Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
New Zealand Human Rights Commission Submissions |
Last Updated: 9 March 2016
Human Rights Commission: Submission on the Independent Review of
Intelligence and Security Services
To: Sir Michael Cullen and Dame Patsy Reddy - The Reviewers,
Independent Review of Intelligence and Security Services
And to: Ministry of Justice
Date: 14 August 2015
Submission of Human Rights Commission
Independent Review of Intelligence and Security Services
14 August 2015
Introduction
1. The Human Rights Commission welcomes the opportunity to provide this
submission to the Independent Review of Intelligence and
Security Services
(‘the Review’). The Commission’s position can be summarised as
follows:
1.1 The Commission considers that there is a strong case for substantial
reform of New Zealand’s intelligence and security regime.
Such reform
should be guided by a principled yet pragmatic methodology that maximises public
trust and confidence in the operations
of our intelligence and securities
agencies. The Commission endorses the principles designed by David Anderson
QC 1 and the Independent Surveillance Review Panel 2
in their recent reviews of UK intelligence and security system as being
instructive for this purpose.
1.2 Accordingly, the Commission considers that the societal challenges
brought about by contemporary (and future) electronic
surveillance and data
interception technology requires that consideration be given to incorporating
the right to privacy into New
Zealand law through inclusion in the rights and
freedoms protected under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
2. The Commission’s specific recommendations for the Reviewers to
consider can be found at paragraph 19 below.
3. Human rights are of central importance when considering intelligence and
security policy, practice and legislation. The Commission
appreciates
the
1 David Anderson QC, A Question of Trust, Report of the Investigatory Powers Review, June
2015, https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp- content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Print-Version.pdf
2 Independent Surveillance Review, A Democratic License to Operate, Report of the
Independent Surveillance Review, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security
Studies, July 2015, https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/ISR-Report-press.pdf
interest the Reviewers have taken in this matter to date and welcomes any
opportunity for ongoing dialogue.
Initial Observations
4. Over the last two years, the role and functions of New Zealand’s
intelligence and security services have been subject to
an unprecedented
degree of public interest, judicial scrutiny and legislative reform. This
occurred against a backdrop of domestic
and international events that shone a
public spotlight on intelligence services, in particular their extensive mass
surveillance
and data interception capabilities. The Commission has taken a
close interest in these developments and their implications for human
rights in
New Zealand3.
5. The legal and operational functions of these essential services give rise
to human rights considerations that are fundamental
to the functions of
a modern democratic state. With this in mind, the Commission recommended in its
2013 report to the Prime
Minister that an independent review of New
Zealand’s intelligence and security regime take place4. The
Government has referred to the Commission’s recommendation, and
the subsequent legislative action it took
to establish the periodic review
process, in its sixth periodic report to the UN Human Rights Committee under the
International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights5.
6. The activities of intelligence and security agencies can be
described as having a two-fold effect on human rights. Firstly,
these
activities may limit the human rights of people in New Zealand, an
obvious example being the impact of surveillance
operations on the privacy
rights of affected persons. Conversely, the role and functions of intelligence
and security services enhance
the government’s capability of meeting its
human rights related duty to protect its people from harm.
3 For further detail, please refer to the bundle of Commission reports and related international materials dated 27 July 2015 provided to the Reviewers
4 Human Rights Commission, Report to the Prime Minister: Government Communications
Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill; Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security) Bill, and associated wider issues relating to surveillance and the human rights of people in New Zealand, 9 July 2013, para 49, p 12
5 New Zealand Government, New Zealand’s sixth periodic report under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2015, p 13, paras 83-88
7. This has led to a complex, polarised public debate, both in New Zealand
and internationally. In his review of the UK’s intelligence
and security
legislation, David Anderson QC described this debate as
“double-jointed”, dominated by the arguments of
law enforcement
officials and “securocrats” for more operational capability and
fewer restraints on the one hand; and
arguments by civil liberties advocates for
more safeguards and less capabilities on the other. Anderson comments that
“the
silent majority” (the general public) sit in between these
positions “in a state of some confusion.”6
8. At heart of this debate lies a perception that a trade-off is required
between privacy rights and rights related to personal security7 in
order to enable the operations of the intelligence and security services. The
Commission submits that such a characterisation is
too narrow. Instead, a
balanced position can be found within the human rights concepts and principles
that underpin the modern democratic
state8.
9. This balance has been explored in detail in the recent reports issued by
David Anderson QC and the Independent Surveillance
Review Panel (the
ISR Panel) 9 . The approaches taken in those reports are
instructive and of invaluable application to the New Zealand
context.
10. Anderson’s approach in balancing the complex and competing
sets of interests is to place the notion of trust at
the heart of the matter,
noting that “if one thing is for certain it is that the road to a
better system must be paved with trust.” The Commission considers
that, in order to earn the trust of the public, the
“trustworthiness” of laws, institutions and
practices is a matter of
paramount importance in this respect.
