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2002
THE PARLIAMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
TRANSPORT
SAFETY INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
TRANSPORT SAFETY
INVESTIGATION
(CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS) BILL
2002
REVISED EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
THIS
MEMORANDUM TAKES ACCOUNT OF AMENDMENTS MADE BY
THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE BILL AS INTRODUCED
(Circulated by
authority of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services,
the
Honourable John Anderson, MP)
TRANSPORT SAFETY INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
The purpose of the Transport Safety Investigation Bill (TSI Bill) is to
maintain and improve transport safety in the aviation, marine and rail modes by
providing for the:
• reporting of transport safety
matters;
• conduct of safety investigations by the Australian Transport
Safety Bureau (ATSB);
• making of safety action statements, including
safety recommendations to address safety deficiencies identified by
investigations; and
• publication of investigation
results.
Arrangements in the Bill are based on the principles of
international best practice for investigation currently adopted in the aviation
and marine transport sectors. Such investigations
are:
• independent - of other interests such as regulatory and
commercial ones;
• no-blame - in conduct and outcome to encourage
cooperation and reporting on safety; and
• open - involving a wide
dissemination of findings and the fair treatment of directly involved
parties.
This Bill consolidates the ATSB’s investigation powers in
Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Navigation (Marine
Casualty) Regulations under the Navigation Act 1912 into one piece of
legislation. The powers under those pieces of legislation will be repealed upon
the enactment of the TSI Bill (refer to notes on clauses of the Transport
Safety Investigation (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2002 in this
Explanatory Memorandum. In addition, the TSI Bill introduces international best
practice investigation to the rail industry on the interstate system consistent
with the Commonwealth’s constitutional powers and the Intergovernmental
Agreement on Rail Safety signed with the states and Northern Territory in
1996.
Having one piece of legislation for investigation will serve
to:
• clarify the ATSB’s roles and responsibilities in
relation to its objectives for investigations;
• update and standardise
objectives and administrative arrangements for the conduct of investigations,
including a common process for investigation reports;
• provide
consistent treatment of sensitive information obtained during safety
investigations, including disclosure of such safety information in courts and
coronial inquests and for Freedom of Information purposes;
and
• facilitate appropriate multi-modal cooperation with other bodies
such as through Memoranda of Understanding and cross-modal use of ATSB
investigation expertise.
The Bill has seven parts.
Part 1 -
Preliminary: This Part includes the objects of the Bill, its application,
both inside and outside Australia, adoption of Chapter 2 of the Criminal
Code, relationship with other laws, and constitutional limitations on powers
and functions. Definitions in the Bill are broadly described to cater for
multi-modal requirements and also to avoid unintentionally restricting the
ATSB’s ability to investigate a particular safety matter. The Bill is
intended to prevail over other Commonwealth and State laws to the extent of any
inconsistency when necessary to meet the objects of the Bill. Its provisions
reflect the Commonwealth’s primary role within constitutional limits with
respect to aviation and large ships and a role in rail investigations on the
interstate rail system, which includes those aspects of the intrastate system
that may have an effect on the interstate system.
Part 2 -
Administration: This Part provides for the creation of the office of the
Executive Director of Transport Safety Investigation which has a range of powers
under the Bill to conduct safety investigations, including powers of delegation
to appropriately qualified people. There is express provision covering
independence of action by the Executive Director. Neither the Minister whose
portfolio includes responsibility for the ATSB nor the relevant Departmental
Secretary may give direction on the exercise of powers under the Bill. This Part
also includes provision for Australia’s compliance with international
aviation and marine agreements. Regulation will describe international
obligations for marine safety investigation arrangements such as the Code for
the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents, adopted by the Assembly of
the International Maritime Organisation in resolution A.849(2) and those for
aviation under the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation. Annex 13 to
the latter (Chicago) Convention prescribes standards and recommended practices
for accident and incident investigation adopted by the International Civil
Aviation Organisation in 1951 and subsequently.
Part 3 - Compulsory
reporting of accidents etc.: Under this Part, people responsible for
reporting must report matters related to safety. Non-reporting may result in a
penalty of up to a maximum of 6 months imprisonment for immediately reportable
matters. Regulation will identify matters to be reported, people responsible for
reporting, nominated officials to receive reports and the manner of reporting,
having regard to existing arrangements and efficiency and
effectiveness.
Part 4 - Investigations and reports: Division 1 of
this Part provides for the Executive Director to investigate transport safety
matters which are listed in Clause 23 and describes circumstances in which the
Executive Director cannot investigate certain transport safety matters. To
appreciate the full scope of the ATSB’s powers to investigate under the
Bill, these matters should also be considered in conjunction with Clause 11 in
Part 1, which describes the constitutional boundaries of investigating under the
Bill. The Division also makes it an offence to hinder an investigation.
Division 2 provides for the publication of investigation reports where this is
necessary or desirable for transport safety, the release of confidential draft
reports, and protection of the draft report from further release including
disclosure for the purposes of legal proceedings or disciplinary actions. The
Bill clarifies that draft reports are not admissible in evidence in civil or
criminal proceedings, including coronial inquiries. The same provision applies
to final reports (with the exception of coronial inquiries).
Part 5 -
Investigation powers: This Part provides the powers to investigate, to
require attendance before the Executive Director to answer questions etc.,
access to relevant premises, including accident sites, the detention of
transport vehicles, issue of warrants, protection and handling of evidential
material and penalties for non-compliance with some provisions to allow
unimpeded conduct of a safety investigation and to encourage the free flow of
information relating to the improvement of safety. Additionally, this Part
provides a mechanism for the release of evidential material that is not
OBR information or restricted information, by the Executive Director to
other agencies.
Certain provisions in this Part also prevent
self-incrimination being used as an excuse for not complying with the
requirements under this Part but make any information and evidential
material provided under those provisions, inadmissible in evidence against
the person in civil or criminal proceedings.
Regulations will provide for
the form of identity cards, and payment of witness expenses for attending before
the Executive Director.
Part 6 - Protection of OBR information and
restricted information: Sensitive information collected during the course of
an investigation is separated into two Divisions under this Part. Division 1
deals with on-board recording (OBR) information, which cannot be used in
criminal proceedings against a crew member. The use of OBR information in civil
proceedings and coronial inquiries will be subject to different restrictions.
Other sensitive information collected during an investigation is afforded
another level of protection and is referred to as restricted information
in Division 2. Division 3 confirms that the information gathering powers of the
Commonwealth Parliament and Royal Commissions are not affected.
Part 7
- Miscellaneous: This Part provides confirmation of the common law general
immunity for the exercise of powers under the Bill, arrangements for ATSB staff
members’ participation in coronial inquiries, compensation for acquisition
of property and provision for the making of regulations. Regulation will provide
further details on payment of fees for ATSB’s attendance at coronial
inquiries.
Existing Budget allocations for aviation and marine investigations will
be unaffected by this Bill. However, additional funding for rail investigations
will be required and would need to be sought for 2003-2004. The minimum amount
required is estimated to be $0.75 million per annum. This would enable four to
six medium complexity rail investigations to be conducted each year. The
funding arrangements would be similar to that accorded to aviation and marine
accident investigations, whereby extra funds may be required if a major accident
occurs justifying a very complex inquiry.
A Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) has been prepared for the rail
component of the Bill only. The Office of Regulatory Review (ORR) was also
consulted on the requirement to prepare a RIS for the provisions applying to the
aviation and marine transport modes, including on additional provisions that
were incorporated following a period of external consultation on an exposure
draft of the Bill. However, ORR advised that a RIS was not required because it
considered that the provisions applying to the aviation and marine transport
modes were not sufficiently different from existing arrangements to have a
significant effect on business.
Regulatory Impact Statement – Commonwealth Rail Safety Investigation Legislation
On 13 April 2000, the Minister of Transport and Regional Services issued
a media release relating to the tabling of the Government’s
response to four reports on land transport issues that had been approved by
Cabinet. The Minister said, inter alia:
. . . rail safety is a priority
and the Government will legislate to enable the Australian Transport Safety
Bureau to independently investigate accidents and incidents on the interstate
rail system. The reports of such systemic, ‘no-blame’ investigations
will be publicly released by the ATSB to allow the rail industry to benefit from
the lessons learned.
The rail industry has historically developed on a
State basis with vertically integrated government-owned rail authorities and
without the intention of it becoming a seamless national activity. However,
the rail industry has changed significantly over the last ten years. The
carriage of passengers and freight by rail is now seen as an important national
and commercial activity in which State boundaries increasingly have no meaning.
Privately owned corporations trade, new rail operators travel, and new track
owners’ rail networks and control systems routinely operate across State
borders. Initiatives to establish an interstate corridor are well advanced with
the States and Northern Territory (NT) agreeing on the geographical limits of
the Defined Interstate Rail Network in the context of the ATC National Rail
Summit Communique, 10 September 1997 and in the 1999 IGA for National Rail
Uniformity. In response to a need recognised in the 1993 Standing Committee on
Transport (SCOT) report, A National Approach to Rail Safety Regulation,
the rail industry is now moving toward national codes of practice and other
means of standardisation. However, the adoption of such harmonised measures,
including all aspects of rail safety, is currently dependent upon the
cooperation and agreement of the various States, NT, and individual rail
industry organisations. Rail safety investigations and the recommendations
arising out of such investigations, currently rest with State and NT rail
accreditation authorities. The standardisation of the investigation of rail
accidents, incidents and safety deficiencies is seen
as a measure to enhance rail safety but an area that is considered not to have
progressed sufficiently. This concern was acknowledged in a communique issued by
the Australian Transport Council (ATC) on 19 May 2000, which stated inter
alia:
Ministers note Rail Group strategic issue 8 that:
‘participants in the rail industry do not openly investigate and share
safety problems and findings within a ‘no blame’ safety culture. As
a result, mistakes are often repeated, with consequential loss of life and
injury, thus reducing rail’s competitive safety/social advantage over
road. In developing safety procedures and priorities, there is a need to better
define and reflect community concern for the avoidance of major accidents
particularly those with injuries and fatalities to fare-paying
passengers’.
Deregulation of transport in overseas countries has
prompted the review and reform of national rail safety regimes. Those reforms
have been characterised by a number of common
features, including the provision for independent investigation. Independent
rail investigations are conducted in a number of countries including Canada, New
Zealand, Sweden, and the USA.
The 1996
Inter-governmental Agreement (IGA) in relation to National Rail Safety
was signed by the Commonwealth, the States and the NT formalising ATC
endorsement of the recommendations of the 1993 SCOT report. In the development
of that report, the need for a separate investigatory agency was discussed at
some length. There were divided views as to whether national arrangements should
incorporate such an agency.
Despite the differences, ATC agreed
that:
• prescribed accidents/incidents should be reported to the
national agency;
• there is a need for a national approach to
independent rail safety investigations;
• any proposed legislation
‘shall provide the opportunity for an Accredited Owner, Accredited
Operator or a Party to seek the appointment of an independent investigator to
investigate an accident or other serious incident involving interstate rail
operations in which death or major damage occurs’ (later became clause 8
of the IGA);
• an accident investigation capability should be included
in the national arrangements; and
• there should be a national
research/data base facility.
Since the IGA was signed two reports have
been submitted to the Commonwealth Government, which make specific reference and
recommendations on the investigation of rail accidents:
1 The House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and
Micro-economic Reform, Tracking Australia (Neville Report, July 1998)
recommended, inter alia, that the Commonwealth establish a national rail
incident investigation unit.
2 A report by an independent industry
group Revitalising Rail (Smorgon Report, April 1999) recommended that the
regulators should be ‘prepared to transfer its investigation function to
an independent, and possibly multi-modal, agency’.
Two further
reports have been submitted to ATC:
3 The report, Independent
Investigation and Open Reporting of Rail Occurrences (prepared for Rail
Group by the Rail Accident and Incident Investigation Task Group, March 1999 and
endorsed by ATC in April 1999), acknowledged that:
Most investigation
reports are prepared by the parties involved in the occurrence following
internal investigation. Such investigations may be perceived as biased or done
in such a way that avoids or fails to expose evidence of system failures. If the
investigations were undertaken by external investigators with no association
with the parties involved, the investigation would be said to be
‘independent’.
That report also observed that under current
State laws, there are no requirements for reports to be made public. It
recommended that, if written in a style suitable for open reporting, safety
investigation reports should be made public in order to allow for safety lessons
to be more broadly communicated at all levels throughout the industry, and to
demonstrate to the public that actions have or will be taken to address any
identified safety deficiencies.
4 The Independent Review of Rail
Safety Arrangements in Australia (Booz-Allen & Hamilton Report, Sept
1999) recommended that the ATC ministers agree that ‘a separate Rail
Safety Investigations Authority would be set up with the necessary investigation
powers and research and analytical capability as an independent unit within the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)’ in order to ensure that
regulators themselves are subject to appropriate scrutiny in the case of any
major accident or incident.
Standards Australia has recently completed
its work with industry and governments to develop a proposed standard on rail
safety incident investigation as part of the AS 4292 series on Rail Safety
Management. Agreement to include the draft document as a standard could not be
reached as some members of the committee considered that their organisation, or
those that they represented, would not be able to meet the intent of the
standard or that it could potentially be ‘used against them’ in a
legal context. As a result, AS 5022, Guidelines for Railway Safety
Investigation, was released in June 2001. The ATSB considers that, in its
current form, the guidelines inadequately reflect best practice procedures for
safety investigation in some areas. The Bureau’s concerns about the
inadequacies of that document are a reflection of similar concerns about the
inadequacies of the current State-based arrangements for rail safety
investigations and are described in more detail in later sections of this paper.
As AS 5022 is a set of guidelines only, there are no legal requirement for
compliance with the principles contained in that document. In addition, only
some States call up the Australian Standard Railway Safety Management (AS
4292) in their respective rail safety legislation. As such, even if the document
had been published as a standard, there would be no legal requirement for some
States to comply with that standard.
In all industries, it is recognised that safety improvements come about,
in no small measure, by the objective analysis of accidents, incidents and
safety deficiencies, and applying the lessons learnt from that analysis. Open
and independent investigations of safety occurrences in high risk industries
such as aviation, shipping, and the offshore oil industry, is accepted
internationally as the most effective system in terms of safety outcomes and the
public interest.
There is currently no international rail body
equivalent to that of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) or
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which may be used as the
benchmark of ‘world’s best practice’. This could be attributed
to the fact that rail is essentially a land-locked activity and not a truly
global activity as is aviation and marine. However, even this argument is
becoming increasingly fragile with, for example, rail trade and passenger
transport activity spanning the European and Asian continents and similarly
throughout the countries of both North and South America. In the aviation and
marine spheres, both ICAO and IMO have set international standards and
recommended practices for, amongst other things, the conduct of independent
safety investigations. There are currently 185 signatories to the 1944 Chicago
Convention, which includes Annex 13 to the convention, Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation - International, Standards and Recommended Practices.
Most countries, including Australia, the US, Canada and New Zealand, have
incorporated those ‘best practice’ principles of Annex 13, including
systemic ‘no-blame’ investigation methodology and open reporting,
into their international and domestic legislation. Over 150 countries are
signatories to the IMO, including Australia, where Assembly Resolutions A.849
(20) and A.884 (21) make provision for the conduct of investigations into marine
‘casualties’ and ‘near misses’. The investigation
principles promoted by the IMO are similar to those of ICAO.
In order to
illustrate the specific problems being addressed, the international and largely
generic practices and procedures of both ICAO and IMO have been used as the
benchmark against which to compare current practices in rail safety
investigations in Australia. A number of shortcomings are evident in the
Australian context, and are detailed below.
1. Currently, one of the few
completely independent forms of rail safety investigation is through a judicial
inquiry with the powers of a Royal Commission. Such investigations are only
appointed in the event of a major accident, usually involving the loss of life
of fare-paying passengers. Judicial inquiries are inevitably lengthy and
expensive to conduct and are often adversarial and legalistic in nature. While
they have the virtue of being open to the public, they are also subject to
selective reporting by the media. Aviation and marine transport modes have
demonstrated that an independent, technical investigation produces better safety
outcomes. Publishing the reports of such investigations meets the dual purposes
of public accountability of the investigation and ensures the industry is
provided with the detailed analysis of the circumstances and contributing
factors to the accident.
2. Other than judicial inquiries, rail accident
investigations are generally carried out by either (a) State and NT
accreditation authorities; or (b) by rail companies under reporting requirements
of individual State and NT legislation. This gives rise to potential conflicts
of interest in which the investigator may have a direct involvement in part of
the causal chain which led to an accident. In addition, officers of the
regulator may be investigating an accident or incident that may have regulatory
or organisational deficiencies as contributing factors, which reflect adversely
on their organisation. Accident investigations conducted by an individual
company may also present conflicts of interest similar to those previously
described and are often engineering-focussed, blame-based and non-systemic. Such
investigations tend to be focussed on legal and financial aspects, relating to
limiting liability or the recovery of costs from other parties. This can lead,
in turn, to pressure on individuals or teams to modify reports at the behest of
those higher in the chain of responsibility. It also leads to a potential
reluctance to publicly issue reports and their findings. Such a demonstrable
conflict of interest leads to a lack of public confidence in an
‘introverted’ system of accident investigation, which is perceived
to be neither disinterested nor transparent.
3. There is a lack of a
uniform approach to rail safety investigation. In some cases, the powers and
protections offered by some State and NT legislation, do not provide the
appropriate scope to fully explore all the safety issues and potentially limit
the future free flow of safety information where an investigation for the
purpose of a prosecution and the safety investigation process are not able to be
clearly separated.
4. Accidents are random events that cannot be
predicted either in location or time. Each authority of itself, does not have
the 'critical mass' of accidents to justify the resources of a specialist
independent investigation system. This in turn leads to limited exposure to
investigation techniques and a dilution of expertise. For example, in the 1993
SCOT report, the NSW State rail authority acknowledged that in ideal
circumstances, the separation of the regulatory and investigation function is
desirable but that budgetary and other constraints render such an approach
impractical as it often involves duplication, with an associated cost.
5. It has become increasingly and publicly unacceptable to make
advancements in rail safety based solely on the analysis of historical events
that have, at times, had tragic consequences. The contemporary approach to
investigation recognises the importance of identifying safety hazards before
they become factors in accidents or incidents. The investigation of occurrences
that could have affected or might affect transport safety provides valuable
opportunities to seek proactive solutions to safety hazards. Such occurrences
may not have been the result of the unsafe operation of a transport vehicle
itself, for example, there may have been a loss of train control communications
or signalling functionality that does not result in a reportable occurrence but
where safety margins have nevertheless been reduced.
While the principles
of systemic investigation and open reporting are seen as desirable by the States
and NT, there is no uniform procedure or clearly defined mechanism for proactive
investigations.
6. The Commonwealth has a major stake in rail safety in
interstate trade. A Commonwealth Government Business Enterprise owns and
operates track and train control (Australian Rail Track Corporation). The
Commonwealth considers it vital to foster independent and objective
investigations in the interest of cost effective rail transport and public
safety and accountability. However, there is no current legal mechanism that
allows the Commonwealth to investigate in its own right. In contrast, the
Transportation Safety Board of Canada is responsible, under discrete
legislation, for the investigation of rail safety occurrences on the national
network and the international routes that cross into Canada from the USA. Canada
has a similar mix to Australia of both federal and provincial railway networks.
While the TSB does not specifically investigate in the provinces, agreements are
in place with a number of those provinces in which the TSB renders assistance as
required.
