inequitable impact of current policy, we would welcome the
opportunity to
provide MSD with input. The Commission would also recommend that the Social
Services Committee closely monitors the
development of regulations under clause
413.
44. In light of the historical issues regarding the treatment of New
Zealand residents with overseas pensions under s 70 of the Act,
the Commission
recommends that
39 Latimer v Chief Executive of MSD [2015] NZHC 2779 at [21]
40 Boljevic v Chief Executive of MSD [2012] NZAR 280 (HC) per Kos J at [35]
41 Chapter 15, p 227
42 Human Rights Commission on Social Assistance (Payment of New Zealand Superannuation and Veterans
Pension Overseas) Amendment Bill 2009
the Social Services Committee considers the equity and fairness of the
current policy settings reflected in clause 173-175 of the
Bill.
Policy updates
Amending and renaming existing benefits
45. Clause 59 introduces a new benefit named the “Exceptional
Circumstances Benefit” (‘ECB’) to replace the
current
emergency benefit under s 61 of the Act. The qualifying criteria for the ECB on
their face is less prescriptive. The benefit
rate remains at the discretion of
MSD. Clause 59 also introduces a discretionary work-test obligation, and
sanctions will be able
to be imposed for non-compliance. Social obligations in
respect of dependent children (as regards attendance at school and early
childhood education) also apply to recipients of the ECB under clause 114 of the
Bill.
46. Clauses 42 to 44 introduce a Supported Child Payment (SCP) to replace the
previous orphans benefit (OB) and unsupported child
benefit (UCB) set out under
ss 28-31 of the current Act. The amendments consolidate the current entitlements
under those benefits
and replace their outdated terminology. The Bill, however
removes the current entitlement of step-parents to receive the orphans
benefit,
consistent with the current UCB eligibility criteria. The RIS considered that
while extending SCP eligibility would be fair
and transparent, step-parents are,
like other parents, eligible for income support through their own benefit or
through the Working
for Families tax credits, essentially leading to a dual
entitlement not available to other parents43. Transitional provisions
of the Bill, however, enable step-parents currently receiving the OB to continue
to do so and provides that
OB applications made before the legislative
changeover will be determined as SCP applications using the criteria under the
1964 Act.44
47. The impact of these amendments is difficult to predict. While they do not appear to introduce a significantly narrowing or broadening of eligibility criteria, it will be critical that their introduction does not have a detrimental impact on current and future recipients. In the case of the ECB, it will be particularly important that the exercise of administrative discretion is guided by the application of human rights principles. We accordingly reiterate our recommendation at paragraph 24b above that the Bill include
a principle under clause 4 that any person performing or exercising a
duty, function, or
43 RIS para 139
44 Schedule 1, clauses 4, 5, 7
power under its auspices must be required have regard to the
Government’s human
rights obligations when doing so.
Redirecting benefits
48. Clause 421(2)(a) enables regulations to be developed to specify
circumstances in which payments made to a beneficiary may be redirected
with or
without good cause, or with or without the beneficiary’s consent. The
Commission is concerned by the approach taken
by the Bill and notes that the
policy rationale for this reform is not explained in the Bill’s
Explanatory Note.
49. Part 3 of the RIS covers this aspect of the reform in some detail. The
RIS notes that redirection of benefits to third parties
to manage are “a
useful tool for enabling clients to budget within their benefit
income...”.45 The RIS points to UK research that indicates that
the redirection of benefit income can have positive effects (such as enabling
management
of debt and avoiding creditor sanctions) and negative effects (for
example, leaving low income households with insufficient finances
to cover
household expenses.46
50. What is clear, however, is that the redirection of income without good
cause or consent raises human rights considerations, particularly
where doing so
would impact detrimentally on the subject’s economic right to an adequate
standard of living.
51. The RIS indicates that the rationale for clause 421 appears largely to
underpin current redirection practices that are undertaken
to pay social housing
rent. The RIS goes on to state that, in terms of rights compliance, “we
[MSD] consider that the approach
in the case of social housing is
justifiable...we have confidence in the advice on the [NZBORA] compatibility in
part because the
Ministry and its legal representatives have had success in
defending policies that have been the subject of
complaints.”47
52. That may well be the case but we would expect a more robust approach to
developing human rights consistent policy.
53. Clause 421 is open-ended in terms of its application and does not
include any reference to social housing. Likewise, the Bill’s
Explanatory
Note does not refer to any
45 RIS, para 91
46 RIS, para 92
47 RIS, para 115
intention for the provision to be primarily directed towards this purpose. In
addition, the
Attorney-General does not appear to have specifically considered clause 421
in his s
7 report.
54. The Commission considers that the Bill’s overall approach to the
redirection of benefit income under clause 421 does not
appear to conform with
the human rights requirement that social security qualifying criteria is
reasonable, proportionate and transparent.48 The approach is also
inconsistent with the Explanatory Note’s statement of intent that
“matters relating to human rights
and freedoms” and
“provisions that confer economic rights” will be included in primary
legislation.
55. The Commission considers that the development and implementation of any
regulatory framework under clause 421 of the Bill should
be consistent with
human rights standards and principles. The issues arising from clause 421
further emphasises the importance of
ensuring that the purposive provisions of
the Bill under clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill expressly obligate human rights
consistent policy
development, implementation and administrative
decision-making.
56. The Commission accordingly recommends that:
a. The Committee reviews clause 421 and considers the extent to which
redirection provisions ought to be included in primary legislation,
given the
human rights implications.
b. That “without good cause” is deleted from clause
421(2)(a). The Commission notes that the RIS does not appear to identify
or
analyse any circumstance where the use of redirection without good cause can be
justified.
48 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 19 on the right to social security,
4 February 2008, E/C.12/GC/19, para 24
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