11. In order to achieve a more balanced, accessible system that more
effectively reflects and responds to the public interest, Anderson
recommends
that the
6 A Question of Trust, p 245, 13.1. 13.2
7 Such as the right to life and the right to personal security (Article 3 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and Articles 6 and 9.1 of the ICCPR)
8 For the historical context informing the Commission’s position, refer to speech by David Rutherford, Chief Commissioner, Protecting the balance: trust, confidence, privacy and intelligence, NZIP Annual Conference, 15 July 2015, https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/protecting-
balance-trust-confidence-privacy-and-intelligence/
9 The ISR Panel consisted of senior stakeholder representatives from across government, industry, civil society and Parliament – see A Democratic License to Operate, para 0.3
design and operation of intelligence and security legislation, policy
and practices reflect the following five inter-related
principles10:
• Minimise no-go areas
• Limited powers
• Rights compliance
• Clarity and transparency
• A unified approach
12. The ISR Panel frames the relationship between the public and
the government security and intelligence services within
concept of the
eponymous “democratic license to operate”, whereby the mandate of
the intelligence and security services
is derived from the consent of the people
through the democratic process.
13. The ISR Panel based the notion of a “democratic license to
operate” upon three distinct “deals”.11 The first
deal exists between citizen and state and must be reflected in a clear,
transparent legal framework and a coherent, visible
and effective oversight
regime. The second deal regards an improved “shared understanding”
between the government and
private sector as to the role internet and
telecommunications companies have to play in sustaining the essential principles
that
govern an open society. The third deal concerns the importance of
international harmonisation. This concept is particularly important
when
considering New Zealand’s role in the Five Eyes Alliance and its
obligations under international human rights treaties.
14. This approach provided the foundation for the ISR Panel’s
development of the following ten ‘tests’ with which
to measure the
potential intrusive impact of new legislation or regulations governing
intelligence and security powers. These tests
are:
• Rule of law
• Proportionality
• Necessity
10 A Question of Trust pp 246-255
11 A Democratic License to Operate, para 5.30-5.34
• Restraint
• Effective oversight
• Recognition of necessary secrecy
• Minimal secrecy
• Transparency
• Legislative clarity
• Multilateral collaboration
15. The Commission also wishes to emphasise the value of the recent work of
UN entities in defining the role of intelligence and security
services within
the terms of the international human rights framework. In particular, the
reports of UN Special Rapporteur Martin
Sheinin to UN Human Rights Council that
set out best practice guidelines 12 are particularly useful
points of reference against which intelligence and security policy and
legislation can be assessed.
Related issues outside the scope of the Review
16. The Commission notes that the 2013 and 2014 legislative reforms to intelligence and security law have avoided the issue of countering radicalism, nor has the use of ethnic or racial profiling in surveillance operations been directly addressed. The Commission considers that both civic education initiatives and community development approaches that avoid stigmatisation of particular communities are essential components of any security framework. These activities should have the ongoing resource and support required for them to flourish 13 . These measures are also an important component of Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which
calls upon States to14:
12 Human Rights Council, Reports of Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism – Ten areas of best practice in countering terrorism A/HRC/16/51, 22 December 2010; Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures that ensure respect for human rights by intelligence agencies while countering terrorism, including on their oversight, A/HRC/14/46, 17 May 2010
13 Speech by David Rutherford, Chief Commissioner, Protecting the balance: trust,
confidence, privacy and intelligence, NZIP Annual Conference, 15 July 2015, https://www.hrc.co.nz/news/protecting-balance-trust-confidence-privacy-and-intelligence/
14 United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, A/RES/60/288, 2006, Pillar 1, para 3
“promote a culture of peace, justice and human development, ethnic,
national and religious tolerance and respect for all religions,
religious
values, beliefs or cultures by establishing and encouraging, as
appropriate, education and public awareness programmes
involving all sectors
of society.”
17. The Commission also notes the ongoing challenge posed by the exponential
growth in the collection and use of personal data by
private sector entities.
The ISR Panel has noted that the public is as equally, if not more, concerned
about the use of personal
data by private companies as they are in respect of
government agencies15. The ISR Panel goes on to express its concern
that mass data collection and surveillance by private sector organisations are
“largely
overlooked in discussions of transparency”16.
While this concern falls outside the scope of this Review, the Commission
considers that the Review’s findings may
have the potential to model
best practice approaches that are of application across the public and private
sectors.
Summary of the Commission’s recommendations
18. The Commission has focused its submission at high-level issues arising
from the Review rather than statutory detail. A summary
of the
Commission’s positions on the various amendments to intelligence and
security legislation that have taken place
since 2013 can be found in the
annexure to this submission.
19. The Commission has accordingly formulated the following recommendations
for the Reviewers to consider:
a. That the Reviewers undertake a comprehensive review of New
Zealand’s intelligence and security legislation for consistency
with
international human rights law and norms.
b. That the Reviewers consider ways in which the clarity, accessibility
and structure of New Zealand’s intelligence and security
legislation can
be improved.
15 A Democratic License to Operate p 35, para 2.24
16 ibid p 44, para 2.53
c. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers consider the implications
that inclusion of the right to privacy in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act
would have for intelligence and security law, policy and
operations.
d. That the Reviewers investigate the implications of consolidating
the NZ legislative framework into a unified structure.
e. That the Reviewers investigate the implications of developing a
statutory Code of Practice for ensuring human rights compliance
by intelligence
and security agencies.
f. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers consider statutory
mechanisms (such as a statutory Code of Practice) for requiring
human rights
training for intelligence and security officials
g. That that the Reviewers investigate current and potential measures
which enable oversight mechanisms to assess intelligence and
security practices
against New Zealand’s domestic and international human rights
obligations.
h. That the Reviewers investigate the implications of consolidating
current oversight roles and functions into an independent
centralised judicial
entity such as an Intelligence and Security Commission.