7. The publishing and public dissemination of rail safety
reports produced by or on behalf of the State and NT rail safety accreditation
authorities, is discretionary. The majority of State/Territory rail safety
legislation does not require reports to be made public. There have been very few
independent investigations and fewer truly public reports. As such, many of the
important safety messages are not reaching the working level or the travelling
public. As a result, there is limited opportunity to apply relevant safety
lessons in other parts of the rail industry in order to ensure an acceptable
level of safety throughout the industry and eliminate duplicated effort. Such
duplicated effort may have a direct and significant human and financial cost. In
contrast, for example, all safety investigation reports completed by the ATSB in
the aviation and marine spheres are made public. There have been many examples
of where findings and recommendations arising from those public reports within
Australia have been embraced internationally. Even within Australia, lessons
learnt have been incorporated in a number of ways including, but not limited to,
amendments to regulations and recommended practices, changes to design and
maintenance, and the restructure of relevant organisations to better support and
enhance safety within those organisations. Issues of commercial advantage
arising from the release of reports are viewed as secondary to the importance of
reducing or eliminating safety risks.
1.3 Risk
Accidents
are random events that cannot be predicted.
In 1998, 15, 336
‘rail occurrences’ were reported from four States (NSW, Victoria,
Queensland, South Australia). Of these 2,728 or 18%, were categorised as
‘major occurrences’ involving serious injury, death or significant
damage (Rail Accident and Incident Investigation Task Group, March 1999). The
majority of those categorised as major occurrences were investigated internally
by the companies involved and reports of the findings were provided to the
respective accreditation authorities. The remainder of the occurrences were
reported in limited detail to the accreditation authorities and were used to
identify trends. Only six of the occurrences were considered by accreditation
authorities to warrant independent investigation.
The interstate network,
as it is currently defined, accounts for approximately 8,000 kilometres of the
total rail network in Australia, or approximately 20% of that network. The
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), a Commonwealth government business
enterprise which commenced operations on 1 July 1998, owns and/or controls
approximately half of that network. In the second half of 1998, a total of 501
occurrences were reported to ARTC. In 1999, a total of 1,176 occurrences were
reported, of which 31 were categorised as major occurrences. It is considered
that the remainder of the interstate corridor would experience a similar number
of occurrences each year.
The Australian rail system hauls about
one-third of the total net tonne kilometres of freight of the national rail
task, a figure that has increased by 36% from 1988 to 1997. Interstate freight
tonnage has increased by 27% in the last decade (Australasian Rail Association
website) which amounts to a total annual revenue of approximately $500 million.
In addition, over 700,000 passengers are carried on interstate journeys each
year (Australasian Rail Association).
The social cost of rail accidents
in 1988 was assessed at around $100 million per annum (ATC 1993 report). The
Independent Review of Rail Safety Arrangements in Australia (Booz-Allen
& Hamilton Report, Sept 1999) observed that in 1993, the cost of rail
accidents was comparable to that of air accidents. While that figure has not
been updated, it is expected to be considerably higher in 2000, particularly if
insurance costs are taken into consideration. While this figure is considered to
be low compared with the social cost of road accidents and travel by rail is
regarded as a safe mode of transport, it is significant in absolute
terms.
Except for a handful of examples, investigation reports produced
by companies, accreditation authorities and even some independent inquiries that
have been instigated by the States, have not conformed to accepted best-practice
safety investigation principles. For example, individuals continue to be named
in most reports particularly if they have been completed by the company
involved, the ‘no-blame’ philosophy is not reflected as those
reports often continue to attribute a single causal factor, and there are few
public examples of proactive investigations of safety occurrences. In addition,
there have only been a few independent inquiries as there is a general view that
only serious accidents need an independent approach. The risk associated with
these identified inadequacies is that the investigation reports do not lend
themselves well to public dissemination, they do not guarantee that safety
issues from an organisational and systemic perspective have been explored fully,
and only a limited number of serious occurrences are investigated. The lack of a
proactive approach means that death, serious injury or property damage has often
already occurred before anything is done about it.
A national database of
rail safety occurrences is currently being developed by the Commonwealth with
assistance from the States and NT. It is intended that the database will provide
a national overview of the safety health of the rail industry, something that
has not previously been achievable under the State-based arrangements. It will
also assist the States, NT and the Commonwealth to take a more considered and
strategic approach to any emerging rail safety issues, and will play a role in
the ongoing monitoring of the national codes of practice once they have been
implemented. Despite the intended benefits of such an initiative, the States and
NT are currently under no legal obligation to investigate anything other than
predominantly defined events ie. accidents and incidents in which death or
injury has occurred to persons or where damage has occurred to, or defects have
been identified in, rolling stock or track infrastructure.
2.1 Objectives of government action
To enhance rail safety
by creating a national rail safety investigation regime that meets ‘best
practice’, including:
♦ objectivity
arising from;
− independence from regulatory and
commercial concerns
− unrestricted authority over
the conduct of investigations
♦ the adoption of a
systemic approach where appropriate;
♦ the sole
objective to improve safety and not to attribute blame or
liability;
♦ certainty arising
from;
− uniform
procedures
− a high level of public
accountability through public reporting of all investigations
♦ a mechanism for proactive safety
investigation; and
♦ a high level of centralised
expertise.
All States and NT have railway legislation, making provision for the
operation of railways under their individual jurisdictions. Such legislation
covers all aspects of rail operations under their separate jurisdictions
including financial and safety issues that, in turn, includes the investigation
of rail occurrences. The same authorities that oversee regulations, both
commercial and operational, conduct investigations of accidents and incidents
under their respective legislation.
State and NT rail accreditation
authorities have been invited to utilise the expertise and independence of the
ATSB. While some States have indicated that they would utilise this offer,
others have not responded. Further, it is at the various authorities’
discretion whether or not they invite the ATSB to lead or assist in an
investigation. Under such an arrangement, the ATSB is bound by the State and NT
legislation and there is no guarantee of open reporting. Officers of the
ATSB have been involved in rail accident investigations on six occasions at the
invitation of the States between 1997 and 2002.
There is currently no specific power to regulate rail safety
investigation at a Commonwealth level. However, there are a number of general
powers which, together, can be used to support legislation regulating most, if
not all, rail operations.
Through ATC, the Commonwealth has led the
States and NT in promoting an Australia-wide, uniform rail policy. This includes
developing a consistent approach to safety issues, including accident
investigation. The Commonwealth is a signatory, with all other State and NT
administrations, to the Inter-governmental agreement in relation to rail safety.
Clause 4 of the 1996 IGA states that:
Legislation shall be passed
or appropriate administrative action under existing legislation taken as soon as
practicable by the Parties which allows for the application of the Australian
Rail Standard and any additional requirements notified in Clause 7 as the basis
for accrediting safe operations by interstate rail Operators and
Owners.
Clause 8 of the IGA states that any proposed
legislation:
shall provide the opportunity for an Accredited Owner,
Accredited Operator or a Party to seek the appointment of an independent
investigator to investigate an accident or other serious incident involving
interstate rail operations in which death or major damage occurs.
As
noted previously, the Commonwealth is a ‘Party’ to the
IGA.
Australian Standard - Guidelines for Railway Safety
Investigation
Rail accreditation authorities and the rail
operators, through Standards Australia, have developed AS 5022 Guidelines for
railway safety investigation, closely modelled on the existing Commonwealth
marine and aviation procedures. However, as previously discussed, there is no
legal requirement for compliance with this guideline by the States and NT,
further contributing to a lack of uniformity.
Continue to conduct investigations under State and NT legislation with
the rail industry carrying out the majority of those investigations and with the
balance conducted by State and NT accreditation authorities. The Commonwealth
(ATSB) would continue to be invited to participate in or conduct independent
rail investigations at the discretion of the State and NT accreditation
authorities.
3.2 Self-regulation
The introduction of a
system of self-regulation requiring rail operators, individually or
collectively, to undertake investigations, with no State, NT or Commonwealth
involvement, is an option.
Quasi regulation would involve no legislative powers. Rail safety
investigation could be conducted in accordance with national codes of practice
and/or Australian Standards/Guidelines, or through the development of Memoranda
of Understanding between the Commonwealth, States and NT.
The Commonwealth to use its Constitutional powers to set up a national
investigator with coercive powers in relation to rail safety investigations on
the interstate track and those parts of the intrastate track that have a safety
impact on interstate operations, analogous to existing Commonwealth aviation and
marine investigation legislation.
4.1 Groups affected by the problem and proposed
solutions
There are four general groups to be
considered:
♦ the general
public;
♦ State/Territory governments
(Departments of Transport and their accreditation
authorities);
♦ the rail industry;
and
♦ the Commonwealth.
The general public
has the right to expect that rail occurrences involving death or injury of train
crew or the public, major damage, or damage to the environment, are properly
investigated and that significant factors contributing to those occurrences are
fully determined. The general public also has the right to expect that any
resulting safety lessons, which assist to prevent further similar occurrences,
are made public.
Legislation and the application of rail safety
investigation methodology varies considerably between State and NT Governments.
The interstate operators are seeking uniform standards and a uniform approach to
rail safety. This includes a uniform approach to rail safety investigations and
that such investigations should be separate from the regulatory functions of the
accreditation authorities.
The Commonwealth has an existing pool of
resources and a proven track record in systemic ‘no-blame’
investigations in the aviation and maritime spheres. The consistent application
of these principles to the rail industry would meet the stated objectives as
outlined in section 2.2 Objectives of government action.
4.2 Self regulation
Rail operators and track owners
already have an obligation to investigate under their own management, accidents
and incidents involving company property, systems and/or staff. They have the
appropriate technical expertise and operating knowledge of the industry and, in
particular, their own company. In addition, it may be argued that they possess a
sufficient degree of self-preservation and commitment to safety to ensure that
they conduct thorough rail safety investigations.
The implementation of
this option would necessitate a repeal of current State-based legislation, which
requires the rail industry to operate in a co-regulatory environment, a process
designed to apply external safeguards to an otherwise self-regulated
industry.
This option does not meet the objectives of independence and
objectivity as it would not cater for the often multiple interests in a rail
safety investigation. These interests would be as diverse as accreditation
authorities, track owners, operators, maintenance providers, employee
representatives, occupational health and safety representatives, and the
travelling public. Issues related to conflicts of interest and the competing
goals of safety and commercial viability are not likely to be adequately
addressed, or be seen to be adequately addressed, under such a regime. There may
be reluctance to share information in relation to the findings of an
investigation if it is seen to erode a competitive advantage. All of these
concerns may potentially result in an inherent lack of confidence in the
industry’s ability to investigate itself.
Further requirements with
their attendant costs would be imposed on the industry, in order that an
appropriate level of expertise for the investigation of safety issues is
assured. Such a regime would result in greater pressure to conduct judicial
inquiries in the absence of any formalised system to ensure that public
accountability is at least assured following serious accidents (Refer to section
1.2 Problem being addressed for other issues related to the use of
judicial inquiries).
Quasi-regulation relies heavily on the cooperation and agreement of all
the parties involved and is not legally binding. Therefore, this option would
not wholly meet the objective of a consistent approach to rail safety
investigation.
Whilst the agreement and adoption of national codes of
practice for the defined interstate network is progressing, with parts of the
national code implemented during 2001 and additional parts due to be implemented
during 2002, those codes do not address the specific issue of rail safety
investigation. The codes were predominantly developed to address efficiency
issues with passenger and freight operations. Although safety issues are
inherently intertwined with operational issues, it is considered that rail
safety investigation should be kept at ‘arm’s length’ from a
document that sets operational standards and which may itself be under scrutiny
during a safety investigation.
As with self-regulation, quasi-regulation
will not satisfy the necessary requirements in relation to the powers and
protections that must be afforded to investigators and affected parties to
ensure that the primary objective of safety is able to be rigorously pursued in
order to benefit the industry and the travelling public.
Given the
continued fragmented nature of the industry and the strong interests of the
States and NT, it is unreasonable to expect that the States and NT could come to
an agreement with the Commonwealth on the narrow issue of rail safety
investigation, when other rail reform issues remain unresolved after
eight years of the current reform agenda. This was recently illustrated when it
has become apparent that the views held by the States, NT and the rail industry
on the proposed draft Australian standard on Railway Safety
Investigation, were extremely varied in respect to fundamental issues such
as definitions, investigation methodology, and reporting.
Quasi-regulation in the form of MOUs between the Commonwealth, the
States and NT, may be beneficial in so far as it may help to clearly define the
roles and responsibilities of each party in the event of a rail safety
investigation on the interstate system. This, in turn, may reduce duplicated
effort and resources and any inconvenience to the rail industry as a result of
an unnecessary further layer of investigation. It may also allow for a strategic
approach in relation to the expertise that may be required to reside within a
Commonwealth investigatory agency and which may be able to be sourced
externally. An MOU may also provide for a cooperative approach in respect of the
uniform training and development of
investigators.
4.4 Explicit Commonwealth
legislation
Commonwealth legislation would apply only to improve
safety of the interstate rail system. State and NT authorities would maintain
jurisdiction to investigate intrastate operations, including urban networks,
where the interstate system is not affected.
The rail industry is a
high-risk operation with the potential to significantly impact on public safety
and environmental integrity.
The introduction of proposed Commonwealth
legislation may be viewed as the most formal and potentially complicated option
to implement. However, this option will meet the objectives as a legal framework
provides certainty, consistency and specific safety investigation provisions
such as ensuring confidentiality, protection against self-incrimination,
transparency, and requirements to divulge relevant information overriding other
requirements not to divulge such information. As litigiousness increases, the
protections of such legislation may be the only way to ensure that information
from witnesses and other relevant parties to a safety investigation is
forthcoming.
In a currently dynamic rail industry, competition and
horizontal structures are replacing vertical, government-controlled structures.
As a result, critical interface and other safety issues have been raised for an
expanding number of operators in both ‘above’ and
‘below’ rail operations. An objective, independent, rail safety
investigation capability, supported by relevant Commonwealth legislation, is
required in this environment to ensure that such safety issues are properly
identified and adequately addressed.
The introduction of explicit
Commonwealth legislation with rail safety investigations conducted by an
independent agency such as the ATSB, has great potential to bolster public
confidence in the rail industry. With the ATSB’s proven track record in
other modes of transport investigation, many expensive judicial inquiries
resulting from the public’s lack of confidence in the integrity of an
investigation conducted by interested parties, including the accreditation
authorities, may be averted.
Some accreditation authorities, while
welcoming ATSB assistance, believe that the ATSB needs to prove the
effectiveness of its investigation methodology to the industry, prior to
mandating it through legislation. Some authorities view such a proposal as
resulting in more unnecessary power over the States by the Commonwealth and that
any proposed Commonwealth legislation goes against the intent of the
IGA.
The introduction of any proposed Commonwealth legislation will come
with attendant administrative costs and, if not handled adequately, has the
potential to result in a further player added to the already multiple interests
to a rail safety investigation. The Commonwealth would need to fund its own
investigation capacity (estimated to be a minimum of $0.75 million per annum).
The funding arrangements would need to be similar to those accorded to aviation
and marine accident investigations, whereby extra funds may be made available if
a major inquiry justifies supplementary expenditure. The cost of any rail safety
investigation that falls within Commonwealth jurisdiction would be wholly funded
by the Commonwealth and therefore has the potential to reduce the States’
and NT costs for investigation and the need for the States to have the same
level of investigation resources.
The legislation will clearly state the
roles and responsibilities of the State/Territory governments, rail owners and
rail operators in such matters as:
• accident and incident
reporting requirements to the Commonwealth;
• the requirement to
provide information to the Commonwealth for rail safety investigations;
and
• the Commonwealth’s authority/powers over accident sites and
custody of wreckage.
Reporting protocols as referred to above, would need
to be established in order to eliminate duplication of effort resulting in an
unnecessary cost to the industry. An industry education campaign would need to
be conducted and appropriate literature would need to be distributed to ensure
maximum awareness, understanding and cooperation with the new Commonwealth
regime. These initiatives could be funded by the Commonwealth at an estimated
cost of $0.75 million per annum.
The adoption of an independent
organisation reporting publicly significantly reduces the public expectation for
judicial inquiries. Experience of equivalent Commonwealth marine legislation,
which makes provision for judicial inquiries, is that the last marine accident
to be subject to a judicial inquiry occurred in 1985. Since that time, all
serious accidents have been investigated and reported on by specialist
Commonwealth investigators. This includes accidents involving fatalities and
major pollution incidents.
Whilst Commonwealth legislation would provide
explicit powers for the Commonwealth to investigate for rail safety, any
benefits or reforms arising from those rail safety investigations would rely
largely on the cooperation of the State accreditation authorities and the rail
industry. It is not intended that the Commonwealth would have the power or
responsibility for implementing safety reforms on the interstate rail system. If
such powers were granted to the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth investigation
agency would, by default, become a quasi regulator and in so doing would not be
truly independent. It is intended that the rail safety legislation would provide
for the Commonwealth to identify and communicate safety deficiencies to the
relevant action agency, with any response from action agencies, including any
intended safety action being taken by the action agency, being placed on the
public record. This is similar to the arrangements in the aviation sphere. As
the ATSB is regarded as an independent and credible investigation agency,
records show, for example, that approximately 80% of its recommendations have
been accepted by the aviation industry. This approach is also similar to that of
royal commissions of inquiry, in which there is no legal authority to enforce
the adoption of recommendations. However, business reality and common sense
suggests that such recommendations cannot be simply ignored and must be dealt
with and acted upon appropriately.
As the introduction of explicit
Commonwealth rail safety investigation legislation is just one element of a
wider package of reform in the rail industry, it is not possible to separate the
positive outcomes of sound rail safety investigation principles from those of
other changes taking place within the rail industry. It is expected that these
reforms which include such things as increased standardisation in procedures and
technology and improvements in infrastructure, will compliment this legislation.
Option 1
Status Quo |
Public Rail Industry
State Government C’wealth Government
|
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Costs/disbenefits
|
Rail accident reports not easily accessible to public, limiting public
awareness and choice
Potential for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. |
Non uniform approach retained.
Interstate operators are subject to different legislative provisions and investigation methodology with the potential to create confusion and a higher workload for an operator. Operators not required to make investigation reports public. Safety-critical information may be withheld from industry or other rail authorities. This has a direct human and financial cost if the same safety mistakes reoccur. Potential for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. Cost of independent investigations could be passed on from the States and NT to the industry. |
Potential conflicts of interest, leading to lack of credibility in the
investigation process.
Potential for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry, with, significant resource implications. State and NT expertise may be diluted in so far as there are insufficient investigations of a major nature on a State by State basis. States and NT not required to make investigation reports public. Safety-critical information may be withheld from industry or other rail authorities. This has a direct human and financial cost if the same safety mistakes reoccur. Cost of any Commonwealth participation in independent investigations would be passed on the States. |
Commonwealth may be seen as avoiding responsibility for leadership and
public good resulting in political opinion arising against the
government.
Any involvement by Commonwealth in investigations must rely on current provisions of State and NT legislation – which do not meet the objectives of ‘best practice’ in all cases. Involvement by Commonwealth in investigations only by invitation the States and NT (which may not be forthcoming if politically sensitive). |
Benefits
|
No specific benefits identified.
|
No further implementation requirements.
Industry maintains current relationship with the States, NT and the Commonwealth. No requirement to change internal procedures or rail safety reporting protocols. |
No further implementation requirements
States and NT maintain current legal jurisdictions and relationship with the Commonwealth. No requirement to change internal procedures or rail safety reporting protocols. Discretion to report publicly may enable problems to be dealt with internally without unnecessarily undermining the confidence of the public. |
No further implementation requirements
No direct financial cost to Commonwealth. Commonwealth would maintain harmony with States and NT as far as is practicable, in respect of the traditional roles of the States and NT and the Commonwealth. |
Option 2
Self Regulation |
Public Rail Industry
State Government C’wealth Government
|
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Costs/disbenefits
|
Would not meet public interest test for safe rail transport and right to
critical safety information
Perception by public of conflicts of interest and competing goals of safety and commercial viability if the rail industry is allowed to self-regulate in relation to rail safety investigations. Such concerns are not likely to be adequately addressed, or be seen to be adequately addressed, under such a regime. As a result, public confidence in the industry could suffer. Greatest political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. |
May not satisfy multiple interests and could create an unnecessary
adversarial climate between the various parties.
Would not address issues of proper public accountability Would not overcome provisions in insurance policies that information must not be divulged unless required by law. Therefore critical information may be withheld. Greatest political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. Cost of any independent investigations would be passed on to the industry. Some rail safety occurrences may not be fully investigated due to financial constraints. |
Contrary to existing legislative provisions.
Greatest political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. Would require a repeal of current State legislation. |
Commonwealth may be seen as avoiding responsibility for leadership and
public good resulting in political opinion arising against the government.
|
Benefits
|
No specific benefits identified.
|
Rail industry free to set own standards and protocols for rail safety
investigation without influence/oversight of States/Territories or Commonwealth.
Discretion to report publicly may enable the industry to deal with problems internally without unnecessarily undermining the confidence of the public. Industry’s sense of self-preservation is likely to ensure well-intentioned efforts to address safety issues. |
Will free up resources previously devoted to investigation, which will
enable greater priority on other matters such as accreditation processing and
auditing.
|
No direct cost to the Commonwealth.
Will free up resources previously allocated to rail safety investigation. |
Option 3
Quasi Regulation |
Public Rail Industry
State Government C’wealth Government
|
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Costs/disbenefits
|
Limitations of self-regulation also apply to quasi-regulation, with
consequent affect on public confidence.
Significant political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. No legal requirement for the industry to conform with safety recommendations arising as a result of quasi-regulation if the industry does not want to embrace them due to financial or other reasons. |
Many of the same concerns held by the industry about self-regulation also
apply to quasi-regulation.
Significant political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. |
Progress toward a national approach to rail safety investigation through
the use of an Australian standard is protracted and States and NT continue to
disagree on fundamental issues. Therefore, possible to be no closer to achieving
the potentially positive outcomes of a uniform approach.
Significant political pressure for accidents to be investigated through a judicial inquiry with non-existent or inadequate legislation and government capability to investigate. Therefore, significant resource implications, both financial and human and the potential for the focus to be on blame and liability. Cost of any Commonwealth participation in independent investigations would be passed on the States and NT. Administrative costs of negotiating and maintaining an MOU with the Commonwealth that requires continued cooperation with all the parties. |
Administrative costs of negotiating and maintaining MOUs with several
States and NT which requires continued cooperation with all parties.
|
Benefits
|
No specific benefits identified.
|
May ensure greater standardisation in the way the industry is treated by
the respective authorities in relation to rail safety investigation as the roles
and responsibilities of all the parties are clearly understood and that there is
no duplication of effort.
No legal requirement to conform with safety recommendations arising as a result of quasi-regulation if the industry does not want to embrace them due to financial or other reasons. Cooperative relationships fostered through quasi-regulation between the States, NT and the Commonwealth, may have a flow-on effect on the industry. |
Quasi-regulation in the form of MOUs between the Commonwealth and the
State/Territory governments will ensure that roles and responsibilities of all
the parties are clearly understood and that there is no duplication of
effort.
Has the potential to foster cooperative relationships between the States, NT and the Commonwealth. |
Quasi-regulation in the form of MOUs between the Commonwealth and the State
and NT governments will ensure that roles and responsibilities of all the
parties are clearly understood and that there is no duplication of
effort.
Has the potential to foster cooperative relationships between the States, NT and the Commonwealth. Fewer resources required to develop and support quasi-regulation in contrast to explicit Commonwealth legislation. |
Option 4
C’wealth Regulation |
Public Rail Industry
State Government C’wealth Government
|
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Costs/disbenefits
|
|
Occasionally, destructive tests on materials/components conducted by the
Commonwealth, may have an operational or financial cost to the industry. It is
envisaged that such a requirement would be infrequent and only used when
considered necessary for a full understanding of relevant safety issues. It is
not possible to accurately predict the potential cost of this procedure as it
may range from just a few dollars to several thousand. However, the cost
associated with such an activity may be covered by the Company’s
insurance.
Mandatory reporting requirements require review to reduce duplication and ensure all the relevant parties are notified of any rail safety occurrence/investigation. Custody of wreckage and power of authority over evidence would remain with the Commonwealth investigation agency until such time as it considered of no further use to the inquiry. Protocols will need to be established to overcome any potential delays to the progress of other investigations or the restoration of rail services. For example, access to evidence would be available under the supervision of the ATSB and evidence may be collected/recorded where necessary on behalf of the ATSB in order to reduce delays to the restoration of normal services. |
State and NT rail safety accreditation authorities traditional role
modified.
States may provide technical/general assistance to Commonwealth rail safety investigations, which may have an impact on their resources (States would be compensated in cases where State resources were requested by the Commonwealth). State and NT investigations confined predominantly to intrastate rail. Further resources may be required to gain the benefits from the establishment of MOU’s with the States and NT in order to determine protocols for Commonwealth rail safety investigation. |
Commonwealth has an independent investigation Bureau, ATSB. Cost of some
rail accident investigations would shift to the Commonwealth’s
investigation agency, the ATSB at an extra cost of $0.75 million per
annum.
Resources within the allocation referred to above, would be required to gain the benefits from the establishment of MOU’s with the States and NT in order to determine protocols for Commonwealth rail safety investigation. |
Benefits
|
Greater access to safety information.
Greater public confidence in investigation process and it’s outcomes. Potential to avert, in all but the most serious of accidents, judicial inquiries with their attendant costs and adversarial characteristics. |
Create uniform safety investigation regime where Commonwealth jurisdiction
applies.
Greater public accountability. Potential to influence issues of liability in civil proceedings. Greater potential to make improvements in safety industry-wide, not just localised within a particular company or State. Less impact on resources than the use of judicial inquiries. |
Will free up some resources previously devoted to investigation, which will
enable greater priority on other matters such as accreditation processing and
auditing.
Less impact on resources, both financial and human, than the use of judicial inquiries. |
The ATSB, as a centre of excellence with a proven track record in safety
investigations, would provide the Commonwealth, States, NT and the rail industry
with objective rail safety findings.
Ensures that safety messages are conveyed to the whole industry and the public. Ensures that witnesses and other relevant parties are forthcoming with safety-related information. A transparent rail safety regime. Greater support from the Commonwealth for industry in safety management and training. Ability to identify trends and respond in a proactive manner to developing safety issues that fall within its jurisdiction and to relay this information to the States, NT and the rail industry. Commonwealth meeting its responsibility for leadership and public good. The legislation will support the national codes of practice as it will provide a mechanism to identify any safety issues arising from the implementation and ongoing operation of those codes. |
Coroners – the current relationship between the States, NT
and the respective coroners would be similar if Commonwealth legislation was
enacted. Therefore, it is considered that there would be no adverse impact on
the work of the coroner. Some provisions of the proposed legislation will
provide greater certainty to coroners with respect to access to certain types of
information and assistance from the Commonwealth. This could be reinforced
through Memoranda of Understanding.
Workcover/Comcare -
Workcover/Comcare have traditionally played an active role following rail
accidents and incidents. It must be recognised that the objectives of any
proposed Commonwealth rail safety legislation and that of Workcover and Comcare
are quite separate and must be treated as such. Whilst the introduction of
another ‘player’ other than the States and NT would result following
the implementation of Commonwealth legislation, the relationship would remain
unchanged. On those occasions when the Commonwealth chooses to investigate, it
is expected that the Commonwealth investigation will replace that of any State
or NT rail accreditation authority such that no additional investigation is
conducted for a particular accident or incident than what the rail industry
might normally be subject to.
In line with similar legislation in the
aviation and marine transport modes, it is proposed that control
of accident sites (following the activities
of ‘first response’ agencies) and protection of sensitive
information would be retained by the Commonwealth investigation agency. This may
have the potential to delay the progress of other investigations if not handled
appropriately and may also slow progress toward returning to normal operations.
However, cooperative arrangements have been established in the other modes of
transport investigation to minimise any problems arising from such a situation.
Such arrangements could include access to or provision of evidence and
communication of relevant factual information to other parties as soon as
possible. Similar arrangements could be applied in the rail safety context.
Insurers – In line with similar legislation in the aviation
and marine transport modes, it is proposed that control
of accident sites (following the activities
of ‘first response’ agencies) and protection of sensitive
information would be retained by the Commonwealth investigation agency. This may
have the potential to delay the progress of other investigations if not handled
appropriately. However, cooperative arrangements have been established in the
other modes of transport investigation to minimise any problems arising from
such a situation. Such arrangements would include access to or provision of
evidence and communication of relevant factual information to other parties as
soon as possible. Similar arrangements could be applied in the rail safety
context.
Rescue authorities – generally, rescue authorities
have the task of saving lives, providing first aid and to a lesser degree,
returning operations to normal following an occurrence. Any proposed
Commonwealth legislation would not have an adverse impact on that role. The
proposed legislation will specifically acknowledge the need for first response
agencies to carry out those important activities largely unimpeded. It may be
appropriate as part of the ATSB’s educational role, to provide educational
material and training to rescue personnel in order that they have a clear
appreciation of the requirements of a rail safety investigation in terms of
preservation of evidence etc.
Australian Rail Operations Unit (AROU)
– as the manager and owner of the proposed national codes of practice,
the activities of the AROU may be subject to investigation following a safety
occurrence on the interstate network. A Commonwealth investigation, with a
national rather than State focus, would provide an opportunity to independently
monitor the finalisation, implementation and effectiveness of those codes.
Safety findings in relation to the national codes may provide insight into
required changes/improvements to those codes in order to achieve better safety
outcomes. This impact is viewed as positive rather negative.
Small
business – It is not considered that small business would be affected
by the introduction of any proposed Commonwealth legislation.
Given the increasing value of rail as a method to transport freight for
interstate trade and its extensive use by passengers, the potential benefits
that have previously been outlined in this document will affect a significant
portion of the Australian population for a relatively small cost to the
taxpayer. Refer to information supplied in section 1.3 –
Risk.
Australian Transport Council National Rail Summit Communique, 10
September 1997
Australian Transport Council Communique, 19 May
2000
Booz-Allen and Hamilton, Independent review of rail safety arrangements in
Australia -a report to SCOT, September 1999
Committee ME/79 Draft
Australian Standard for Comment-Rail safety incident investigation
(AS4292.7), January 2000
Intergovernmental agreement in relation
to national rail safety, 1996
Intergovernmental agreement
for national rail uniformity, 1999
Inter-governmental working group
on rail safety, A National Approach to Rail Safety - report to SCOT,
September 1993
Rail Accident and Incident Investigation Task Group, Independent
Investigation and Open Reporting of Rail Occurrences - a report for Rail
Group, March 1999
Rail Group, Independent investigation and open
reporting of rail occurrences - a report to SCOT, March 1998
Smorgon.
J, Revitalising rail - Report to the Prime Minister, April
1999
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications,
Transport and Micro-economic Reform, Tracking Australia - Neville
Report, July 1998
5 Consultation
The following rail organisations have been consulted:
Australasian
Railway Association Inc.
AROU Advisory Group
Interstate Rail Operators
Group
FreightCorp
Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry
Union
Australian Services Union
National Rail Corporation Ltd
Australia
Southern Railroad
Great Southern Railway
Australian Rail Track Corporation
The State rail accreditation authorities of NSW, Vic, SA, WA, Qld and
NT
Individual meetings were held with some industry operators and other
industry organisations. Proposals have also been discussed at accreditation
authority and Rail Group, SCOT and ATC meetings.
In September 2001,
comment from the rail industry was sought on an Exposure Draft of the proposed
legislation. A multi-modal industry consultation workshop was held in Canberra
on 21 September 2001 to brief the aviation, marine and rail industry on the
proposed provision of the new legislation. A number of comments were received
from interstate operators and State and Territory regulatory authorities. The
ATSB has sought to accommodate to the extent possible a number of concerns
raised by those parties within a revised version of the Bill and will work with
the industry and regulatory authorities to develop agreed protocols through
Memoranda of Understanding. Consultation has also occurred with occupational
health and safety bodies.
Operators and industry organisations
Operators and industry
organisations are generally in support of Commonwealth legislation with the
following reservations and concerns:
• Another layer of
investigation in addition to the many and varied interests of other
investigation bodies eg Workcover, company, EPA, insurers etc.;
• Protection of witnesses – some organisations were supportive
provided that the legislation provides protection to witnesses against the use
of information provided to the investigation in criminal or civil proceedings;
and
• A definition of what constitutes Commonwealth jurisdiction, for
example, geographical corridor v interstate trade needs to be
established.
• Lack of standardisation compounded by the fact operators may be
accountable to several State jurisdictions;
• An opinion that
investigations are still conducted primarily for the purpose of blame or
liability despite progress in this area. The Glenbrook inquiry was sited at
several meetings as an example of an accident inquiry seeking to apportion blame
and liability;
• Limited public reporting of investigations resulting
in safety messages not being widely spread; and
• That Commonwealth
jurisdiction should be as wide as possible.
• The development of a national database of rail accident/incident
statistics coordinated by the ATSB. Many operators see this as a good
opportunity to ensure that safety issues are identified at a national level and
safety messages disseminated widely. Also, opportunities for
benchmarking.
• The Commonwealth’s established reputation/track
record as an independent investigation agency in other modes will be able to be
utilised in the rail industry.
State/Territory rail safety
accreditation authorities
Accreditation authorities’ concerns
about proposed Commonwealth legislation include the
following:
• the proposal would result in more unnecessary power
over the States;
• the initiative is contrary to the intent of the 1996
IGA;
• the current regime is adequate and there is a wish to maintain
discretionary powers over the terms of reference and whether or not individual
investigation reports are publicly released;
• the States and NT are
progressively improving their rail safety legislation to embrace the principles
of open, independent, ‘no-blame’, systemic investigations;
and
• the ATSB needs to prove the effectiveness of its investigation
methodology to the industry, prior to mandating it through legislation.
By adopting this option, it is considered that the following benefits
outweigh the costs/disadvantages that have been identified. This
option:
• provides for the demonstrable independence of the
investigating process, while providing the capacity for State authorities to
remain involved in rail safety investigations, under ATSB leadership, through
Memoranda of Understanding;
• a nationally consistent approach with the
use of a well-proven model for investigation used in other transport modes
within Commonwealth jurisdiction and high risk industries
internationally;
• provides certainty through a legislated requirement
for transparency that, in turn, ensures that safety information is distributed
to all areas of the rail industry and the general public;
• maximises
potential benefit for travelling public including public confidence and
accountability issues;
• enables the development of a pool of
professional, dedicated resources, concentrated in the one centre –
trained in contemporary investigation techniques and the management of complex
investigations as a national resource for rail safety investigation and
investigator training;
• is consistent with recommendations made by
recent public reports; and
• Government’s stated policy to
introduce Commonwealth legislation for the investigation of rail safety
occurrences as part of the reform program for interstate rail.
Before the legislation is finalised, ATSB will hold a workshop with
interstate rail operators and the State and Territory Departments of Transport
to consider the legislation and the procedures that will be followed to ensure
major stakeholder interests are fully considered and to avoid unnecessary
overlap or duplication of existing arrangements.
Following enactment of
the legislation, ongoing review of its application against its objective will
occur through consultation with major stakeholders at the Rail Safety
Consultative Forum (RSCF) SCOT and ATC forums, and through direct consultation
with the rail industry. Investigation reports are to be available on the ATSB's
website together with other educational material to promote rail safety. The
ATSB's Annual Review will report on progress of implementation of the
legislation.
TRANSPORT SAFETY
INVESTIGATION BILL 2002
Part 1 - Preliminary
Clause 1
Short title
This clause provides the proper title of the
Bill.
This clause provides that the Bill commences on the date of proclamation
or the expiration of six months after it receives Royal Assent, whichever is
earlier. This period will allow sufficient time for the completion of the
drafting of the regulations, which will need to commence at the same time as the
Bill.
Clause 3 Definitions
This clause defines
certain terms used in the Bill. In particular:
Accident is
defined to cover more serious occurrences involving death, serious injury,
destruction or serious damage of vehicles or property. The definition serves to
distinguish more serious occurrences from other incidents or situations. Where
an accident has occurred, the Executive Director may exercise certain coercive
powers in respect of the accident site and accident site premises, in addition
to powers, which are available in relation to premises that are not accident
sites. (Refer also to the definitions of accident site, accident site
premises and special premises).
Commonwealth place
includes all places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes, but does
not include the Australian Capital Territory.
Constitutional
corporation may be a foreign corporation (ie. company formed outside the
limits of the Commonwealth) or a trading or financial corporation formed within
the limits of the Commonwealth. This term is also defined to include any body
corporate formed in a Territory (ie. regardless of whether or not it is carrying
out trading or financial activities).
Control area is a generic
name being used for the purposes of this Bill. It will include, for
example:
in aviation - the flightdeck of an aircraft
in marine - the
bridge of a ship
- the machinery control room of a ship
- the cargo control room of a ship
in rail - the locomotive cab of a rail
vehicle
Note that control area is not intended to cover such
facilities as air traffic control centres or equivalent facilities in other
modes. Refer also the Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause
48.
Court is defined to mean any person or body that has power to
require the production of documents or answering of questions. This will
include, for example, the Administrative Review Tribunal or a coroner, but the
definition expressly excludes the Parliament or a Royal Commission so that the
restrictions under the Bill which are applicable to provision of evidence for
purposes of court or tribunal proceedings, will not apply to Parliamentary or
Royal Commission proceedings.
Crew member may include such persons
who are employed (or engaged under contract) as the technical Flight Crew and
Cabin Crew of an aircraft, the Master and seagoing crew of a ship, or the
Driver, Second Person or Guard and Conductor of a rail vehicle, and who are on
board the respective transport vehicle at the time that it is operating. For
further explanation, refer also to the Explanatory Memorandum comments on the
definition of operational duties.
Evidential material means
anything that may be relevant to an investigation conducted under the Bill.
Evidential material includes on-board recordings and restricted
information (such as interview notes, results and analysis of tests,
personnel records, electronic data and other recorded information, medical
records and autopsy results). Refer also to the Explanatory Memorandum comments
on the definition of restricted information and further comments at
Clauses 60, 61 and 62. In addition, evidential material may include
information that is not restricted information such as fuel and
maintenance records, photographs, log books etc. and physical evidence such as
components of transport vehicles, wreckage of transport vehicles and
baggage.
On-board recording or OBR is defined by reference
to Clause 48 which sets out the conditions to be met before a recording may be
regarded as an OBR within the meanings of the Bill. A Cockpit Voice Recording
(CVR), as referred to in aviation, is one example of an OBR. Note that a
recording becomes an OBR only upon the happening of an Immediately Reportable
Matter as prescribed by the regulations. However, once an Immediately
Reportable Matter has occurred, the entire recording becomes an OBR,
including parts of the recording made prior to the time of the occurrence,
unless and until such time as the Executive Director declares that the recording
ceases to be an OBR (see Clause 49). Also note that as long as a recording falls
within the definition of an OBR, the protection and restrictions under Part 6
apply.
Operational duties are those duties that a person is
designated to carry out in order to safely and efficiently operate a vehicle on
an assigned task, such as the carriage of passengers or cargo, from one
destination to another. It requires such persons to operate the transport
vehicle within its prescribed performance limits, to ensure that any passengers
are supervised and assisted throughout the operation of a transport vehicle
including emergency evacuations, and to observe laws and standard operating
procedures applicable to that transport vehicle.