20. The Commission’s position is set out in more detail below under
the following sections, based on the terms of reference
of the
Review:
• Part A: Concerning the adequacy of the current legislative
framework to protect NZ’s current and future national security, while
protecting
individual rights.
• Part B: Concerning the current oversight arrangements and whether these provide sufficient safeguards at an operational, judicial and
political level to ensure that NZSIS and GCSB act lawfully and
maintain public confidence.
21. As regards the Review’s matters of particular focus, the Commission
has previously stated its position on the Countering
Foreign Terrorist Fighters
legislation sunset clause and the definition of “private
communications” under the GCSB Act
in its submissions on those pieces of
legislation. These positions are referenced in the annexure to the submission.
The Commission
does not intend to expand on those positions further in this
submission.
PART A: The legislative framework
22. The legislative framework governing New Zealand’s intelligence and
security sector is complex and spread over a number of
relatively obscure
legislative instruments. The statutory structures and terminology used are, for
the most part, highly technical
and lack unifying guidelines or a code of
practice. As a result, the legislative framework is relatively impenetrable and
inaccessible
to members of the public.
23. This is perhaps reflective of the ad hoc way in which the legislature has
responded to the intelligence and security sector’s
evolving policy and
operational objectives over the years. While this is not unique to
New Zealand, this is not a desirable
situation. In his analysis of the UK
legislative framework, Anderson notes:
“Obscure laws – and there are few more impenetrable than RIPA
and its satellites [the UK equivalents] corrode democracy because neither
the public...nor the legislators...truly understand what they
mean.”17
24. The Commission considers Anderson’s five inter-related principles – minimising no-go areas, limiting powers, rights compliance, clarity and transparency and a unified approach - provide invaluable guidance when approaching the complex and competing sets of interests that must be taken into account when contemplating the design and utility of intelligence and
security legislation.
17 A Question of Trust p 253
Minimising no-go areas and limiting powers
25. Anderson characterises the above two principles as
follows:
• In order for a system to be trusted, it must be fair and effective.
No-go areas should be minimised as much as possible,
whether in the physical or
digital world.
• That intelligence and security powers are limited in the interests
of privacy
26. The operation of intelligence and security legislation has inherent
implications for the privacy of individuals. This, in turn,
gives rise to
democratic concerns. As the ISR has noted, the individual’s right to
privacy, while not an absolute right, is
a pre-requisite in a functioning modern
democracy and provides the basis for freedom, personal autonomy and personal
expression18.
27. While a free-standing right to privacy is not expressly contained in the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the right is guaranteed
under international
human rights law by way of Article 17 of the ICCPR, which provides
that:
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
nor to unlawful
attacks on his honour and reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks
28. Rapid advancements in electronic mass surveillance and data interception are highlighting the difficulties New Zealand’s domestic human rights law has in responding to emerging challenges brought about by 21st century information technology. The absence in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of a right to privacy, analogous to that guaranteed under Article 17 of the ICCPR, inhibits the current statutory compliance and oversight provisions
from taking into account the impact of intelligence and security powers
on a
18 A Democratic License to Operate, p 31, para 2.10,
person’s right to privacy (see paragraph 49 below). While the Privacy
Act
1993 regulates the collection and use of personal information, it is not
underpinned (or empowered) by a presumptive statutory right
to
privacy.
29. Accordingly, the Commission would encourage the Reviewers to give some
consideration to this issue. The Commission considers that
the inclusion of a
right to privacy in the NZBORA is entirely appropriate in the contemporary
context and would render it more consistent
with the objectives stated in its
long title, which are:
(a)to affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms
in
New Zealand; and
(b)to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights
30. In its 2014 report to the UN General Assembly, The Right to Privacy in
the Digital Age19, the Office of the UN High Commissioner (OHCHR)
has noted that any legal limitations to the right to privacy under Article 17 of
the ICCPR must be:
...sufficiently accessible, clear and precise so that an individual may
look to the law and ascertain who is authorized to conduct
data surveillance and
under what circumstances. The limitation must be necessary for reaching a
legitimate aim, as well as in proportion
to the aim and the least intrusive
option available.20
31. The principles of necessity and proportionality are therefore crucial
human rights concepts21 when considering the powers and
jurisdictional scope of our intelligence and securities agencies.
19 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, June 2014, A/HRC/27/37
20 ibid para 23, p 8
21And are not only limited to the right to privacy under Article 17. For example, Article 12.3 of the ICCPR provides for a restriction on the right to freedom of movement on the grounds of national security; an issue of direct relevance to the amendments to the Passport Act 1992 made under the Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters legislation. In its General Comment No
27 on the right to freedom of movement under Article 12, the UN Human Rights Committee
has found that in order to comply with Art 12.3 any such restrictions must be
necessary to protect their aim and adhere to the principle
of proportionality.
See CCPR/C/21/Rev 1/Add 9 paras 11-18
32. The OHCHR suggests that the onus is upon governments to demonstrate that
powers that interfere with individual privacy are both
necessary and
proportionate to address the specific risk. Without these precepts, the
activities of government intelligence
agencies, such as mass surveillance
programmes risk arbitrariness, even if they serve a legitimate aim and are
vested under an accessible
legal regime22.