Restricted
information covers various types of information acquired by a staff member
under or in connection with the Bill, not including OBR information.
Restricted information is a subset of evidential material and is
sensitive information that may have an adverse impact on the free flow of safety
information in the future (and in turn have a substantial adverse impact on the
proper and efficient conduct of an investigation conducted under this Bill) if
it was made freely available by the Executive Director for purposes other than
transport safety, such as ‘blame’ inquiries.
The exclusion of
OBR information from the definition is to separate the protection of unique OBR
information from the protection of other types of information obtained by the
Executive Director for purposes of the Bill.
Note that the disclosure
and admissibility of restricted information is subject to the provisions
of Part 6 Division 2-Restricted Information.
State referral of
power means a referral by a State to the Commonwealth allowing the
Commonwealth to legislate in respect of a certain subject matter which is not
normally within the Commonwealth’s legislative power under the
Commonwealth Constitution.
Clause 4 Act binds the
Crown
This clause provides that the Crown in right of the
Commonwealth and all the States and Territories is subject to the Bill, but it
cannot be prosecuted for an offence under the Bill.
Clause 5
External Territories
This clause provides that the Bill applies in
all external Territories, eg. Christmas Island, Norfolk Island
etc.
Clause 6 Application outside Australia
This
clause provides that the Bill applies outside Australia, unless there are
provisions in the Bill, which provide otherwise. This means the Bill authorises
the Executive Director to do anything in a foreign country where he or she is
authorised to do the same thing in Australia. For example, an Australian flight
crew stationed in a foreign country may be subject to the provisions of Clause
32 of this Bill ie. requirement to attend before the Executive Director.
However, it should be noted that subjects of foreign countries are under no
obligation, when they are outside Australia, to comply with provisions of the
Bill and therefore it may not be possible in those cases to enforce provisions
requiring compliance with the Bill.
Clause 7 Objects of this
Act
This clause sets out the objects of the Bill. In general, the
main object will be to determine the events and factors, both immediate and
underlying, relating to a transport safety matter that has been investigated
under the Bill. In doing so, safety deficiencies in the transport system may be
identified and relevant safety action statements, including safety
recommendations to address those safety deficiencies, may be made by the
Executive Director in order to improve transport safety. There will be public
reporting of transport safety matters, particularly including investigation
findings in the interests of transport safety. Such reporting may also include
studies of trends in accidents and other occurrences that have been reported to
the Executive Director.
An additional object of the Bill is for the
Executive Director to cooperate with other Commonwealth agencies or persons
having powers under another law of the Commonwealth to also investigate the same
matter as that being investigated under the Bill. This will include agencies
such as the AFP, AMSA, CASA and Comcare. Other provisions within the Bill,
notably Clauses 24, 43, 44 and 45, reinforce the notion of cooperation by
providing specific defences against penalties to allow such parties and others
to carry out their statutory responsibilities and to provide a mechanism for the
provision of evidence in the possession of the Executive Director to other
parties on request. However, whilst the Executive Director will cooperate with
those parties to the extent possible, this provision must be read in conjunction
with other provisions within the Bill, particularly Parts 5 and 6, which may
place some necessary limitations on otherwise unfettered cooperation in the
interests of transport safety and in ensuring separation between
‘no-blame’ investigations and a process that may lead to blame or
liability.
The objects of the Bill will NOT be to determine blame
or liability of a person. Note that the term ‘person’ may include a
body corporate. In addition, no adverse inference is to be drawn by the fact
that a particular operator may be subject to an investigation of a transport
safety matter under this Bill. Note also that the Bill (see Clause 17) is the
mechanism for Australia complying with international agreements including for
aviation, Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation -
International Standards and Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation. Article 94(7) of the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, IMO Resolution A.849(20), SOLAS (IMO Convention for the Safety of Lives at
Sea) & MARPOL (IMO Convention of Marine Pollution) outline international
agreements for ships and marine navigation.
Clause 8
Application of Criminal Code
This clause provides that
Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (which is found at the Schedule to the
Criminal Code Act 1995) applies to offences against this Bill. Chapter 2
of the Criminal Code contains all the general principles of criminal
responsibility that apply to any offence, irrespective of how the offence is
created. Chapter 2 covers elements of an offence, circumstances in which there
is no criminal responsibility, extensions of criminal responsibility, corporate
criminal responsibility, and proof of criminal responsibility.
Subclause 8(2) means that the offences under the Bill may apply
outside the geographical limits of Australia in accordance with section 15.4 of
the Criminal Code. Under section 15.4, there is no need for the
offending conduct to have any connection with Australia, and the fact that the
conduct is not a crime under the law of the foreign country where the conduct
occurred cannot be used as a defence.
Clause 9 Penalties
specified at foot of sections or subsections
This
clause provides that where a provision creating an
offence specifies a maximum penalty for an offence, then the offence is
punishable by a penalty up to the maximum specified. This is so irrespective of
whether the provision specifying the maximum penalty is a clause or a subclause
of this Bill, or whether the offence is created expressly.
Clause 10
Relationship with other laws
Subclause 10(1) makes it clear
that the Bill is not intended to ‘cover the field’ of transport
safety investigation. This provision means that the Bill does not prevent a
State or a Territory from conducting their own investigation into safety,
disciplinary or administrative matters under their own legislation as long as
that legislation is not directly inconsistent with this Bill. Therefore, State
and Territory authorities, which have jurisdiction to investigate, will be able
to do so, in parallel to any investigation under this Bill if necessary. The
only occasion when this Bill has primacy over State or Territory laws is when
there is inconsistency with the State or Territory legislation, eg. when the
operation of that legislation hampers an investigation conducted under this
Bill. For example, both State laws and this Bill may allow investigators to
seize evidential material at accident site premises. In such cases, the
Executive Director will have primacy over the State laws. However the Executive
Director will endeavour to work cooperatively with the State and Territory
authorities in order that they are able to conduct their own investigations.
Note that if the Commonwealth elects not to investigate, State and Territory
authorities will not be precluded from conducting their own investigation into
the matter in whatever form or forms. Also note that Clause 45(6) allows for
evidential material that is not OBR information or restricted
information to be provided to other agencies such as regulatory bodies,
police, coroners and occupational health and safety (OH&S)authorities. Other
provisions in Part 6 of the Bill deal with the disclosure and admissibility of
OBR information and restricted information to other agencies.
The
potential to save lives through an unimpeded transport safety investigation is
imperative, consistent with Australia’s international obligations and in
the interests of the continued free flow of safety information. It must be
recognised that 90% of accidents and incidents are a result of human or
technical factors where no malice was intended and that only a very small
proportion of accidents are the result of serious criminal activity where there
was an intention to harm other persons and/or property. It is the former types
of operational accidents and incidents that the ATSB focuses on and has the
expertise to investigate. Recent experience overseas emphasises the need for
agencies to cooperate to the extent possible and to acknowledge that where an
accident was not the result of a serious crime, the recognised independent
safety investigation agency should be the lead agency. This means that the ATSB
must be able to direct and control safety investigation activities beyond those
required in the ‘first response’ phase following a transport
accident and to coordinate with other agencies to the extent possible to allow
those agencies to achieve their respective objectives. Equally, it is be
recognised that on those rare occasions such as September 11, 2001 in New York
and Washington, when serious criminal (terrorist) activity caused four fatal
aircraft crashes, the relevant law enforcement agency will be the lead agency.
It is noted that under the Annex 13 definition of an accident, obvious cases of
terrorism such as those cited in this example, are not considered to be
accidents and safety investigation agencies such as the ATSB would not routinely
investigate such occurrences. In such cases, the ATSB would provide whatever
expertise and support it was able to assist the Australian Federal Police and
other authorities.
There will be some occasions when it is not
immediately apparent whether a transport accident was the result of human and/or
technical failure or the result of a serious crime. The Airbus 300 accident in
New York (November 2001) which resulted in 260 fatalities, was a case in point.
On that occasion, a public announcement was made early in the investigation that
until there was evidence to suggest that the accident was the result of a crime,
the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) would remain the lead agency.
That arrangement worked well and is being reflected in protocols in an MOU that
is under development between the NTSB and the US Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Subclause 10(2) provides that the Bill
prevails over other Commonwealth legislation, including any other legislation
allowing Commonwealth agencies or authorities other than the Executive Director
to conduct an investigation into a transport safety matter, to the extent of any
inconsistency. However, it is assumed that Commonwealth laws are compatible and
can operate concurrently. Therefore, this Bill does not exclude Commonwealth
agencies from investigating a transport safety matter, in parallel if necessary,
as long as that legislation does not hamper an investigation conducted under
this Bill. For example, another Commonwealth Act may have similar provisions to
this Bill, which state that certain powers may be exercised under warrant in
relation to evidence collection. This Bill would have primacy over the evidence
collected under those provisions only in those cases where the ED considered
that the operation of those provisions hampered an investigation under this
Bill. Notwithstanding, the Executive Director will endeavour to work
cooperatively with other Commonwealth authorities in order that they are able to
conduct their own investigations with little or no impediment in accordance with
current practice.
For further reasons for primacy over other legislation,
refer also to comments at Subclause 10(1).
Clause 11
Constitutional limitations on powers and functions
This clause
prescribes the limits, as consistent with the Commonwealth’s
constitutional power, within which the powers under the Bill may be exercised in
relation to each mode of transport, including aviation, marine and rail. The use
of the ‘purpose’ limitation will make it easier to apply a generic
set of laws to all three modes of transport.
Subclause 11(1)
relates to aviation safety investigation and is consistent with the
Commonwealth’s constitutional power to legislate in respect of external
affairs, trade and commerce with other countries and among the States, foreign
corporations and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of
the Commonwealth, matters referred to the Commonwealth by any State or States,
power to legislate in respect of territories and Commonwealth places and in
respect of any other matter to which the Commonwealth has the power to make
laws. The Commonwealth’s wide constitutional power to make laws relating
to air navigation has been confirmed by court decisions such as Airlines of
New South Wales Pty Ltd v. New South Wales (Airlines No.2 (1965) 113 CLR
54).
Subclause 11(2) relates to marine safety investigation and is
consistent with the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to legislate in
respect of external affairs, trade and commerce with other countries and among
the States, foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations formed
within the limits of the Commonwealth, matters referred to the Commonwealth by
any State or States, power to legislate in respect of territories and
Commonwealth places and in respect of any other matter to which the Commonwealth
has the power to make laws. For instance, based on the external affairs power,
the Bill will allow investigation into occurrences involving intrastate
operations as long as they are operating outside the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. (Refer to Subclause 11(5)). For
example, an intrastate ship that is operating from Brisbane to Weipa along the
Great Barrier Reef could be investigated under this Bill if it was involved in
an investigable matter (Refer to Clauses 22 and 23).
Subclause 11(3)
relates to rail safety investigation and is consistent with the
Commonwealth’s constitutional power to legislate in respect of trade and
commerce among the States, and of the Northern Territory. It is also consistent
with the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to legislate in respect of
foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations formed within the
limits of the Commonwealth, matters referred to the Commonwealth by any State or
States, power to legislate in respect of a Commonwealth place and in respect of
any other matter to which the Commonwealth has the power to make laws. The
subclause does not contain provisions to reflect the Commonwealth’s power
to make laws with respect to external affairs. This is due to the lack of
international element at present in the context of rail transport. The Bill
would also cover intrastate operations if the Executive Director considered that
there was an impact on the safety of operations on the interstate rail system.
For example, an intrastate train may collide with an interstate train on the
Defined Interstate Rail Network (DIRN), or an intrastate train may be involved
in a single-vehicle safety occurrence on the DIRN, or there may be an accident
on track that is not considered part of the DIRN but is being used for
interstate operations. Note that the Northern Territory is referred to in this
subclause but not the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) as there is no part of
the current interstate rail track within the ACT.
Subclause 11(4)
clarifies that the constitutional limits imposed under Clause 11 are only
relevant and applicable in relation to the exercise of powers under the Bill.
The constitutional limits regarding the protection of OBRs and OBR information
are provided separately under Clause 48.
Subclause 11(5) makes it
clear that for the purposes of Clause 11 only, outside Australia means
outside the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
In other words, the territorial sea is considered outside Australia for purposes
of Clause 11. This definition has been adopted to ensure that the
Commonwealth’s external affairs power can be invoked to the maximum extent
possible for the purposes of the Bill. However, any references to
‘Australia’ in other provisions of the Bill, for example, Clauses
22, would have the ordinary meaning in accordance with Section 15B of the Act
Interpretation Act 1901 which includes the coastal sea (including the
territorial sea) of Australia. In other words, the territorial sea would be
considered within Australia for purposes of all other provisions of the
Bill.
Part 2 -
Administration
Clause 12 Executive Director of
Transport Safety Investigation
This clause creates the office of the
Executive Director of Transport Safety Investigation. The incumbent of this
office will be a public servant appointed by the Secretary of the Commonwealth
Department within which the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) exists for
administrative purposes by reference to Clause 77 of the Public Service Act
1999. It is anticipated that the Executive Director would be a member of the
Senior Executive Service of the Department. The Executive Director will be
accountable to the Secretary in matters relating to the operation of the
Public Service Act 1999 and other legislation such as the
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 15 for an explanation of the level of
independence that the Executive Director has in relation to the exercise of
powers under this Bill.
Clause 13 Delegation
Subclause
13(1) permits the Executive Director to delegate all or any of his or her
powers under the Bill to any suitably qualified person, subject to the
limitations provided under this clause. A suitably qualified person may be a
Commonwealth or State/Territory officer or a private individual with appropriate
qualifications and experience. This is an acknowledgment of the need to maintain
transport safety as a priority over what might otherwise be considered in other
statutes as unacceptable protocol to delegate powers to anyone other than a
Commonwealth officer and allows Australia to meet international obligations in
respect of aviation and marine safety investigations. This flexibility is
essential as it may be necessary, for example, in remote locations to delegate
powers to an appropriately qualified person in order that perishable evidence is
collected in a timely fashion and that witnesses are interviewed quickly before
their memory becomes less reliable. In such cases, only those powers, or aspects
of those powers, seen as necessary to adequately carry out investigative
functions on behalf of the Executive Director under this Bill, would be bestowed
on those persons. To ensure the Executive Director maintains control over the
manner in which the delegated powers are exercised, the delegation may be
conditional upon the delegate complying with the Executive Director’s
directions given under Subclause 13(7) in relation to the exercise of the powers
by the delegate. The Executive Director may also limit the scope of any
delegation by limiting the powers to be delegated depending on the qualification
and experience of the individual concerned. The Executive Director may also
revoke a delegation at any time if he or she believes it is necessary or
desirable to do so.
Refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clause 14 – Special Investigators.
Subclause 13(2)
provides that the Executive Director’s power under Clause 14 to
appoint a special investigator and in respect of Clause 25 to release
final reports on investigations, cannot be delegated. In other words, only the
Executive Director himself or herself may appoint a special investigator for any
particular investigation and release final reports on investigations.
It
was considered appropriate that only the Executive Director be able to delegate
powers to special investigators, after careful consideration of the need
(see Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause 13(1)), as those investigators
may be other than APS employees and are therefore not subject to the same
controls as APS employees.
Release of reports under Clause 25 reflects
current practice in respect of the public release of investigation
reports.
Subclause 13(3) provides that the powers in relation to
the requirement, by written notice, for attendance and/or production of
documents may only be delegated to those persons identified in that subclause,
including special investigators.
Subclause 13(4) provides
that the power to apply for a warrant may only be delegated to those persons
identified in that subclause but does not include special investigators.
Subclause 13(5) provides that the power to enter residential
premises under warrant may only be delegated to a Commonwealth officer. The
requirement to act quickly or to comply with international obligations were not
considered relevant arguments in the case of residential premises. It was
therefore determined that standard Commonwealth policy in respect of delegations
should apply to residential premises powers.
Subclause 13(6)
places a responsibility on the Executive Director to ensure powers are not
delegated to someone who will not exercise them in a responsible manner
consistent with the provisions of this Bill. The Executive Director must
carefully consider the need to delegate. Since the Executive Director is
ultimately responsible for the application of this Bill, it is in his or her
interest to maintain the integrity of the process of delegations by making a
determination about the suitability of any particular
person.
Subclause 13(7) provides for the Executive Director to
prescribe the manner in which the delegate may exercise the delegated powers,
and specify in detail particular requirements of a delegation as he or she sees
necessary. This will be particularly important where it is considered by the
Executive Director as necessary to delegate powers to persons other than staff
members. For the purpose of this provision, ‘directions’ can be any
direction in any form in addition to any direction or condition spelt out in the
relevant instrument of delegation. Such directions may take the form of a verbal
or written direction to an individual or to a group, for example, directions and
policy contained within an ATSB policy and procedures
manual.
Subclause 13(8) clarifies that where the Executive
Director’s power under a particular provision of the Bill has been
delegated, any reference to the Executive Director in that provision means the
delegate as well as the Executive Director.
Clause 14
Special investigators
This clause allows the Executive Director to
appoint a special investigator to exercise powers under Clause 32, in
addition to all other powers, which the Executive Director may delegate to any
suitably qualified person. A special investigator could be a
State/Territory official, a private expert or other private person provided he
or she meets the criteria set out in the regulations regarding qualifications
and experience required for such an appointment. In addition, a special
investigator could be a person appointed to an investigation under this Bill
in accordance with international obligations. The reasons for the need to
appoint private citizens as delegates to exercise coercive powers are set out in
the comments at Subclause 13(1) in this Memorandum.
Clause 15
Independence
This clause provides that neither the Minister nor the
Secretary may direct the Executive Director in relation to the manner in which
the Executive Director exercises his or her powers under this Bill except in
respect of a direction by the Minister under paragraph 21(1)(b). The
independence of the Executive Director is consistent with Australia’s
international obligation to conduct independent investigations into transport
safety occurrences. For example, Paragraph 5.4 of Annex 13 to the International
Convention on Civil Aviation provides that ‘the accident investigation
authority shall have independence in the conduct of the investigation and have
unrestricted authority over its conduct’. The Secretary or Minister cannot
direct the Executive Director to not investigate a particular transport safety
matter, nor can they direct which staff members are selected to conduct an
investigation into a particular transport safety matter. In addition, neither
the Secretary nor the Minister can influence the content of any information that
is released by the Executive Director in the interests of transport safety. Note
that the Executive Director remains accountable to the Minister and the
Parliament. Also note that the Executive Director is answerable to the Secretary
in matters related to such legislation as the Public Service Act 1999 and
Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997.
Clause 16
Minimal disruption to transport services
This clause explains that
the Executive Director is to be cognisant of the commercial implications caused
by the disruption to transport services following a transport accident. In order
to ensure, to the extent practicable, that the safety investigation process
itself does not result in delays to transport services, the Executive Director
will adopt procedures that enable him/her to carry out investigative functions
and duties efficiently. This clause is primarily concerned with cases where,
following an occurrence, the transport vehicle is not able to be moved under its
own power and where the location of the accident site is such that the transport
vehicle, its wreckage and the area secured by the Executive Director for the
purpose of examination of the vehicle and its wreckage, may temporarily prevent
other transport services from operating or may delay those services. For
example, a derailment on an interstate rail line, the crash of an aircraft on
the main runway at Sydney or the disabling of a ship in a main shipping channel.
In practice, the safety investigation process is often carried out at the same
time as ‘first response’ and recovery operations are in progress and
where those activities in themselves preclude the operation of normal services
for safety reasons. In some cases, where the accident site is large and complex,
it must be acknowledged that the on-site investigation process will necessarily
take longer. In the interests of transport safety, the Executive Director may be
required to delay services on those rare but critical occasions. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 39 – Power to Stop and Detain
a Vehicle.
Note that for the purposes of this clause, transport
relates to transport by means of aircraft, ships and rail
vehicles.
Clause 17 International obligations
This
clause requires the Executive Director to exercise his or her powers in a manner
consistent with Australia’s obligations under relevant international
agreements that are identified by the regulations. It is intended that the
applicable international agreements will include for aviation, Annex 13 to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and for marine, Article 94(7)
of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, IMO Resolution A.849(20), SOLAS
& MARPOL. Note that there is no equivalent international agreement for rail.
Part 3 – Compulsory reporting of accidents
etc.
Clause 18 Immediate reports
This
clause creates an obligation on a responsible person to report an
immediately reportable matter as soon as possible and by means prescribed
by the regulations. It is intended that the regulations will state the preferred
means of reporting, eg. by telephone. The reason for such a requirement is that
the need for the Executive Director to act as quickly as possible to preserve
evidence and to determine the proximal and underlying factors that led to an
accident or serious incident is often paramount for optimum safety outcomes.
The regulations will prescribe immediately reportable matters and
provide a list of responsible persons for each transport mode.
Responsible persons for the purposes of reporting will include only those
with an operational connection to the transport vehicle such as the crew, the
owner and/or operator of the transport vehicle or persons performing vehicle
control duties, for example, air traffic controllers or train controllers. The
principles of this provision and the penalties applying to the failure to report
transport safety matters are derived from the existing aviation legislation.
‘First response’ agencies such as the police are not to be included
in the list of responsible persons required to report safety occurrences.
However, in practice, such agencies may indeed be the first to provide
notification of some transport accidents to the ATSB though there would be no
attendant penalty if they did not do so.
The penalty associated with the
failure to report immediately reportable matters is intended to ensure
that responsible persons who may wish to deliberately conceal the fact
that an accident or serious incident has occurred, perhaps motivated by
insurance implications or employer disciplinary sanctions, will be discouraged
from doing so. Consequently, timely reporting will enable the Executive Director
to act quickly for reasons previously outlined in this Clause.
Note that
a report under Clause 18 must be followed by a written report under Clause 19.
It is also recognised that there may be a number of responsible persons
who are aware of a particular immediately reportable matter. The ATSB has
no objections to multiple reports being received as a result of the obligation
imposed on those responsible persons. The important issue is that the
ATSB is made aware of the immediately reportable matter in a timely
fashion so that appropriate action can be taken to commence an investigation.
However, it is acknowledged that it would be impractical to expect each and
every responsible person who is aware of an immediately reportable
matter to report and to impose a large criminal penalty if they do not.
Therefore, if the responsible person has reasonable grounds to believe
that the immediately reportable matter has already been reported by
another responsible person, then they are no longer under that
obligation. It is recommended that if the responsible person is in doubt,
then he or she should report the matter anyway.
Subclause 18(3)
explains that matters that are required to be reported under provisions of the
Navigation Act 1912 or the Protection of the Sea (Protection of
Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 will satisfy the reporting requirements under
this Bill where they are reportable matters under this Bill. The policy intent
is to nominate Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) officers as
nominated officials under the provisions of Clause 19. AMSA officers, in
turn, will be expected to report such matters to the Executive
Director.
Clause 19 Written reports within 72
hours
This clause requires a responsible person to provide a written
report on a reportable matter (which may be an immediately reportable
matter or a routine reportable matter) within 72 hours. The change
from 48 hours (as referred to in current aviation legislation) to 72 hours was
to ensure compatibility with similar reporting requirements under
State/Territory legislation, in particular, requirements as they currently
relate to rail safety occurrences. The regulations will prescribe routine
reportable matters. Note that this requirement is in addition to the
reporting requirement under Clause 18 in relation to immediately reportable
matters. Note also that the same principles apply as referred to in the
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 18, regarding responsible
persons being relieved of the obligation to provide a written report if they
have reasonable grounds to believe that another responsible person has
already done so.
Subclause 19(3) Refer to Explanatory Memorandum
comments at Subclause 18(3).
Clause 20 Nominated officials for
receiving reports
This clause allows the Executive Director to
provide a list, in the regulations, of officials who have the function of
receiving reports under Clause 18 or Clause 19. In some cases, it is considered
appropriate for organisations or persons other than the Executive Director to be
the main conduit for such reports. For example, in the case of marine
occurrences, it is unreasonable for foreign ship Masters to differentiate
between the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau, and as AMSA (through AusSAR) is often the first point
of contact, a report is made to AMSA. It is expected that AMSA will, in turn,
report to the ATSB, rather than the owners and operators involved in the
reportable matter reporting directly to the ATSB.
Part 4 – Investigations and
reports
Clause 21 Investigations
Subclause 21(1) and
Subclause 21(2) provide that the Executive Director has discretionary
power to investigate any investigable matter except with respect to a direction
to investigate in respect of paragraph 21(1)(b). The Executive Director may also
discontinue or scale down any particular investigation in cases where it is
clear that there is little safety value in continuing the investigation and
available resources are better directed elsewhere. Note that this Bill does not
preclude the Executive Director from re-opening an investigation if the
Executive Director becomes aware of significant new
information.
Paragraph 21(1)(b) places a limit on the Executive
Director’s discretionary power to investigate by requiring the Executive
Director to investigate a transport safety matter upon a direction from the
Minister. This paragraph must be read in conjunction with Clause 15
Independence. It must be noted that while the Minister can, upon written
direction, require the Executive Director to commence an investigation into a
particular transport safety matter, the Minister cannot place any
restrictions on the manner in which the investigation is
conducted.
Subclause 21(3) requires a statement to be released
within 28 days of discontinuing an investigation, explaining the reasons why the
Executive Director has elected not to continue to investigate a particular
investigable matter.
Clause 22 Restriction on investigations of
transport safety matters
This clause describes circumstances in which
a transport safety matter may or may not be investigated under the Bill. The
restrictions provided under Clause 22 are imposed on policy grounds and are
additional to the constitutional limits imposed under Clause 11. Note that a
reference to ‘Australia’ in this clause should be interpreted in
accordance with Section 15B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, which
defines ‘Australia’ to include the coastal sea (including the
territorial sea).
Subclause 22(1) provides that a transport safety
matter is not investigable unless it has a link to Australia, for example, the
occurrence occurs in Australia, involves an Australian transport vehicle outside
Australia, there is evidence relating to the occurrence found within Australia,
or where a foreign country requests the Executive Director to investigate.
An example in relation to paragraph 22(1)(c) is where a foreign
registered ship en route from New Zealand to Australia may be involved in an
occurrence outside Australia. The Executive Director will have the power to
investigate by virtue of the fact that the ship arrives and docks at an
Australian port and there is now evidence in Australia (on board the ship) for
the purposes of a safety investigation such as the crew, ship’s documents
and ship components.
A further example, though in aviation, is where a
foreign registered aircraft is involved in a near collision within the
Australian Flight Information Region while it is en route to Singapore. The
Executive Director will have the power to investigate by virtue of the fact that
evidence exists within Australia such as the Air Traffic Control tapes and
records. If the crew that was involved in the occurrence later returned to
Australia, the Executive Director would be able to exercise powers under the
Bill in order to, for example, interview the crew. It must be noted that in such
cases, aspects of the investigation conducted outside Australia in such
situations may be subject to the laws of the relevant country.
Paragraph 22(1)(d) relates to an occurrence or situation that
normally falls outside the policy boundaries of this legislation such as the
sinking of a foreign ship or crash of a foreign aircraft in international waters
off the Australian coast. In such cases the Executive Director will have the
power to investigate if the country that would normally be responsible for
conducting such an investigation, requests the Executive Director to do so. This
element of Clause 22 enables Australia to meet its international obligations in
respect of marine and aviation safety investigations.
Subclause
22(2) excludes from the application of the Bill occurrences involving
ONLY exempt transport vehicles (ie. Australian defence aircraft or
ships, or aircraft and ships operated by the military, customs or police of a
foreign country).However, the Executive Director may investigate a matter
normally outside the application of the Bill at the request of the Australian
Defence Force (see Subclause 22(3)). Note that the Executive Director may
investigate an occurrence involving BOTH an exempt transport
vehicle and a transport vehicle that is not an exempt transport
vehicle and/or a civil transportation facility. In such cases, the
Executive Director has broad and coercive powers to obtain evidential
material in relation to the exempt transport vehicle, including
systems and facilities that support the safe operation of that
vehicle.
Note that a civil transportation facility may include,
but is not limited to, installations such as Air Traffic Control centres and
facilities used to support the maintenance of transport vehicles or logistics of
transport vehicle operations. This would include even those facilities that may,
in some cases, also support the safe operation or maintenance of exempt
transport vehicles.
Subclause 22(3) clarifies that the
Executive Director may investigate an occurrence involving defence vehicles at
the request of the Australian Defence Force. It also places a requirement on the
Executive Director to publish details of any request by the Australian Defence
Force. Publishing details of the request provides a mechanism to advise those
persons who may become subject to the powers and obligations under this Bill as
a result of the request, who would not otherwise have become subject. For
example, military personnel involved in the occurrence that the Executive
Director has been asked to investigate. Note that the term ‘publish’
means to make public or generally known and is not confined to any particular
means. In practice, the ATSB would liaise directly with relevant personnel in
the Australian Defence Force and would, as a minimum, place details of the
request on the ATSB website (or similar).
Clause 23 Transport
safety matters
This clause defines transport safety matter for
the purposes of the Bill. In order to keep the list of investigable transport
safety matters generic, and avoid using mode-specific terminology, a broad
‘menu’ of general event or situational descriptions has been listed.
This ‘menu’ must be considered in conjunction with Clause 11, which
describes the constitutional boundaries of investigating under this Bill.
Decisions about which particular transport safety matters will be investigated
and to what level under this Bill, will be determined at a policy level, as
consistent with Government policy. For example, when prioritising matters to be
investigated, the Executive Director may have regard to the Government policy,
which requires that the primary consideration be the safety of
fare-paying passengers. Note that
this clause covers events where no damage to any property or injury to any
person has in fact taken place but where something occurred that affected, is
affecting or could affect transport safety. For example, the loading of
contaminated fuel, the breakdown of rail or air traffic control services,
incorrect loading of a transport vehicle having a significant effect on the
vehicle’s mass and balance, incorrect transmission, receipt or
interpretation of significant messages or a significant change to air or sea
port operations resulting in vehicle operations for which the port was not
designed. All of the previous examples may have the potential to adversely
affect the safety of transport systems.
Note also that an investigation
maybe triggered by a series of occurrences that reveal an adverse safety trend
for the particular transport mode or transport safety more generally. In
addition, the occurrence does not need to involve any particular transport
vehicle but may affect, or have the potential to affect, any number of transport
vehicles.
Clause 24 Offence to hinder etc. an
investigation
Subclause 24(1) sets out the elements of the
offence of hindering an investigation, namely a person must be reckless as to
any possible adverse impacts of his or her conduct, and that the conduct must
have the result of adversely affecting an investigation, and the conduct is not
authorised by the Executive Director. Note that in accordance with guidance in
the Criminal Code, where recklessness is a fault element of a physical
element of an offence, proof of intention, knowledge or recklessness will
satisfy the fault element.
This provision is intended to cover conduct
such as withholding information, concealing evidence, tampering with evidence
etc but no conduct will constitute an offence unless it actually has an adverse
effect on an investigation. This clause not only relates to accident sites where
it is very important that evidence is preserved, but also extends to include
such things as the destruction/removal of evidence remote from the accident site
such as minutes of meetings, training records, data recordings etc. Such
information may provide crucial evidence pertinent to the investigation. Where
an immediately reportable matter has occurred, the offence may apply before the
matter is reported and before Executive Director decides to investigate. This is
because a person would reasonably be expected to know that the Executive
Director is likely to investigate in such cases. Therefore, this provision
serves to discourage persons from tampering with evidence before the matter is
reported to the Executive Director and an investigation can be commenced.
Without such a provision, it would be possible for persons to tamper with
evidence relating to a serious safety occurrence before reporting to the
Executive Director in the knowledge that they cannot be prosecuted for doing so
with the real potential for critical safety information to be lost or destroyed.
In all other cases, ie. where the transport safety matter is not immediately
reportable, the offence will apply only if the conduct took place at the time
that the Executive Director was conducting an investigation. In such cases,
where the transport safety matter is of a less serious nature, it would not
reasonably be expected that a person would know that an investigation is likely
to be conducted.
Note that this offence is broader than Clause 149.1 of
the Criminal Code (Obstructing Commonwealth Public Officials) as it
covers conduct that is not directed at a particular official but rather
hindering an investigation or future investigation more generally.
This
offence is not generally intended to put restrictions on agencies with
legitimate rights to investigate. Those agencies, in accordance with Clause 10
of this Bill, may investigate in parallel if necessary to an investigation being
conducted by the Executive Director. Those agencies would not ordinarily be
considered to be hindering an ATSB investigation and thus be subject to the
attendant penalties unless the actions of officers from those agencies were
clearly reckless and adversely affected an investigation under this Bill. In
practice, the Executive Director will coordinate and cooperate with other
agencies, consistent with the objects clause of this Bill, and would reasonably
expect cooperation from those agencies. It is intended that working protocols
between the Executive Director and other relevant agencies such as transport
regulatory authorities, police, OH&S authorities and coroners will be dealt
with in Memoranda of Understanding. These protocols may, for example, provide
that the Executive Director will authorise certain conduct for purposes of
paragraph 24(1)(d). Note also that State or Territory governments cannot be
prosecuted for an offence under the Bill.
This provision and others,
ensures that the Executive Director has an unhampered ability to conduct a
safety investigation and is consistent with the principles of international
agreements.
Subclause 24(2) provides exceptions to the offence
under Subclause 24(1) in addition to the standard defences under Part 2.3 of the
Criminal Code such as a ‘sudden and extraordinary emergency’.
These additional exceptions include conduct ensuring the safety of persons,
animals, or property, the removal of deceased persons or animals, making safe
vehicles and wreckage, and conduct to protect the environment from significant
damage or pollution. This will allow, for instance, ‘first response’
agencies to ensure the safety of persons, animals and property; coroners to
remove bodies from the wreckage of a transport vehicle for the purposes of a
coronial inquiry; and agencies such as the Australian Maritime Safety Authority
to deal with the damaging effects of pollution without the need for
authorisation by the Executive Director.
Subclause 24(3) makes it clear
that the offence in Subclause 24(1) does not apply in cases where a person may
have initially given consent to the Executive Director to enter premises in
accordance with Clause 34 and subsequently withdrawn that consent or has chosen
not to provide assistance to the Executive Director as a result of the
withdrawal of consent. In such cases, the Executive Director would be required
to consider the need to obtain a warrant except if the premises were special
premises where entry is permitted without consent or warrant. (For further
explanation on entry to premises, refer to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Clauses 33, 34 and 35).
Subclause 24(4) clarifies that, in the
spirit of cooperation, the Bill is not intended to unnecessarily impede the
statutory activities of other Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies.
Therefore the Executive Director will not unreasonably withhold authorisation
under paragraph 24(1)(d).
Subclause 24(5) clarifies that conduct
may include an omission. For example, an Air Traffic Services officer not
retrieving/isolating air traffic control information when it would be reasonably
expected that the officer should have known that such an action was necessary in
the circumstances.
Division 2 – Investigation
reports
Clause 25 Reports on
investigations
Subclause 25(1) provides for the publication of
investigation reports by the Executive Director for the purposes of transport
safety. Subclause 25(2) allows the Executive Director to release such things as
preliminary reports, interim factual reports, safety recommendations etc either
as an internal policy or in accordance with an international agreement, whether
or not the investigation has been completed. The release of investigation
reports is considered vital to ensure that the public and the transport industry
are aware of the safety issues and to confirm that the investigation process has
been open and independent. That process, in turn, allows an opportunity for the
transport industry, including operators, manufacturers, regulators etc., to take
appropriate safety action to reduce or eliminate the risk of similar safety
occurrences in the future.
Subclause 25(3) clarifies that a
report may include submissions made to the Executive Director either in response
to a draft report released under Clause 26 or to safety recommendations. For
example, the Executive Director may wish to include, as part of the public
record, comments made by directly involved parties to the investigation in
relation to the accuracy of the factual information in a draft report in
accordance with Subclause 26(1). Similarly, the Executive Director may also wish
to include responses to safety recommendations that were issued to organisations
or individuals. Those responses would normally indicate whether the organisation
or individual accepted the safety recommendations and what action, if any, is to
be taken to address the safety issues identified during the investigation.
Advice received from organisations on safety action taken or proposed in
response to the findings of an investigation of a transport safety matter may
also be included in a published report in the form of a safety action
statement.
Subclause 25(4) clarifies that, without consent, a
person will not be referred to by name in a report. In order to meet the
‘no blame’ principle of the Bill and to comply with international
obligations, long standing practice has been not to name any person in a report
that has been directly or indirectly an object of the investigation.
Notwithstanding, this clause may accommodate future policy changes with respect
to naming other persons in an investigation report such as the investigator in
charge, the author of the report, the current Executive Director or the Minister
who may have directed that a particular transport safety matter be investigated
under paragraph 21(1)(b). In such cases, the consent of those persons would be
required.
Subclause 25(5) clarifies that a report may include any
safety action statements and safety recommendations issued by the Executive
Director either as part of the final report or those issued separately from the
final report.
Note that this Bill continues to refer to safety
recommendations in conformity with ICAO Annex 13 terminology. However, it is
believed that safety action undertaken or in progress (in the form of safety
action statements) should be reported in preference to making safety
recommendations as this has the potential to result in better safety outcomes
such as early implementation of safety measures and reflects well on
organisations that take timely safety action. Where this is not possible, safety
recommendations will normally be couched in broad terms in language that is
sufficient to clearly address the desired safety outcome and not to provide
prescriptive solutions. Safety solutions are usually best left to regulators and
other organisations with the technical knowledge and ability to make appropriate
risk-based, cost effective safety changes within their sphere of
influence.
Clause 26 Draft reports
Subclause 26(1)
permits the Executive Director to provide draft reports on a confidential basis
to appropriate persons for the purpose of allowing those persons to make
submissions. The primary purpose of this subclause is to improve the accuracy of
the contents of the report by allowing directly involved parties to view and
comment on the draft report. Directly involved parties are those individuals or
organisations that may have influenced the circumstances that led to a transport
safety occurrence. It may include individuals and organisations remote in time
and place to the occurrence but whose decisions and actions had an impact on the
nature of the operating environment of the transport vehicle and, in turn, the
decisions and actions of the operating crew. For example, the owner of the
transport vehicle, the organisation that manufactured the transport vehicle, the
transport safety regulator responsible for the rules under which the transport
vehicle operates or the organisation that employs and trains the operating crew
of the transport vehicle. This process is consistent with international
agreements relating to aviation and marine investigation, to which Australia is
a party. Depending on the circumstances of a particular occurrence, directly
involved parties could include some or all of the following, for example, in
aviation:
• some or all of the surviving crew members of an
aircraft;
• the aircraft operator;
• the aviation regulatory
authority;
• the manufacturer of the aircraft;
• the air
traffic control service provider;
• the aircraft component
manufacturer;
• the aircraft maintainer;
• the
aerodrome/airport operator; and
• another person or organisation whose
reputation may be affected following the public release of the report.
Equivalent parties in other modes may be considered by the Executive
Director to be directly involved parties for the purposes of this
subclause.
This subclause also permits the Executive Director to provide
advance notice of the broad form of the published report to directly involved
parties. This may, in turn, allow those parties to prepare themselves for any
possible repercussions, such as media attention, following the public release of
the final report.