33. Further to this point, both the ISR Panel and Anderson
reinforce “the articulation of enduring principles”
as a key
component of any intelligence and security regime. The ISR Panel goes on to
recommend the development of statutory Codes
of Practice, written in plain
accessible language, that include details of the technical implementation and
application of governing
legislation23.
34. The Commission endorses this approach. New Zealand’s disparate
legislative framework lacks a coherent set of principles
that guide consistent
practices or set appropriate parameters of implementation.
35. Rebecca Kitteridge indirectly identified this concern in her March 2013
report Review of Compliance of the Government Communications Security
Bureau. Ms Kitteridge recommended the development of a
“comprehensive compliance framework” for the GCSB. In coming
to this
recommendation, Ms Kitteridge observed:
“I would argue that GCSB [is at the] high-risk end of the compliance spectrum. Its powerful capabilities and intrusive statutory powers may only be utilised for certain purposes. The necessarily secret nature of its capabilities and activities prevents the sort of transparency that would usually apply to a public sector organisation. It is therefore imperative that the public be able to trust that those exercising the powers are doing so only in the way authorised
by Parliament. A robust compliance regime, including visibly
demanding
22 A/HRC/27/37 para 25, p 9
23 A Democratic License to Operate, Recommendation 2
external reporting and oversight, should provide considerable assurance to
the public.” 24
36. A statutory Code of Practice that applies across the intelligence and
security sector has the potential to provide a stronger
protective mechanism
against intrusive practices or “jurisdiction creep” than a
policy-level compliance framework.
37. In addition, the Commission agrees with Anderson’s position that
arbitrary distinctions should not be drawn between content
data and
communications data (meta-data). Instead, what is important is that such data
may only be accessed pursuant to properly
authorised requests, based on clear
laws that are subject to independent judicial
oversight.25
Rights compliance
38. In recent submissions, the Commission has identified a number of concerns
about the potential impact on human rights of the recent
tranche of reforms to
New Zealand’s intelligence and security laws26.
39. The Commission has accordingly proposed that intelligence and
security legislation includes both explicit reference to
human rights principles
and places an onus on officials to respect human rights in the course of
implementing their statutory duties.27
40. This approach reflects international human rights standards articulated in a number of recent UN reports and General Assembly resolutions28. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, for example, has proposed
a number of practice standards that include:
24 Rebecca Kitteridge, Review of Compliance of the Government Communications Security Bureau para 38, p 20, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/assets/GCSB-Compliance-Review/Review-of- Compliance.pdf
25 A Question of Trust para 13.12-13.14
26 See Human Rights Commission, Reports and related materials on intelligence and security policy, 27 July 2015
27 Human Rights Commission, Briefing to DPMC, para 2.4
28 Such as General Assembly Resolution 68/178 on the Protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism and
Resolution
67/167 concerning.the right to privacy in the digital age
• That all intelligence services are constituted through publicly available laws that comply with international human rights law29.
• That intelligence services are prohibited from undertaking any action that contravenes international human rights law30.
• That intelligence services and their oversight institutions take
steps to foster an institutional culture based on respect
for human rights,
including training members on the relevant provisions of international human
rights law.31
41. Furthermore, the OHCHR has observed a disconnect between the “clear
and universal” framework for the promotion and
protection of privacy under
international human rights law and the inadequacy of the legislative frameworks
of many States in providing
safeguards and accountability for privacy
violations32.
42. The OHCHR has also identified a “clear and pressing need for
vigilance” in ensuring that surveillance policies and
practices comply
with international human rights law. Accordingly, the OHCHR has recommended that
States review their national laws,
policies and practices to ensure full
conformity with international human rights law, and address any shortcomings
through the adoption
of a clear, precise, accessible, comprehensive and non-
discriminatory legislative framework33.
43. This Review provides an important opportunity for this type of human
rights stock-take to take place. This should also include
consideration of
whether a specific statutory mechanism is required to ensure human rights
compliant policy and practice. With
this in mind, the Commission
considers that a statutory Code of Practice could provide a basis for
incorporating into legislation
a set of human rights-complaint principles and
related values that underpin national security policy and practice.
44. Further to this point, the UN Special Rapporteur Scheinin has
observed that:
29 A/HRC/14/46, Practice 4, p 7
30 ibid, Practice 5
31 A/HRC/14/46, ibid, Practice 19, p 17
32 A/HRC/27/37, para 47
33 ibid para 50
“...it is good practice for national security and its constituent
values to be clearly defined in legislation adopted by parliament.