Subclause 26(2) makes it an offence for a
person who receives a draft report under Subclauses 26(1) or 26(4) to copy or
disclose the contents to any other person or to a court. A draft report may be
subject to change before its release to the public and is issued to directly
involved parties for the reasons described above. It is vital that there is an
obligation on those individuals who are issued with or have a copy of the draft
report under paragraphs 26(1)(a) or (b) or 26(4)(a) or (b), to not further
disclose that information or provide it to a court. This is to prevent the
information, for example, from being taken out of context or misused and, as a
result, prejudicing that particular investigation or future investigations, or
unnecessarily and unjustly tarnishing reputations. Copying a draft report for
purposes other than those described in Subclause 26 (4) may attract a penalty of
up to 20 units. Disclosing a draft report for purposes other than those
described in Subclause 26 (4) may attract a penalty of up to two years
imprisonment.
Subclause 26(3) provides that the offence under
Subclause 26(2) does not require any proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence with respect to the fact that the draft report has been provided
under Subclause 26(1) or (4). However, a person is not criminally responsible
for the offence if at or before the time of the offending conduct the person
considered whether or not the draft report had been provided under Subclause
26(1) or (4), and was under a mistaken but reasonable belief that the report was
not provided to him or her under either one of those provisions (see section 9.2
of the Criminal Code regarding mistake of fact (strict liability)).
Subclause 26(4) clarifies that Subclause 26(2) does not prevent
copying or disclosure that is necessary for preparing submissions on the draft
report or for taking remedial action in relation to identified safety
deficiencies. In respect of making submissions to a draft report, it may be
necessary for several persons within an organisation to view the draft report in
order to assist with that process. The latter reason is an acknowledgment of the
importance of taking timely remedial safety action, whether or not an
investigation has been completed.
Subclause 26(5) clarifies that a
court cannot compel a person to provide a draft report to the court. This
subclause differs from previous references in Clause 26 about disclosure to
courts as those references relate to voluntary disclosure.
Subclause
26(6) provides that no disciplinary action may be taken against an employee
or a person on the basis of information in the draft report acquired under
Subclause 26(1) or (4). As draft reports may be subject to change before the
release of the final report, it may be premature to take disciplinary action
against an employee when the contents of the final report suggest that
disciplinary action may not have been warranted.
Subclause 26(7)
clarifies that, without consent, a person will not be referred to by name in a
draft report. For further explanation, refer to Explanatory Memorandum comments
at Subclause 25(4).
Clause 27 Reports not admissible in
evidence
Subclause 27(1) makes investigation reports
inadmissible in evidence in civil or criminal proceedings whether through
inadvertent disclosure or in contravention of this part of the Bill. This
subclause sends a clear message that such information is to be used for the
purpose of safety only and should not to be used in the judicial system for the
purpose of blame or liability, otherwise it could prejudice the free flow of
safety information in future transport safety
investigations.
Subclause 27(2) excepts coronial inquiries from
the provisions in Subclause 27(1). This acknowledges that coronial inquiries
share a similar purpose to investigations conducted under this
Bill.
Subclause 27(3) precludes admission of draft reports in
civil (including coronial) and criminal proceedings. A draft report may be
subject to change as a result of further investigation and the ‘interested
party’ process. Therefore, it would not be in the best interest of the
legal system or the individuals and organisations affected by the analysis and
conclusions of the investigation, for the ATSB to provide such a report for use
in any court proceedings, including coronial proceedings. The risk of incorrect
conclusions being drawn from the information contained in a draft report could
be significant and the repercussions unnecessary and damaging. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comment at Subclause 27(1).
Part 5 – Investigation
powers
Division 1 -
Preliminary
Clause 28 Powers only exercisable in
relation to an investigation
This clause clarifies that the powers
provided in Part 5 are confined to an investigation under this Bill. In
clarifying this matter, this clause acknowledges that the Bill provides for wide
and coercive powers that may infringe upon the rights of individuals. Therefore,
those powers must not be exercised except in relation to an investigation
conducted for the ultimate purpose of enhancing transport
safety.
Clause 29 Identity cards
Subclause 29(1)
imposes an obligation on the Executive Director to ensure that identity cards
are issued to persons exercising premises powers. Premises powers are defined in
Clause 3. Such an obligation is considered reasonable and is consistent with
requirements in other statutes, which also provide for premises powers. Persons
affected by the powers in this subclause need to be assured that the person
exercising those powers has a legal right to do so.
Subclause
29(2) makes it mandatory for an identity card to have a photograph and be in
a form prescribed by regulations. A photograph will clearly indicate to the
affected parties that the delegations to exercise those powers have been
conferred on the person shown on the identity card and enable the affected
parties to verify that the person carrying the identity card is bona
fide.
Subclause 29(3) creates an offence if a person issued with
an identity card does not return the card to the Executive Director when the
person ceases to be entitled to a card. This subclause therefore acknowledges
that the coercive powers conferred on the wearer of an identity card must not be
misused. This would prevent, for example, a person continuing to exert the
powers associated with the card to gain access to premises even though that
person no longer has the delegation to exert those powers.
Subclause
29(4) means the offence under Subclause 29(3) requires no proof of
‘fault element’ such as intent or knowledge.
Subclause
29(5) qualifies Subclause 29(4) by making a person not guilty of the offence
if the identity card was lost or stolen. Note that if a lost card was
subsequently used by another person, that person may be guilty of an offence
under the Criminal Code such as impersonation of a Commonwealth public
official, and may be subject to legal action for engaging in certain conduct
without proper legal authority (such as trespass).
Subclause 29(6)
requires the holder of an identity card to carry it when exercising premises
powers. For example, if four ATSB investigators wished to gain access to
premises at the same time, each of the four investigators who are exercising the
premises powers must have an identity card displayed, not simply the first
investigator of the four to gain access to the premises. However, an identity
card is not required by a person who is merely assisting an investigator to gain
entry to premises, where such assistance is required and who is not otherwise
exercising premises powers under this Bill.
Clause 30
Production of identity card
This clause removes the ability of the
Executive Director to exercise investigation powers under Part 5 if an occupier
requires the production of his identity card and the Executive Director (or
delegate) fails to comply.
Clause 31 Powers conferred on
magistrates
Subclause 31(1) clarifies that the powers
conferred on a magistrate by Part 5, are personal powers and not powers of a
court. Since the powers under Part 5 (ie. powers relating to search warrants)
are administrative and not judicial powers, this provision is consistent with
the notion of the separation of powers of the Judiciary and the Executive, and
the general assumption that a non-judicial power is conferred on the magistrate
only in his or her personal capacity.
Subclause 31(2) extends
court immunity to magistrates exercising powers under Part 5. For example, an
action against a magistrate in the ACT in relation to his or her issue of a
search warrant under Part 5 will not be successful unless the person who brought
the action can prove the magistrate was acting with malice and without
reasonable and probable cause (see Section 241 of the Magistrates Court Act
1930 (ACT)).
Subclause 31(3) makes it clear that a
magistrate of a particular State or Territory may issue search warrants in
respect of premises in another State or Territory. For example, it may be more
practical and expeditious to issue a warrant in the ACT (most investigators are
based in Canberra) before an investigator departs to the location where the
warrant is to be executed, say, the north-west of Western Australia. In such
cases, it may be logistically difficult to obtain a warrant from a magistrate in
Western Australia when it is considered necessary to act quickly to
preserve/collect evidence.
Division 2 –
Requirement to attend before the Executive Director
Clause
32 Executive Director may require persons to attend and answer questions
etc.
Subclause 32(1) enables the Executive Director to require
the attendance of a person for the purpose of an investigation and to require
production of specified evidential material. This mechanism ensures that
the Executive Director has the ability to obtain ALL the information he or she
considers is relevant to a safety investigation, particularly in cases where the
person does not wish to be cooperative. Note that this requirement may at times
be time-critical due to the possibility that evidential material may be
perishable or may become inaccessible. In addition, the need to require a person
to provide information to the Executive Director may also be essential in the
interests of safety as that person may be aware of critical safety information
that has the potential to prevent similar events from occurring. There is no
explicit provision for either legal counsel or any other person to accompany the
person attending before the Executive Director. However, as a matter of policy,
the Executive Director will allow a person to be accompanied by whomsoever they
wish, though that person or persons will be asked to observe only and not to
actively participate in the interview. Note that where the Executive Director
considers that the person accompanying the person attending before him/her is
engaging in conduct that is adversely affecting the investigation, that person
may be subject to penalties in respect of Clause 24 – Offence to hinder
etc. an investigation.
Also note that when a person is attending
before the Executive Director or his or her delegate under this subclause, that
person is required to answer questions put by any person the Executive Director
allows (not just the Executive Director or delegates) relating to matters
relevant to the investigation.
Subclause 32(2) clarifies that a
coroner, acting in his capacity as a coroner, cannot be compelled by the
Executive Director to answer questions or to provide evidential material.
However, this subclause does not prevent the Executive Director requiring a
coroner who, for example, may have been an eye witness to a transport accident,
to answer questions etc. as a private citizen. In addition, this subclause does
not prevent a person assisting the coroner such as police officer being required
by the Executive Director to attend and answer questions etc.
Subclause 32(3) provides that the Executive Director may only
exercise his or her power under Subclause 32(1) by issuing a written notice.
This subclause also outlines notice requirements when attendance of a person is
required for an investigation or when specified evidential material is
required. Note that the notice must be directed to an individual and not an
organisation.
Subclause 32(4) provides that the Executive
Director, when a person is required for an investigation, has the discretion to
require answers on oath or by affirmation and that he or she may administer
oaths or affirmations to a person. While this is not a common practice, there
may be some occasions in relation to critical safety matters, when the Executive
Director considers it necessary in order to satisfy himself or herself that the
person has been truthful and forthcoming in the provision of
information.
Subclause 32(5) makes it an offence to fail to attend
or produce evidential material as required under Subclause 32(1), or to
refuse to take oaths or make affirmations or answer questions. Note that this
clause should be read in conjunction with Clause 47 which describes the relevant
protection to a person from criminal and civil proceedings, in the event that
they incriminate themselves whilst complying with Clause 32. Therefore, a person
is not excused from attending and answering questions truthfully and providing
evidential material on the grounds that the answer to those questions or
the production of that evidentiary material may incriminate themselves or make
themselves liable to a penalty. This acknowledges the importance of the primary
need to identify the safety issues that may potentially save lives overriding
the right of an individual to exercise their right to claim self-incrimination
privilege or ‘penalty privilege’.
Subclause 32(6)
provides that the offence under Subclause (5) does not require any proof of
intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence with respect to the fact that
the requirement to answer questions or provide evidential material has
been given in accordance with clause 31. However, a person is not criminally
responsible for the offence if at or before the time of the offending conduct
the person considered whether or not the requirement was given in accordance
with Clause 32, and is under a mistaken but reasonable belief that the
requirement was not given in accordance with Clause 32 (see Section 9.2 of the
Criminal Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Subclause 32(7) provides an entitlement to payment of
fees, allowances and expenses in accordance with the regulations, for persons
who attend before the Executive Director under Subclause 32(1). In practice in
most cases, the Executive Director travels to a mutually agreed location so that
the person is subject to minimal
inconvenience.
Division 3 – Powers in relation to
premises
Clause 33 Power to enter special premises
without consent or warrant
This clause enables the Executive Director
to enter special premises without a warrant or consent and to use
reasonable force where necessary. Special premises is defined under
Clause 3 to include premises such as a transport vehicle or an accident site. In
practice, this clause allows an investigator to gain access to accident sites in
order to preserve and collect, as soon as possible, potentially vital evidence
relevant to an investigation. As there is usually considerable evidence on an
accident site that is perishable, it may be impracticable or impossible to get a
warrant in time, and so it is imperative to gain access to the site in a timely
fashion without having to obtain a warrant first. It may also be impractical to
gain consent to enter an accident site as this may unduly delay the commencement
of the evidence preservation and collection process. This power also extends to
vehicles, which, by their transient nature, may also need to be quickly accessed
in case they are removed to a less accessible location where relevant evidence
may be removed or destroyed simply by virtue of the vehicle relocating. Vehicles
include not only transport vehicles as defined for purposes of this Bill,
but also other vehicles such as cars and trucks. The ability to gain access to
vehicles without a warrant is consistent with similar provisions in other
statutes.
Clause 34 Power to enter any premises with occupier’s
consent
Subclause 34(1) enables the Executive Director to
enter any premises with the consent of the occupier. This is consistent with
long-standing ATSB practice in relation to entry to premises. However, where the
occupier has provided consent to enter premises, then subsequently withdraws
consent to cooperate further with the Executive Director, the Executive Director
may have to consider the need to exercise his/her powers under the provisions of
a warrant.
Subclause 34(2) makes it mandatory to inform persons
that they may refuse consent for entry to premises under Subclause 34(1), when
the Executive Director is obtaining consent. If the occupier refuses consent,
the Executive Director may consider the need to gain access to the premises
under the provisions of a warrant (refer to Clauses 40, 41 and 42), except in
relation to special premises, where the Executive Director may enter
without consent or warrant.
Subclause 34(3) requires consent to be
voluntary. A person must be completely willing and not goaded/forced into
consenting.
Clause 35 Power to enter any premises with
warrant
Subclause 35(1) empowers the Executive Director to
enter any premises under an investigation warrant. This is standard protocol,
which is consistent with Commonwealth legal policy. This provision will apply,
where necessary, to premises other than special premises.
Subclause 35(2) outlines formal requirements that the Executive
Director must comply with before entering premises under an investigation
warrant. These require announcement of authority and giving an opportunity to
any person at the premises to allow entry.
Subclause 35(3) excuses
the Executive Director from the requirements of Subclause 35(2) if he or she
believes it is necessary to ensure the safety of a person or effective execution
of the warrant. For example, if the investigator observes that someone’s
life is in danger inside the premises, they may consider it necessary to enter
the premises quickly to render or seek assistance. This provision is consistent
with warrant provisions in other statutes. It may also be the case, for example,
that the occupier is trying to stop or delay the Executive Director from
entering the premises in order to prevent evidential material from being
collected or to allow time to hide or destroy evidential material. In
such cases, it may be considered sufficiently important to prevent such actions
by entering the premises quickly without complying with Subclause
35(2).
Subclause 35(4) imposes a requirement on the Executive
Director to provide to the occupier a copy of the warrant or a copy of the form
of a warrant (eg. a proforma warrant may be all the Executive Director could
give to the occupier if the warrant was obtained by telephone under Clause 41
and therefore a copy of the signed warrant is not yet available at the time of
entry). This assures the occupier that the warrant is legitimate and explains
clearly the terms of the warrant. The occupier may also be able to determine
whether the Executive Director goes beyond the prescribed conditions of the
warrant.
Subclause 35(5) allows the Executive Director to use
whatever force and assistance is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances
to execute the warrant. This provision is consistent with Commonwealth legal
policy with respect to warrants.
Clause 36 Powers after entering
premises
Subclause 36(1) outlines what the Executive Director
may do after entering premises. This includes searching for, conducting tests
on, operating, retaining samples of, securing and copying evidential
material. This subclause also outlines what an investigator can do to access
or acquire evidential material. For example, it may be necessary to
operate equipment, other than electronic equipment, to obtain relevant
evidential material. Note that if experts are required to operate
equipment or obtain evidential material, the Executive Director may need
to issue appropriate delegations in order for this to be achieved.
Paragraph 36(1)(g) allows the Executive Director to remove
evidential material from premises with the consent of the owner where
practicable or, where it is not practicable to obtain the consent of the owner,
the occupier. This provision is consistent with other Commonwealth statutes that
provide for the removal of evidential material with consent. There may be many
situations when it will not be easy to identify who is the legal owner of the
material. For example a person may have been killed in a transport vehicle
accident or has otherwise passed away. Alternatively there may be a dispute
over the ownership of the thing, for example, aircraft parts and components are
often leased to multiple parties and under insurance arrangements the title to
the wreckage and parts of a crashed aircraft may pass to insurers. Similarly
when an airline is subject to insolvency proceedings, there may be a dispute
between a creditor and a person administering the insolvent firm. In such cases,
it would not be considered practicable to obtain the consent of the owner and it
would therefore be sufficient to obtain the consent of the
occupier.
Subclause 36(2) makes it clear that before evidential
material may be removed from premises with the consent of the owner or
occupier in accordance with paragraph 36(1)(g), the Executive Director must
inform the person of the purpose for which the material is required and that
they may refuse consent. Note that consent must be voluntary. This is consistent
with long-standing ATSB practice and reflects similar requirements in other
Commonwealth legislative regimes.
In cases where the occupier refuses
consent, the Executive Director must consider the need to seize the
evidential material under the terms of a warrant except if those premises
are special premises where material may be seized without consent or
warrant. Alternatively, the Executive Director may consider using his or her
powers to require that specified evidential material be produced to the
Executive Director in accordance with Clause 32.
Subclause 36(3)
provides additional powers if the premises are special premises. These
include the power for the Executive Director to require a person on the premises
to answer questions and produce evidential material and the power for the
Executive Director to seize evidential material, without the need for an
investigation warrant. The power of seizure will allow evidential
material to be removed from the premises for further examination. Special
premises include accident site premises and vehicles in accordance
with Clause 3 – Definitions.
In practice, this subclause
applies particularly to accident sites, where it may be necessary to
obtain information from witnesses while it is still fresh in their memories and
not ‘tainted’, for example, as a result of talking to other
witnesses or simply ‘faded’ as a factor of time passing between the
event and being interviewed by the Executive Director. Evidential
material, particularly on accident sites, could include wreckage,
documents etc., all of which may be perishable, that is, it could be damaged or
changed in some way due to the nature of the site and the passage of time. Such
evidential material must be collected/recorded
quickly for further examination off-site. This subclause also acknowledges the
transient nature of vehicles and therefore the possible need to seize
evidential material before it becomes inaccessible or perished by virtue
of the relocation of the vehicle to another place.
Note that consistent
with Commonwealth legal policy, the power to seize things without a warrant
under Subclause 36(3) is more limited than the power of seizure under warrant
under Subclause 36(4). The Executive Director may only seize evidential
material under paragraph 36(3)(b) where the material is directly relevant to
the investigation and where seizure is necessary to prevent interference with or
the concealment, loss, deterioration or destruction of the material.
Subclause 36(4) provides additional powers if entry to the
premises is made under an investigation warrant, for the Executive Director to
require a person on the premises to answer questions and produce evidential
material and for the Executive Director to seize any evidential
material in accordance with the warrant.
Subclause 36(5) makes
it an offence for refusing or failing to comply with Subclauses 36(3) or 36(4).
Such coercive powers are seen as necessary in the interests of transport safety.
Note that the provision of false or misleading information in the course of
complying (or purporting to comply) with a requirement under Subclause 36(3) or
36(4) is a criminal offence under Clause 137.1 of the Criminal
Code.
Subclause 36(6) provides that the offence under
Subclause 36(5) does not require any proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence with respect to the fact that the requirement to answer questions
or provide evidential material etc. has been given under Subsection 36(3)
or 36(4). However, a person is not criminally responsible for the offence if at
or before the time of the offending conduct the person considered whether or not
the requirement was given under Subsection 36(3) or 36(4), and is under a
mistaken but reasonable belief that the requirement was not given under either
of those provisions (see Section 9.2 of the Criminal Code regarding
mistake of fact (strict liability)).
Clause 37 Occupier to
provide Executive Director with facilities and assistance
This clause
imposes a requirement on occupiers of premises that are the subject of an
investigation warrant, to render reasonable facilities and assistance to the
Executive Director exercising his powers. This subclause is consistent with
similar provisions in other statutes.
Clause 38 Occupier entitled to
be present during search
Subclause 38(1) clarifies the extent
of an occupier's entitlement to be present during a search if an investigation
warrant is being executed in relation to the premises. The provision entitles
the occupier to be present at the premises and to observe the
search.
Subclause 38(2) removes rights to observe a search if the
occupier impedes the search.
Subclause 38(3) clarifies that a
right to observe does not preclude a simultaneous search of two or more areas of
the premises. This subclause is consistent with similar provisions in other
statutes.
Clause 39 Power to stop and detain transport
vehicles
This clause allows the Executive Director to stop and detain
a transport vehicle for the purposes of an investigation (Clause 28). However,
the transport vehicle must not be detained for longer than is necessary and
reasonable (Subclause 39(3)). The use of such a power must be consistent with
the main object of the Bill (Subclause 7(1)). In addition, the power under
Clause 39 can only be exercised if the Executive Director considers it is
necessary to prevent the evidential material on the transport vehicle from being
removed from Australia or being interfered with or to prevent its concealment,
loss, deterioration or destruction. This provision is primarily intended to
capture circumstances where, following the occurrence of an investigable
transport safety matter, a transport vehicle is capable of normal or near-normal
operation including, for example, continuing its journey either to other parts
of Australia or, in particular, overseas. In such cases, the Executive Director
may need to stop and/or detain the vehicle in order to collect evidential
material. Note that in order to exercise those powers, the Executive Director
may obtain such assistance and force as is necessary and reasonable under the
circumstances.
Current practice suggests that this provision would rarely
be required as, in most cases, investigation activities that meet the
requirements of the Executive Director are able to be completed at a time and
place mutually agreed to by the Executive Director and the operator of the
transport vehicle, with little or no disruption to transport services. Refer
also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause
16.
Division 4 – Investigation
warrants
Subclause 40(1) provides that the Executive Director may apply to
a magistrate for an investigation warrant.
Subclause 40(2)
clarifies that, before issuing a warrant, a magistrate must satisfy himself or
herself that there is evidential material on the premises or there may be
within 72 hours.
Subclause 40(3) clarifies that a magistrate may
require further information concerning the grounds for issuing a warrant and
that unless such information is provided by the Executive Director or some other
person, the warrant must not be issued.
Subclause 40(4) specifies
that the content of a warrant must authorise entry to the premises, authorise
the exercise of powers set out in Clause 36 and authorise seizure of
evidential material to which the warrant relates. Paragraph 40(4)(b)
requires the time of entry to be specified. Paragraph 40(4)(c) requires the
warrant to specify the day on which the warrant ceases to have effect and
paragraph 40(4)(d) requires the purpose of the warrant to be stated.
Clause 41 Investigation warrants by telephone, fax
etc.
Subclause 41(1) provides for the application for a
warrant under Clause 40 to be made by telephone and electronic means if urgent.
This may be necessary in cases where the Executive Director considers it
necessary to obtain a warrant quickly and when it may not be practical to do so
in accordance with Clause 40. For example, it may be necessary for a marine
investigator to board and search a ship on a weekend before the ship departs for
an overseas port. In such cases, the only practical means of obtaining a warrant
quickly may be in accordance with this subclause.
Subclause 41(2)
provides that a magistrate may require communication by voice to the extent
practicable in the circumstances. This is to allow the magistrate to satisfy
himself or herself that there is evidential material on the premises or
there may be within 72 hours and to clarify any of the conditions of the warrant
being requested by the Executive Director.
Subclause 41(3)
requires the Executive Director to prepare details of the kind specified in
Subclause 40(2) setting out the reasons for and conditions of the
warrant.
Subclause 41(4) clarifies that the Executive Director
may, for example in urgent situations, submit an application for a warrant
first, and then proceed to swear to declare the truthfulness of the information
provided to the magistrate after the event. Note, however, that the Executive
Director must provide duly sworn information to the magistrate no later than the
day after the day of expiry or execution of the warrant in accordance with
Subclause 41(7).
Subclause 41(5) provides for a magistrate to
issue a warrant on consideration of the information and any further information
required if he or she is satisfied there are reasonable grounds to issue the
warrant.
Paragraph 41(6)(a) makes it obligatory for a magistrate,
upon signing a warrant, to tell the Executive Director the terms, date and time,
duration and record the reasons.
Paragraph 41(6)(b) makes it
obligatory for the Executive Director to complete a form of warrant as
instructed by the magistrate, and record details of the magistrate and
date.
Subclause 41(7) makes it obligatory for the Executive
Director to return the form of warrant and duly sworn information to the
magistrate not later than the day after the day of expiry or execution of the
warrant whichever is the earlier.
Subclause 41(8) makes it
obligatory for the magistrate to attach documents provided under Subclause 41(7)
to the signed warrant and deal with them in the same way as an application under
Clause 40.
Subclause 41(9) clarifies that a form of warrant
completed under paragraph 41(6)(b) has the same authority as a warrant signed by
the magistrate.
Subclause 41(10) provides that if a warrant signed
by a magistrate authorising the exercise of power is not produced in evidence in
court proceedings the court must assume, unless the contrary is proved, that the
exercise of the power was not authorised by the warrant. That is, if the
original document representing the warrant signed by the magistrate (and not
simply the ‘form of warrant’ produced by the Executive Director) is
not provided to the court, then the warrant used by the Executive Director at
the time, is not considered to be legally authorised.
Clause 42 False
statements etc. in application for warrant etc.
Subclause
42(1) makes it an offence for the Executive Director to make false or
misleading statements, or statements omitting significant information, in an
application for an investigation warrant.
Subclause 42(2) and
Subclause 42(3) provide that the prohibition under subclause 42(1) does
not apply where the Executive Director’s statement is not false or
misleading in relation to a material aspect, or where the statement did not omit
anything significant.
Subclause 42(4) makes it an offence for the
Executive Director to misuse warrant provisions under Clause 41, for example, by
presenting a document that purports to be a warrant issued under Clause 41 where
it is not, or contains terms different from the terms of the warrant issued.
Subclause 42(5) provides that the offence under paragraph
42(4)(a) or (c) does not require any proof of intention, knowledge, recklessness
or negligence with respect to the fact that the document purports to be a form
of warrant under Clause 41. However, the Executive Director is not criminally
responsible for the offence if at or before the time of the offending conduct he
or she considered whether or not the document purported to be a warrant under
Clause 41, and is under a mistaken but reasonable belief that it did not (see
Section 9.2 of the Criminal Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Subclause 42(6) provides that the offence under
paragraph 42(4)(b) or (d) does not require any proof of intention, knowledge,
recklessness or negligence with respect to the fact that the form of warrant is
under Clause 41. However, the Executive Director is not criminally responsible
for the offence if at or before the time of the offending conduct he or she
considered whether or not the warrant was under Clause 41, and is under a
mistaken but reasonable belief that it was not (see Section 9.2 of the
Criminal Code regarding mistake of fact (strict
liability)).
Division 5 – Protection
orders
Clause 43 Protection orders by Executive
Director
This clause allows the Executive Director to issue an order
to prevent evidence from being removed or interfered with. Contravention of such
an order constitutes an offence. This offence differs from the offence under
Clause 24 in that there is no need to prove actual adverse impact on any
investigation where the Executive Director has issued a protection order under
Subclause 43(1). This clause is intended to cover situations, in particular
other than at accident sites, where it might have been usual, despite being
related to a serious safety occurrence (immediately
reportable matter), to remove or interfere with specified things, or a
specified class of things. For example, there may have been an immediately
reportable matter in which the crew of an aircraft was temporarily
incapacitated due to suspected fumes in the aircraft possibly emanating from the
passengers’ cabin baggage lockers. Following a normal landing after the
event, it may have been usual practice to allow the passengers to remove their
cabin baggage. However, the Executive Director may consider it necessary to
examine the passenger cabin baggage in-situ before it is released to the
passengers. In such a case, the Executive Director would issue a protection
order for the baggage not to be interfered with until he or she has properly
examined it. A further example to illustrate this clause in practice is that the
cargo load may have shifted while a ship was en route between ports, resulting
in a loss of ship stability. Although it might be accepted practice to allow
removal of cargo once the ship arrives in port, the Executive Director may
consider it necessary to issue an order for the cargo to remain in-situ until it
is properly examined. In practice, these are not decisions taken lightly and
protection orders would only be issued if the Executive Director considers it
necessary in the interests of transport safety.
Subclause 43(4)
provides exceptions to the offence created under Subclause 43(1). These are the
same exceptions to the offence created under Subclause 24(1). For further
explanation, refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
24(2).
Subclause 43(5) states that, in the spirit of cooperation,
the Bill is not intended to unnecessarily impede the statutory activities of
other Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies. Therefore the Executive
Director will not unreasonably withhold permission under Subclause
43(1)
Division 6 – Securing accident
sites
Clause 44 Securing accident
sites
This clause enables the Executive Director, by securing the
perimeter of an accident site, to prevent any person from entering or remaining
on the accident site without the permission of the Executive Director. The power
described in this clause serves a number of purposes. For example, it enables
better control over the preservation of evidence and allows the Executive
Director to exercise his or her duty-of -care responsibilities with regard to
occupational health and safety issues. This provision is not intended to
restrict access by other agencies with legitimate grounds to investigate, though
such access may necessarily need to be under the supervision of the Executive
Director for the reasons previously outlined.
Note that the site may
have been previously secured by another authority, for example, police or the
local firefighting authority. It is expected that the Executive Director would
not formally control access to the accident site until he or she arrives on site
and the relevant authority declares that the site is safe to access. Prior to
arrival, the Executive Director may liaise with local authorities and provide
advice regarding site access, evidence preservation and safety issues.
Whilst this provision gives power to the Executive Director to control
access to the site once rescue and other ‘first response’ activities
have been completed, the legislation leaves room for the Executive Director to
cooperate with other agencies and is less coercive in this respect than some
provisions of law enforcement agencies. Investigators of the ATSB have enjoyed a
good working relationship with first response and law enforcement agencies over
the years. This legislation does not seek to jeopardise that relationship but
does reiterate that, for the continued free flow of safety information and, in
turn, the safety of the travelling public, law enforcement and safety
investigation processes must remain separate to the extent possible. In essence,
the intention is for both authorities to work cooperatively to achieve
respective objectives.
Subclause 44(3) – Provides exceptions
to the offence created under Subclause 44 (1). These are the same exceptions to
the offences created under Subclauses 24(1) and 43(1). For further explanation
refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
24(2).
Subclause 44 (4) states that, in the spirit of cooperation,
the Bill is not intended to unnecessarily impede the statutory activities of
other Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies. Therefore the Executive
Director will not unreasonably withhold permission under paragraph
44(2)(b).
Division 7 –
Miscellaneous
Clause 45 Retention, testing etc. of
evidential material
This clause sets out the administrative
requirements for evidential material, and those things that may be done
to material seized for the purposes of an investigation.
Subclause 45(2) requires that the Executive Director must provide
a receipt for the evidential material acquired under various provisions
in Part 5 of this Bill. This requirement forms part of the protocol for the
continuity of evidence. The receipt provides proof of who has possession of the
evidence and in what condition it was in at the time it was produced, removed
with consent or seized.
Subclause 45(3) provides that the
Executive Director may make copies of evidential material acquired under
Clause 32 or Part 5. It is normal protocol for the Executive Director to make
copies of documents etc. and not to retain original material any longer than is
necessary. Note that the Executive Director, being a non-judicial authority, is
not bound by formal rules of evidence when conducting an investigation under
this Bill. Therefore, uncertified copies of evidential material are
sufficient for the purpose of a transport safety investigation under this Bill.
Subclause 45(4) provides that the Executive Director may
examine or test evidential material even if the examination or test
results in damage or destruction of that material. Destructive testing is not
normally carried out on evidential material that is considered to be
capable of being returned to its owner for return to normal service or repair,
for example, a propeller blade or the bogie of a rail vehicle. However, the
Executive Director may consider it necessary on some occasions to carry out
destructive testing when there is no other suitable alternative and the testing
is in the interests of transport safety. In such cases, the Executive Director
would consider, on a case by case basis, permitting parties with a legitimate
interest to observe the testing process.
Subclause 45(5) requires
that the Executive Director must return evidential material when it is no
longer required for the purposes of a transport safety investigation and is
consistent with ATSB policy. It is also recognised that other agencies may have
a legitimate right to the same evidential material and the Executive
Director would not wish to unnecessarily frustrate the progress of other
investigations. By returning the material to its owner, other agencies may then
exercise their rights to access such material and obtain the material from the
owner. In addition, the owner of the evidential material may be
temporarily disadvantaged as a result of evidential material being held
by the Executive Director for the purposes of an investigation. For example, an
aircraft or ship may be delayed from returning to normal service until such time
as the evidential material is returned. In such cases, the Executive
Director would only hold that material for such time as was considered necessary
for the purpose of the investigation.
Subclause 45(6) and Subclause
45(7) provides a mechanism for the Executive Director to provide
evidential material that is not OBR or restricted information
directly to other Commonwealth and State authorities or to a coroner. Making
available such material is provisional on a request in writing from the relevant
authority or coroner, and the Executive Director being satisfied that making the
material available will not interfere with an investigation to which the
material relates. This clause is intended to cover such items as transport
vehicle wreckage, components, baggage, goods and documents or other evidence
acquired at accident sites or obtained under other provisions of the Bill except
when that information is OBR or restricted information. Note that
restricted information includes information acquired under compulsion in
accordance with the provisions of Clause 32 and paragraphs 36(3)(a) and 36(4)(a)
and is therefore subject to the protection under Subclause 47(2).
Note
also that the provision of OBR or restricted information to other
authorities or to the coroner, would be subject to Part 6 – Protection
of OBR information and restricted information.
Subclause
45(8) explains that the owner includes an agent of the owner and therefore
allows evidential material to be returned to an agent where appropriate.
For example, it is not unusual in marine for most of the dealings in relation to
an investigation to be conducted through a shipping agent acting on behalf of
the owner. It would also be impractical in some cases to return material
directly to the owner so an arrangement with an agreed agent may need to be
made. In many cases, following an accident where the vehicle suffers extensive
damage, the owner is deemed to be the insurer.
This subclause also
provides a list of those persons or authorities that may be given evidential
material under Subclause 45(6).
Clause 46 Compensation for
damage to electronic equipment
This clause provides detail on the
circumstances in which compensation for damage to electronic equipment must be
made when such equipment has been operated by the Executive Director in
accordance with premises powers (Clause 36). This is a common provision in other
legislation permitting operation of electronic equipment on
premises.
Clause 47 Self-incrimination not an
excuse
Subclauses 47(1) and 47(2) clarify that whenever a
person is obliged to answer questions and produce evidential material
under provisions of this Bill (such as Clause 32, paragraph 36(3)(a) or
36(4)(a)) that person cannot be excused from answering those questions or
providing that material on the grounds that it might incriminate them or make
them liable for a penalty. These subclauses also acknowledge that such coercive
powers must be accompanied by appropriate protections. Therefore, information
obtained directly or indirectly as a result of answers to questions or
evidential material produced under Clause 32, paragraph 36(3)(a) or 36
(4)(a), cannot be admitted as evidence in criminal or civil proceedings against
the person who provided the information or material. Note that where the
material provided is OBR information, it is also inadmissible according to
Clause 55 in relation to criminal proceedings against crew members. Note
also that the use-derivative-use provisions of this clause are consistent with
Commonwealth legal policy. Advice received from the Attorney General’s
Department indicated that the removal of the derivative-use provisions would not
be supported unless significant empirical evidence was provided as to how this
provision had adversely affected the operation of other statutes.
Notwithstanding, this clause does not prevent other agencies from separately
collecting the same information that may then be admitted as evidence.
Subclause 47(3) means that notwithstanding Subclause 47(2),
information given in answer to the Executive Director’s questions may be
used in evidence in criminal proceedings concerning the falsity of the
information.
Subclause 47(4) clarifies that the immunity provided
under Subclause 47(2) overrides any other clauses in this Bill dealing with the
admissibility of evidence in criminal or civil proceedings. For example, OBR
information cannot be admitted in evidence against the person who provided the
OBR to the Executive Director, even where all the conditions set out under
Subclause 56(3) are met.
Part 6 – Protection of
OBR information and restricted
information
Division 1 – OBR
information
Clause 48 Definition of OBR or
on-board recording
Subclause 48(1) defines the
meaning of on-board recording or OBR. To fall within the definition of an
OBR, a recording must meet the descriptions provided under paragraphs 48(1)(a),
(b), and (c), and also at least one of the descriptions under paragraph
48(1)(d). This is to ensure that there is a proper constitutional basis for the
provisions throughout the Bill relating to OBRs. (Refer also to Clause 11)
Note that the principles contained in this Division relating to the
disclosure and use of OBR information are derived from existing legislation and
reflect standards and recommended practices of international
agreements.
Control area is a generic name being used for the
purposes of this Bill. Refer to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 3 for
examples of control areas in different transport modes.
An OBR
may be in the form of a Cockpit Voice Recording (CVR as referred to in
aviation). It is also the only form of control area recording that is
currently required by any law in Australia (Commonwealth or State/Territory) and
is to be carried in certain classes of aircraft. However, this legislation
acknowledges that such technology is carried in other forms of transport and is
likely to become mandatory in the future. For example, there is already an
international program for the introduction of laws that will require OBRs on
certain classes of ships. Therefore, such recordings will need to be provided
with the same protections as any other similar recordings required by law.
Historically, CVRs were required by law ONLY for the purposes of
transport safety investigation in recognition of the fact that they had the
potential to provide vital information about the circumstances and contributing
factors of accidents. In particular, CVRs were originally intended only to be
used to assist in the investigation of occurrences where the flight crew were
fatally injured as a result of an accident and were therefore unable themselves
to provide critical safety information about the events immediately preceding
the accident. CVR information is now used more broadly in many non-fatal
accidents and serious incidents as the information has also proven to be vital
in those cases.
It is acknowledged that such recordings constitute an
invasion of privacy for the operating crew of an aircraft that most other
employees in workplaces are not subject to. Such recordings, therefore, must be
treated with the utmost confidentiality and continue to be used for safety
investigation purposes only. To ensure the ongoing availability of information
from CVRs, it was considered necessary to protect the rights of individuals, in
particular the operating crew of an aircraft. Inappropriate use of CVR
information in the judicial system, for example, may adversely affect transport
safety, both domestically and internationally, as it is unlikely that the
availability and free flow of safety information will be guaranteed/continued in
the future. Inappropriate use by an operator such as for disciplinary action may
also result in an adverse outcome for transport safety. For example, the
operating crew of an aircraft has the ability to deny access to CVR information
simply by ‘pulling’ a circuit breaker, thus rendering a CVR
inoperative.
In a recent case in New Zealand (NZ), the desire of NZ
police to prosecute a DASH-8 crew for an operational error that led to an
aircraft crash resulted in strong ICAO/international criticism. In this case,
the police charged the crew with manslaughter and seized the cockpit voice
recorder as evidence. These actions subsequently led to NZ and foreign
aircrews ‘pulling’ circuit breakers on CVR devices when within NZ
airspace and in doing so, rendered the CVR inoperative. This effectively denied
access by investigators to vital information for future safety investigations.
Aircrews were also less inclined to be cooperative and forthcoming to safety
investigators in relation to their role in air safety occurrences. At the time
of the events described above, NZ legislation did not provide protection
regarding the disclosure and use of CVRs. Those tensions have since eased with a
change to NZ law that now provides similar disclosure and use provisions for
CVRs as those provided in Australian legislation.