This is
important for ensuring that intelligence services confine their activities to
helping safeguard values that are enshrined
in a public definition of national
security...In many areas, safeguarding national security necessarily includes
the protection of
the population and its human rights; indeed a number of States
explicitly include the protection of human rights as one of the core
functions
of their intelligence services.”34
Clarity and transparency
45. The recent reviews of the UK’s intelligence and security apparatus
have emphasised the importance of having a
clear, consistent
legislative framework that is coherent, transparent and accessible. As Anderson
notes:
“The fact that the subject matter is technical is no excuse for
obscurity. It should be possible to set out a series of limited
powers,
safeguards and review mechanisms with a high degree of clarity and... without
technical jargon”.35
46. Similarly, the ISR Panel lists “legislative clarity” as one
of its ten tenets for testing legislation for intrusions
against privacy, noting
that while such legislation is not likely to be simple, it must be:
“clearly explained in Codes of Practice that have Parliamentary
approval, are kept up-to-date and are accessible to citizens,
the private
sector, foreign governments and practitioners
alike”.36
47. UN reports also emphasise the importance of clear, accessible legislative language. UN Special Rapporteur Frank La Rue has recommended that legal
frameworks governing communications surveillance measures meet
“a
34 A/HRC/14/46 p 5, 6 (such as Switzerland, Croatia and Brazil)
35 A Question of Trust, para 13.33
36 A Democratic License to Operate, p xiv
standard of clarity and precision that is sufficient to ensure that
individuals have advance notice of and can forsee their
application.”37
48. The Commission is of the view that the statutory language in New
Zealand’s intelligence and security legislation is often
less than clear
or precise. In particular, the Commission has noted its concern that important
terminology, such as the definition
of “private communications”
under s 4 of the GCSB Act, is vague and risks undermining reasonable
expectations of privacy38.
49. Another related example is the requirement under s 8D(1)(a) of the GCSB
Act that the GCSB deliver its functions in a “human
rights standards
recognized by New Zealand law”, which is ambiguous as to whether this
includes ratified international human
rights treaties. This is a crucial issue
when considering the obligations that the GCSB has with regards to the right to
privacy,
a right that is guaranteed in international human rights law under
Article 17 of the ICCPR, but conspicuously absent from the NZBORA.
A unified approach
50. Consideration could also be given to consolidation of the disparate
collection of statutes that currently make up New Zealand’s
intelligence
and security framework.
51. Anderson has notably recommended the consolidation of the UK’s
similarly disparate legislative framework into a single body
of law with a
single system of oversight that applies across the investigatory and
intelligence agencies39.
52. This approach has been largely endorsed by the other contemporaneous UK
reviews. The ISR Panel, for example, has endorsed Anderson’s
conclusions
and recommended the development of a comprehensive new law that consolidates
existing statutes. The Intelligence and
Security Committee of the UK Parliament
also proposed, at an earlier stage, a similar unified approach.
37 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression Frank La Rue, A/HRC/23/40, 17 April 2013, para 83, p
21
38 Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, paras 27-28
39 A Question of Trust, para 13.44
53. The Commission also endorses the consideration of a similar
unified approach for New Zealand’s legislative
framework. An
exhaustive, transparent, rights-compliant unified statutory regime of the kind
envisaged by Anderson40 would constitute a significant improvement
on the structure and accessibility of the current regime and would adhere more
closely
to international human rights practice
standards.41
PART A - RECOMMENDATIONS: The legislative framework
a. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers undertake a comprehensive
review of New Zealand’s intelligence and security
legislation for
consistency with international human rights law and norms.
b. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers consider ways in which
the clarity, accessibility and structure of New Zealand’s
intelligence and
security legislation can be improved.
c. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers consider the implications
that inclusion of the right to privacy in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act
would have for intelligence and security law, policy and
operations.
d. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers investigate the
implications of consolidating the NZ legislative framework into
a unified
structure.
e. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers investigate the
implications of developing a statutory Code of Practice for ensuring
human
rights compliance by intelligence and security agencies.
f. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers consider statutory mechanisms (such as a statutory Code of Practice) for requiring
human rights training for intelligence and security
officials.
40 A Question of Trust, para 12.45
41 A/HRC/14/46, p 6, Practice 2
Part B: Oversight mechanisms
54. Oversight mechanisms are crucial components of a human rights compliant
intelligence and security system. They have a critical
safeguarding role in
ensuring that powers are applied lawfully and in conformity with the
State’s human rights obligations.
55. In most jurisdictions, oversight of the intelligence and security
services is carried out in a multi-lateral way by a combination
of institutions
located within the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government.
While there is no single model for
intelligence oversight, effective systems
will include the following features42:
• Specialised oversight institutions with mandates and powers based on publicly available law.
• At least one civilian institution that is independent of both the intelligence services and the executive.
• A combined remit of oversight that covers all aspects of the work of intelligence agencies, including compliance with the law, including human rights, as well as administrative, financial and operative performance.
• Power, resources and expertise to initiate and conduct
investigations
• Measures necessary to protect classified information and
data accessed as a result of oversight work.
56. Among these functions, the independent scrutiny of compliance with laws
and human rights obligations is a particularly important
aspect of the
intelligence and security system’s public mandate. As UN Special
Rapporteur Sheinin has noted43:
Intelligence oversight institutions serve to foster public trust and confidence in the work of intelligence services by ensuring they perform their statutory functions in accordance with respect for the rule of law and human rights.
57. In New Zealand, these oversight institutions and their functions are
spread over a number of statutes and are relatively disjointed,
in reflection of
the current nature of the legislative framework. The Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Security primarily
has the role of providing
independent review of the compliance of intelligence and security agencies with
their legal functions,
and can receive complaints regarding individual cases.
The Commissioner of Security Warrants, a retired High Court judge, is charged
with authorising applications for warrants44 under the New Zealand
Security Intelligence Service Act 1969 and interception warrants (in conjunction
with the Minister) under the
GCSB Act45. Parliamentary oversight is
provided by the Intelligence and Security Committee46.
58. It is notable that none of these institutions are expressly required to have any consideration of New Zealand’s international human rights obligations, which serves to highlight the absence of the ICCPR Article 17 right to privacy from the NZBORA. The Inspector-General, the oversight mechanism responsible for compliance, is not explicitly required to regularly review operational policy and practice against human rights obligations or consider human rights impact 47 , although they may consult with a Human Rights Commissioner
when carrying out any of their inquiry, complaint and review
functions48. The
Inspector-General is also required to review the ‘legal
compliance” of intelligence and securities agencies, however
the
statutory language indicates that this review function is limited to domestic
law.49
59. Furthermore, the Inspector-General’s complaints inquiry
functions are reasonably limited. The Inspector-General
does not appear to
have any authority to inquire into complaints regarding groups of people or
systemic practices (such as racial
or ethnic profiling for example), nor do they
have jurisdiction to issue remedies to individual complainants. Redress is
limited
to the issue of a report that is furnished to the Minister and the
agency chief
44 And providing authorisation for warrantless surveillance under s 41E(2)
45 Section 15B
46 The Commission supports the establishment of a Parliamentary Select Committee with cross-party political membership, see Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, p
13, para 55(a)
47 Section 11(1) Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act
48 Section 12 Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act
executive.50 Complainants have no right of access to that report.
Instead, the Inspector-General is merely obliged to notify the complainant of
their conclusions in limited terms51.
60. New Zealand’s oversight mechanisms therefore have limitations
when it comes to monitoring human rights compliance.
The Commission has
previously raised concern that the 2013 amendments did not establish an
oversight regime sufficient to assure
the public that appropriate scrutiny and
supervision will occur.52
61. In the UK, the Anderson report has recommended the consolidation of three
independent oversight entities into one centralized
Commission, entitled the
Independent Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC). The ISIC
model proposed by Anderson
merges a number of judicial and bureaucratic
functions together under the same roof, including:
• Warrant oversight and authorisation (to be undertaken by
Judicial
Commissioners)
• Capacity to carry out own-motion inquiries
• Review and monitoring
• Audit and inspection of intelligence and security
services
62. Anderson proposes that the strong, centralized ISIC model brings a number
of advantages due to its greater size and unified nature.
This includes having
much broader monitoring and investigation capabilities and a greater public
profile.53
63. The IRS Panel has similarly recommended that a consolidated approach is taken through the creation of a National Intelligence and Surveillance Office (NISO). However, unlike Anderson’s proposal, the Judicial Commissioners who authorise and oversee that warrant process remain independent from the
NISO54.
50 ibid s 25
51 ibid
52 Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, para 42, p 11
53 A Question of Trust, para 14.97
54 A Democratic License to Operate, Recommendations 17-19, p xviii
64. The ISR Panel notes that a clear oversight regime is an essential aspect
of maintaining public trust and confidence in intelligence
and security
services. Complex, obscure legal frameworks and institutions do not tend to
serve the public well as they are difficult
for the public to identify and
access.55
65. The Commission considers that the strong, centralised institutional
models envisaged in the ISIC and NISO models ought
to be considered
for adaptation in New Zealand. The Commission considers that the current
“sole office-holder” approach
taken in New Zealand risks
having insufficient capacity to undertake a suitably broad range of oversight
functions56.
66. New Zealand is a small country and lacks the necessary level of
resources, infrastructure and service demand to justify an entity
on the scale
of Anderson’s ISIC model. Our current oversight regime is far more minimal
in terms of personnel and institutional
scope than the UK’s incumbent
model. Notwithstanding these inherent limitations, the notion of an independent
Intelligence
and Security Commission consisting of judicial commissioners that
places the current Inspector-General and Commissioner for Security
Warrants
functions under one roof has some merit.
67. Such an approach may work to improve the institutional strength, scope
and independence of New Zealand’s oversight regime.
This approach would
also complement a more integrated or unified legislative framework and the
development of a statutory Code of
Practice.
Part B: RECOMMENDATIONS – Oversight mechanisms
g. The Commission recommends that the Reviewers investigate current and potential measures which enable oversight mechanisms to assess intelligence and security practices against New Zealand’s
domestic and international rights
obligations.
55 ibid para 4.42-4.43
56 see also Human Rights Commission, Report to Prime Minister, p 7, para 29
h. The Reviewers investigate the implications of consolidating current
oversight roles and functions into an independent centralised
judicial
entity such as an Intelligence and Security Commission
David Rutherford
Chief Commissioner
Contact Persons: John Hancock, Senior Legal and Policy Analyst
Janet Anderson-Bidois, Legal, Research and
Monitoring Manager
ANNEXURE: Human Rights Commission – Submission on the Independent
Review of Intelligence and Security Services
Table: Comparison of recent reforms to legislative framework of
intelligence and security services with domestic and international
human rights
obligations and principles
Legislation
|
Domestic human
rights laws engaged
|
International
human rights treaties engaged
|
UN Principles/commentary
|
Comments of HRC
|
Passports Act
Effect of reforms:1
Enables the Minister of Internal Affairs to cancel or refuse to issue a
passport on grounds of national security if there are reasonable
grounds to
believe the person poses a danger to the security of another country
|
New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA)
Section 18(3) – right to freedom of movement
Section 27 – right to natural justice (as regards ability to
challenge Minister’s decision)
|
International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
Article 12.2 – freedom to leave any country including
one’s own
Article 12.3 – no restriction on right to freedom of
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010, A/HRC/16/512:
UN General Assembly Resolution
68/1783:
|
The situation of NZ passport
holders who have had their passports cancelled while out of NZ is not
clear.5 A solution may be establishing criteria for the provision of
emergency travel documents.6
Time limitations for lodging an appeal may create problems for persons out
of the country to activate the appeal process.7
|
1 Passport Amendment Act 2014 - enacted 12 December 2014 (by way of Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters Bill 2014)
2 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism:Ten areas of best practice in countering terrorism, see Practice 5, section D, paras 22-23
3 A/RES/68/178, Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism
5 Submission of HRC, Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters Bill 2014, para 5.2
6 ibid para 6.4
7 Submission of HRC, Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Bill 2014, para 6.2(i)
|
|
movement, unless
necessary on grounds of national security
Article 12.4 – no one shall be arbitrarily denied the right to
enter their own country
Article 2.3 – right to effective remedies determined by
competent authorities
|
UNHRC General Comment No.27: Freedom of Movement (Article
12)4
UNHRC General Comment No 29 on
States of Emergency
|
The power of the SIS to suspend travel documents for up to 10 days without
conclusive evidence of a terrorist risk, without any realistic
avenue for
redress or review poses natural justice problems.8
Classified information may be withheld from the review/appeal process.
Suggestion that consideration is given to establishing an independent
review
process to address this.9
Sunset clause should set a shorter operative time period –
‘the absolute minimum’ to
enable the review, civil society engagement and the drafting
of new resulting legislation.10
|
4 CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.9, November 1999
8 Ibid para 6.2(ii)
9 Ibid para 6.5
10 Submission of HRC, Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Bill 2014, paras 7.1-7.2
|
|
|
only for the duration of the
emergency.
|
|
Government
Communications
Security Bureau Act
2003
Effect of reforms11:
To update and broaden surveillance capabilities of GCSB, including enabling
foreign intelligence agencies to access data on NZ citizens
|
NZBORA:
Section 21 - Right to protection from unreasonable search and
seizure
NZBORA Long title (b) - An act to affirm NZ’s
commitments to ICCPR
|
ICCPR:
Article 1712 – regarding the right of
the individual to protection from
arbitrary or unlawful interference to their privacy
Article 9.1- the right to liberty and security of the person
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010, A/HRC/14/4613
to intelligence services, the
categories of persons and
activities subject to collection,
the threshold of suspicion for activating surveillance,
limitations on the duration of
surveillance procedures and procedures for authorising, overseeing and
reviewing and surveillance and collection powers
UN General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age.14
|
The definition of “private
communications” under s4 is unacceptably vague and has the potential
to undermine reasonable expectations of privacy15.
Concern at the very broad statutory remit of the GCSB objectives under s7
and the wide range of activities that it may undertake in
co-operation with SIS,
Police and the Defence Force under s8C.16
Concern at a weak level of oversight by the legislature compared with other
nations.17
Stronger accountability and oversight mechanisms are required; including
establishment of a
|
11 By way of Government Communications Security Bureau Amendment Act 2013
12 See also Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
13 Report of the Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism: Compilation of good practices on legal and institutional frameworks and measures etc 17 May 2010
14 A/RES/68/167, January 2014
15 HRC, Report to Prime Minister: Government Communications Security Bureau and Related Legislation Amendment Bill, and associated wider issues relating to surveillance and the human rights of people in New Zealand, 9 July 2013, paras 27-28
16 HRC Report to Prime Minister, July 2013. Paras
24-25
|
|
|
|
Parliamentary Select
Committee.18
Concern at the use of urgency in passing important amendments to security
legislation19.
Recommends that officials working in intelligence services have human
rights training.20
Legislation should include explicit reference to human rights principles
and obligations of officials to respect/consider/apply human
rights principles
when carrying out functions.21
|
Telecommunications
|
NZBORA:
|
ICCPR:
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010,
|
Notes that many of the
|
17 Ibid para 42
18 Ibid para 55a
19 Ibid paras 46-48
20 Ibid 55d and see also HRC, Protection of Fundamental Freedoms in the Digital Age, Paper for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 June 2014 p
6-7
21 HRC Briefing Paper relating to human rights and the targeted
review of foreign terrorist fighters, for Andrew Kibblewhite, CE DPMC,
3
November 2014 para 2.4
(Interception
Capability and
Security) Act 2013
Effect of reforms: Places obligations on telecommunications network
operators to assist government on network security matters which raise a risk
to
NZ’s security or economic wellbeing.
Also prescribes the use of classified security information obtained by
interception in court proceedings
|
Section 13 – the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion without
interference
Section 14 – the right to freedom of expression
Section 21 - Right to protection from unreasonable search and
seizure
Section 27(1) – right to the observance of natural justice by
any tribunal or public authority
Section 27(3) – the right to defend and be heard in
civil
|
Article 1722 – regarding the right of
the individual to protection from
arbitrary or unlawful interference to their
privacy
Article 14.1
All persons shall be equal before the
court and tribunals
|
A/HRC/14/46
UN Human Rights Council 2013
A/HRC/23/4023
justify their use in exceptional circumstances, the
potential
interference with the rights to
privacy and freedom of opinion/expression poses a risk to democratic
foundations.
|
provisions are unclear and
capable of broad interpretation
.24
Notes a wide Ministerial discretion under the Act (s38) to require, upon
application of surveillance agencies, service operators to
have the same
interception capabilities as network providers.25
Notes concern at the
provisions contained in subpart
8 of the Act regarding use of classified security information in court
proceedings. In particular, the restrictions on disclosure
of that information
to the suspect; and the court’s ability to proceed to hearing in the
absence of the suspect notwithstanding
the power of the court to appoint a
Special Advocate.26
|
22 See also Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
23 Report of Special Rapporteur, Frank La Rue, on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
24 HRC, Report to Prime Minister, July 2013, para 32
25 HRC, Report to Prime Minister, July 2013, para 32
26 Ibid para 33
|
proceedings
brought by the
Crown
|
|
|
|
Inspector–General of Intelligence and Security Act
1996
Effect of Reforms:27
Establishes Inspector- General of Intelligence and Security with a view to
increasing level of independent oversight
of NZ’s intelligence and security services.
|
NZBORA:
Does not directly engage NZBORA, but I-Gs functions include28
inquiring into any complaint by a NZ citizen or intelligence official
about any action, omission or practice by intel/security agencies
that adversely
affects a NZ person
Includes discretion to consult with Human Rights Commissioner in exercise
of s11 functions29
|
ICCPR:
Article 2.3(a) – Places an obligation on the State to access
an effective remedy in cases where their human rights and freedoms have been
breached
Article 2.3(b-c) – obligation to establish competent
authorities to hear and determine such complaints and
grant and enforce remedies
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010, A/HRC/16/51
Practice 6: An effective system of oversight includes at least one
civilian institution that is independent of the executive and the intelligence
services.
Practice 7: Oversight institutions have the power to initiate their
own investigations
Practice 8: Avenues to redress individual complaints are
established.
Practice 9: Recourse to effective remedies are provided, including
reparation for harm caused.
|
The functions of the Inspector- General when carrying out a s11(d) review
does not
explicitly require assessment of operational policy, and
practice against international human rights obligations or the human rights
impact (instead
referring to “legal compliance generally”)
Complaints inquiry function under s 11 is limited to complaints regarding a
New Zealand person; there does not appear to be scope
to inquire into complaints
regarding groups of people or systematic practices
The Inspector-General has no jurisdiction to issue remedies to individual
complainants – redress is limited to the issue of
a section 25
report
|
27 By way of Inspector–General of Intelligence and Security Amendment Act 2013
28 Section 11 Inspector–General of Intelligence and Security Act
29 Ibid, Section 12
New Zealand Security
Intelligence Act 1969
Effect of Reform30
Amends s41 provision of the Act regarding visual surveillance warrants
– in particular s 41D enables the Director to authorize
24 hour
warrantless visual surveillance and/or intelligence interceptions, seizures of
communications and electronic tracking, necessary
for the detection,
investigation of any actual, potential or suspected terrorist act or
facilitation of a terrorist act
|
NZBORA:
Section 21 - Right to protection from unreasonable search and
seizure
|
Article 1731 –
regarding the right of the individual to protection from arbitrary or
unlawful interference to their privacy
Article 9.1- the right to liberty and security of the person
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010,
A/HRC/14/46
|
The s41D powers to proceed
with warrantless surveillance and intelligence powers require the Minister,
the Commissioner of Security Warrants and the Inspector-
General to be
notified.
However, the s41D(1) process does not require any authorization by the
Inspector- General.
The Minister and the
Commissioner of Security
Warrants may direct the warrantless surveillance or intelligence processes
to be discontinued and any material destroyed.
After the expiry of a 24hour warrantless surveillance period any
information obtained relevant to activities prejudicial to security
(both
nationally and relevant to the gathering of foreign intelligence) may be
retained. All other information must be destroyed,
unless a
|
30 By way of New Zealand Security Intelligence Amendment Act 2014
31 See also Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
|
|
|
|
warrant has been duly
obtained after the expiry of the
24 hour period.
|
Intelligence Security and Committee Act
1996
Effect of Reform32: To introduce period reviews of the
intelligence and security services; and to establish a procedure
for chairing Committee reviews of intelligence
services to address
potential conflict of interest in the event the
PM is the responsible
Minister.
|
|
|
UN Human Rights Council, 2010, A/HRC/14/46
|
Supports (and has recommended) full independent inquiry of NZ’s
intelligence and security services.33
Supports establishment of enhanced Parliamentary oversight, preferably
through the establishment of a Parliamentary Select
Committee34.
Terms of reference of inquiry should include reference to relevant human
rights obligations and principles.35
|
|
|
|
|
|
32 By way of Intelligence Security and Committee Amendment Act 2013
33 HRC, Report to Prime Minister, July 2013, para 54
34 Ibid para 55a
35 HRC, Protection of Fundamental Freedoms in the Digital Age, Paper for UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 20 June 2014 p 11
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/NZHRCSub/2015/12.html