The need to provide
adequate protection to CVR information was recently reaffirmed by the
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) in its Working Paper A33-WP/46
of 29 June 2001, in which it expressed a concern about inappropriate use of
accident and incident records in some Contracting States. ICAO considered that
accident and incident records such as CVR recordings should be protected from
utilisation in disciplinary, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings, and
from disclosure to the news media and the public. Therefore, it proposed a
resolution urging Contracting States ‘to examine, and if necessary, adjust
their laws, regulations and policies to protect certain accident and incident
records in order to mitigate impediments to accident and incident
investigations’.
Note that a recording becomes an OBR within the
meaning of the Bill only upon the occurrence of an immediately reportable
matter as prescribed by the regulations. However, once an immediately
reportable matter has occurred, the entire recording becomes an OBR,
including parts of the recording made prior to the time of the occurrence,
unless and until such time as the Executive Director declares that the recording
ceases to be an OBR (see Clause 49). Since a recording is protected under
Clauses 53, 54, 55, 56 and 59 as long as the recording remains an OBR for the
purposes of the Bill. The effect of the definition under this subclause is that
any person is prevented from interfering with or disclosing OBR information
which relates to an immediately reportable matter even before it may have
been reported under Clause 18 and before there is any decision to investigate.
This ensures that, until otherwise indicated, this information is protected and
not used in any way contrary to the provisions of this Bill.
Subclause 48(2) is a broader version of the definition of OBR,
and will capture a wider range of recordings than the definition under Subclause
48(1). It is intended that in most circumstances, the broader definition under
Subclause 48(2) will be adopted. However, where there is doubt as to whether
sufficient link to the Commonwealth’s Constitutional power may be
established with respect to a particular recording, the narrower definition
under Subclause 48(1) will be used in determining whether that recording is an
OBR.
Subclause 48(3) allows the Executive Director to declare
that a particular kind or class of recording that might otherwise be interpreted
under Subclause 48(1) to be an OBR, is not an OBR for the purposes of this Bill.
For example, it may be argued that a recording made at an Air Traffic Control
facility that includes some of the sounds within the cockpit of an aircraft
could be construed as an OBR. To avoid doubt, such recordings will be declared
in the regulations not to be an OBR. As recording technology is rapidly
changing, it was considered appropriate to prescribe any necessary exceptions
within the regulations to avoid either:
• inadvertently
constraining the ability of the Executive Director to provide discrete
protections for an OBR, which is a kind of recording with a unique purpose;
or
• inadvertently broadening those discrete protections to include a
kind of recording that was not intended to be the subject of such
protections.
It must be noted that while a recording made at an Air
Traffic Control Centre, and equivalents in other transport modes, may not be an
OBR for the purposes of this Bill, they would nevertheless be classed as
restricted information and be subject to the considerable restrictions on
disclosure under Part 6 Division 2 – Restricted
Information.
The declaration under this Subclause 48(3) and the
regulations is different from the declaration under Clause 49. Declaration under
the regulations would cover an entire class of recordings of a specified nature,
and once declared, any recording within the specified class would be outside the
scope of the OBR provisions. A declaration under Clause 49 only relates to
discrete recordings relating to a specific occurrence. See Explanatory
Memorandum notes at Clause 49 for further explanation.
Subclause 48(4) defines constitutional journey consistent
with the Commonwealth’s constitutional limits regarding transport safety
investigation.
Clause 49 OBR ceasing to be an OBR under Executive
Director’s declaration
This clause enables the Executive
Director to declare that an OBR ceases to be an OBR. Subclause 49(1) provides
for a discretionary power to do so while Subclauses 49(2) and (3) place
obligations on the Executive Director to make a declaration under specified
circumstances. Note that upon such declaration, all protection for the OBR and
any related OBR information in respect of the recording ceases. However, the
recording may still be protected as restricted information under Division
2, Part 6.
Subclause 49(2) places an obligation on the Executive
Director where he or she elects not to investigate an immediately reportable
matter to declare by published notice that any related OBR is not an OBR for
the purposes of the Bill. When an OBR ceases to be an OBR under this subclause,
any related OBR information also ceases to be OBR information (see Subclause
49(5)).. By declaring that the OBR has ceased to be an OBR, other agencies with
statutory rights to investigate may do so without impediment, for example, State
rail, marine or OH&S agencies and other Commonwealth
agencies
Subclause 49(3) places an obligation on the Executive
Director to declare by published notice that parts of an OBR not relevant to a
transport safety matter that is being investigation under the Bill, are not to
be treated as an OBR on and after the date specified. This allows those parts of
the OBR to be used for other purposes such as training or for other
investigations being conducted by State, Territory and Commonwealth agencies.
Subclause 49(5) also applies with respect to this subclause.
Subclause
49(4) states that once the Executive Director has declared that an OBR
ceases to be an OBR, he or she cannot change/reverse that decision.
Clause 50 Executive Director’s certificate about
disclosure of OBR information
This clause enables the Executive
Director to certify that the disclosure of specified OBR information is not
likely to prejudice or interfere with any investigation. Such certification is
one of the requirements to be met for OBR information to be disclosed under
paragraph 53(3)(d) and to be admitted in evidence in civil proceedings under
Clause 56. Note that this certificate may also be used to allow disclosure by a
person who is not the Executive Director for coronial inquiries under paragraph
53(3)(d) (eg. if police have obtained the OBR information under paragraph
53(3)(b), it would be possible for the coroner to obtain OBR information from
the police under paragraph 53(3)(d) rather than directly from the Executive
Director under Clause 59).
Clause 51 Release of OBR information
in the interests of transport safety
This clause permits the
Executive Director to publicly release OBR information for the purposes of
transport safety, notwithstanding anything in the Bill to prevent disclosure of
such information. In practice, this is not a decision taken lightly (refer to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause 48(1)). If publicly released, OBR
information would be restricted to only those parts of the OBR that are directly
relevant to the circumstances and analysis of the immediately reportable
matter and which could not be obtained by any other means.
Note that
disclosure of OBR information under this clause will not include personal
information except in the circumstances prescribed by the regulations. It is
intended that the Executive Director would only release such information if
required to do so under an international agreement referred to in the
regulations. Note that any personal information released under Subclause 51(2)
will still be subject to protection under other provisions within the Bill which
place restrictions on further disclosure of the OBR information to any other
parties.
Clause 52 Executive Director may authorise persons to
have access to OBR information
This clause provides the Executive
Director with a discretionary power to grant general access to OBR information
to a person who falls outside the definition of staff member either
generally or in relation to a specific occurrence. Such a person may, for
example, be a temporary or non-ongoing employee who is not an APS employee, or a
contractor or consultant who does not have delegated powers under this Bill.
This may become necessary in cases, for example, where experts other than
staff members are required to assist with replaying and analysing the
contents of the OBR. For example, an interpreter may be needed if the contents
of the OBR are in a foreign language, or an expert in voice analysis may be
required to provide expert opinion on the content of the OBR. In accordance with
international agreements, there may be other persons considered appropriate to
have access to OBR information. In most instances, the Executive Director will
consider such a need on a case by case basis. Those persons will be subject to
the confidentiality provisions under Clause 53 in relation to OBR
information.
Clause 53 Copying or disclosing OBR
information
Subclauses 53(1) and 53(2) prohibit copying
or disclosure of OBR information. Note that disclosure to a court, including a
coroner or a tribunal, is also prohibited under this subclause, subject to the
exceptions under Subclause 53(3). Also note that OBR information is defined
under Clause 3 to include a copy or transcript of the OBR made before or after
the occurrence of the immediately reportable matter that caused the
recording to become an OBR. This subclause reinforces the notion that the
confidentiality of this information is considered to be of the utmost importance
and that it is to be used primarily for the purpose of transport safety
investigation.
Subclause 53(3) provides the exceptions to the
prohibition under Subclauses 53(1) and (2). Such exceptions include disclosure
or copying in the course of the exercise of powers under this Bill or in
connection with this Bill (paragraph 53(3)(a)). This represents a normal part of
the investigation process where a team approach is taken and where it may be
necessary to disclose the contents of an OBR to external experts and others for
the purposes of properly analysing the significance of the information. While
paragraph 53(3)(b) allows copying or disclosure, for example, to the police, for
purposes of the investigation of any offence against a law of the Commonwealth,
a State or a Territory, it should be noted that any OBR information so disclosed
would not be admissible in criminal proceedings against crew members (see
Clause 55).
Under paragraph 53(3)(c), disclosure to a court for the
purposes of criminal proceedings is only allowed in criminal proceedings against
someone who is not a crew member, for example, in relation to a hijack
or in-flight violence.
Paragraph 53(3)(d) permits disclosure to
a court in civil proceedings (including coronial proceedings) where the
Executive Director has issued a certificate under Clause 50 stating that the
disclosure is not likely to interfere with ANY investigation, and the court or
coroner has made a determination under Subclause 53(4). Disclosure of OBR
information is also permitted where a coroner has determined the information to
be no longer confidential (paragraph 53(3)(e)). As stated in the Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 50, a person who is not the Executive Director may
disclose OBR information for coronial inquiries under paragraph 53(3)(d) (eg. if
police have obtained the OBR information under paragraph 53(3)(b), it would be
possible for the coroner to obtain OBR information from the police under
paragraph 53(3)(d) rather than directly from the Executive Director under Clause
59).
Subclause 53(4) sets out the conditions under which a court
may order that the OBR information is permitted to be disclosed under paragraph
53(3)(d)(ii). In essence, the court needs to conduct a public interest test to
weigh up the relevance of the information in the administration of justice
against any adverse impact of such disclosure on any current or future
investigation.
Subclause 53(5) allows the court to issue
directions to prohibit or restrict publication and communication of the OBR
information to any person. This subclause ensures that the
‘audience‘ is restricted to only those persons necessary and keeps
out other parties, for example, the media, who may take the OBR information out
of context or use it for purposes other than relating to the
proceedings.
Subclause 53(6) clarifies that a person cannot be
compelled by a court to disclose OBR information. In addition, where a person
discloses OBR information in contravention of Subclause 53(1), that information
cannot then be admissible as evidence, thus removing any doubt about the
discretion of a court to admit such evidence.
Clause 54 OBR
information no ground for disciplinary action
This clause prevents
any person from using OBR information as the basis for a disciplinary action
against that person’s employee. That employee may be a crew member
within the meanings of the Bill or any other person. This clause reinforces the
notion that OBR information is to be used for safety purposes only and that,
while there may be relevant safety messages which arise from the OBR
information, it should be used in a constructive way such as retraining,
changing procedures etc. and not for disciplinary action such as dismissal or
demotion.
Clause 55 OBR information not admissible in criminal
proceedings against crew members
This clause prevents OBR information
and any information or thing derived from the use of OBR information, from being
admitted in evidence in criminal proceedings against a crew member except
proceedings for an offence against the Bill, such as Clause 24 for tampering
with an OBR in order to hinder an investigation.
Clause 56
Admissibility of OBR information in civil proceedings
Subclause
56(1) allows OBR information to be admitted in civil proceedings provided
that the Executive Director issues a certificate under Clause 50 certifying that
the disclosure of the information is not likely to prejudice or interfere with
any investigation, and that the court makes an order under Subclause 56(3).
Note that these requirements are in addition to the restrictions on the
disclosure of OBR information for purposes of civil proceedings under
paragraph 53(3)(d). A public interest order will mean that the court will have
to perform a ‘balancing act’ by weighing up the potential domestic
and international safety impact on current or future investigations against the
proper administration of justice. In conducting that balancing act, the court
will also need to take into account whether the evidence can be obtained by
other means. If the court considers it is likely that the free flow of safety
information will be affected in future because of the disclosure and use of the
OBR information, and that this impact outweighs the administration of justice,
then the court may rule against disclosure (and conversely).
This is consistent with international practice. Note that this subclause
does not allow admittance of OBR information where such information is made
inadmissible by Subclause 47(2) which prevents admittance of information in
proceedings against a person who has given that information without being
allowed to claim self-incrimination privilege or ‘penalty privilege’
according to Subclause 47(1).
Subclause 56(2) allows a party to a
proceeding to apply for an order that OBR information be admissible in the
proceeding. The onus will be on the parties to justify disclosure, rather than
the Executive Director having to continually take privilege claims when
disclosure is sought.
Subclause 56(3) sets out the conditions
under which a court may order that the OBR information is admissible. In
essence, the court needs to conduct a public interest test to weigh up the
relevance of the information in the administration of justice against any
adverse impact of such disclosure on any current or future investigation. (For
further explanation, refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
56(1)). Note that a co-requirement for admissibility is a certificate issued by
the Executive Director under Clause 50.
Subclause 56(4) provides
that coronial inquiries do not come under this clause. In other words, once OBR
information is permitted to be disclosed for the purposes of a coronial inquiry
under either paragraph 53(3)(d) or Clause 59, it will be admissible in the
coronial proceedings.
Clause 57 Examination by a court of OBR
information under subsection 56(3)
This clause places restrictions on
who may be present while a court is examining OBR information for the purposes
of making an order under Subclause 56(3). It also allows the court to issue
directions to prohibit or restrict publication and communication of the OBR
information to any person. This clause ensures that the ‘audience’
is restricted to only those persons necessary and keeps out other parties who
may take the OBR information out of context or use it for purposes other than
relating to the proceedings.
Clause 58 Where a court makes an
order under subsection 56(3)
This clause specifies that OBR
information admitted in a civil proceeding may not be used in evidence for the
determination of the liability in the proceedings of a crew member but
may be used for such purposes with respect to non crew members. It also
allows the court to issue directions to prohibit or restrict publication and
communication of the admitted OBR information to any person. Refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 57.
Clause 59 Use of OBR
information in coronial inquiries
Subclause 59(1) requires the
Executive Director, at the request of a coroner, to make OBR information
available to the coroner, unless the Executive Director believes the
coroner’s access to the information is likely to interfere with any
investigation to which the OBR concerned relates. For example, a particular
transport safety matter may still be under investigation at the time of a
coronial inquiry into that same or related matter. In such cases, the Executive
Director may consider it inappropriate to disclose the requested OBR information
at that time as it may prejudice the investigation if that information was made
public before the investigation was completed. Note that this test is easier to
satisfy compared with the test under Clause 53 for the disclosure by any person
(including a person who is not the Executive Director), which requires the
disclosure to be unlikely to ‘interfere with any
investigation’.
Subclause 59(2) means that the coroner must
examine OBR information in the privacy of the coroner’s chambers (ie.
interested parties to the coronial proceedings and the public will be excluded)
before the coroner may make a determination that the information should no
longer be protected from disclosure. Note that such a determination will not
make the information admissible in any other proceedings where admissibility is
prevented by other clauses of this Bill.
Subclause 59(3) provides
that the coroner may only make a determination under Subclause 59(2) where the
information concerned is relevant and cannot be obtained by an alternative
means, and where any adverse impact on a safety investigation is outweighed by
the public interest. Refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at Subclause
56(1).
Subclause 59(4) allows the coroner to
issue directions to prohibit or restrict publication and communication of the
OBR information to any person. For further explanation, refer also to
Explanatory Memorandum comments at Clause 57.
Subclause 59(5)
makes it an offence to contravene a direction by the coroner in respect of
Subclause 59(4). This offence was included to remove any doubt about whether
there is any real legal consequence attached to the contravention of a
coroner’s direction under Subclause
59(4).
Division 2 – Restricted
information
Clause 60 Limitations on disclosure etc. of
restricted information
Subclauses 60(1), (2) and (3) prohibit
a person who is or has been an staff member, or who has been authorised to
access restricted information under Clause 62, from making a record of
restricted information, or disclosing the information to any person.
Restricted information covers various types of sensitive information
acquired by a staff member under or in connection with this Bill. For further
explanation and examples of restricted information, refer to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 3.
Note that disclosure to a court,
including to a coroner or a tribunal, is also prohibited under this subclause.
The restrictions on the disclosure and admissibility of restricted
information referred to in Division 2 of this Part, reinforce the notion
that safety investigation processes and those relating to judicial proceedings,
particularly criminal proceedings, should be separate to ensure a continued free
flow of safety information. The principles of this provision are derived from
existing legislation and reflect standards and recommended practices of
international agreements. Note that nothing in Division 2 of this Part prevents
other agencies separately collecting and using evidential material that
is restricted information for the purposes of judicial and other
proceedings.
Subclause 60(4) provides the exceptions to the
prohibition under Subclause 60(1), (2) and (3). Such exceptions include
disclosure or copying in the course of the exercise of powers under this Bill or
in connection with this Bill (refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments at
Subclause 53(3)). This subclause allows disclosure to a court for purposes of
criminal proceedings for an offence against this Bill, for example, providing
false information, which is an offence under Clause 24 as well as an offence
under the Criminal Code. In addition, this subclause allows disclosure to
a court in civil proceedings where the Executive Director has issued a
certificate under Subclause 60(5) and the court makes a public interest order
under Subclause 60(6). Note that information disclosed as permitted under
Subclause 60(4) will be admissible in court proceedings, subject to Subclause
47(2), which prevents admission of information in proceedings against a person
where the person has given that information without being allowed to claim
self-incrimination privilege or ‘penalty
privilege’.
Subclause 60(5) enables the Executive Director
to certify that the disclosure of the restricted information is not
likely to prejudice or interfere with any investigation.
Subclause
60(6) allows the court to order disclosure of restricted information
if it is satisfied that any adverse impact on transport safety investigation is
outweighed by the public interest (refer also to Explanatory Memorandum comments
at Subclause 56(1)).
Subclause 60(7) allows the court to issue
directions to prohibit or restrict publication and communication of the
restricted information to any person. Refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 57.
Subclause 60(8) prevents a court
from requiring a person to disclose restricted information. This
subclause also clears up any doubt about the discretionary power of a court in
relation to the admissibility of evidence. This means that restricted
information is not admissible as evidence in civil or criminal proceedings
where disclosure of that information is not permitted under the provisions of
this Bill, for example, a person discloses information to a court in
contravention of Subclause 60(1), (2) or (3). However, this subclause does not
prevent admittance of restricted information in evidence against a person
for disclosing restricted information in contravention of Subclause
60(1), (2) or (3) itself.
Clause 61 Release of information in
the interests of transport safety
This clause provides the Executive
Director with a discretionary power to publicly disclose restricted
information for the purposes of transport safety. Such release may be by way
of publishing a report under Clause 25 containing such information, or by any
other methods. One of the only means to ensure that safety issues arising from
an investigation into a transport safety matter reaches the broadest possible
audience is to publicly release relevant safety information. Transport
operators, transport regulatory agencies and the transport industry in general,
have the capacity to address those safety issues and therefore must have this
information made available to them. In addition, the Government and the
travelling public expect an open and transparent process regarding the
communication of and actions to address, safety issues. This is important in
order to achieve public confidence in the safety of transport.
Note that
disclosure of restricted information under this clause will not include
personal information except in the circumstances prescribed by the regulations.
It is intended that such circumstances may include, for example, release to
Commonwealth regulatory authorities, police or to State and Territory coroners
for the purposes of an investigation into the same transport safety matter. Note
that any personal information released under Subclause 61(2) will still be
subject to protection under Clause 60 which places restrictions on disclosure of
restricted information, although such restrictions only apply to current
or former staff members or someone who has been authorised to access the
information under Clause 62.
Clause 62 Executive Director may
authorise persons to have access to restricted information
This
clause provides for authorisation, at the Executive Director’s discretion,
of a person who is not a staff member, to allow general access to
restricted information either generally or in relation to a specific
occurrence. Such a person may, for example, be a temporary staff member who is
not an APS employee, or a contractor or consultant who does not have delegated
powers under this Bill. For further explanation, refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause
52.
Division 3 -
Miscellaneous
Clause 63 Powers of Parliament and
Royals Commissions not affected
This clause clarifies that the
restrictions on disclosure of information under the Bill do not prevent the
Commonwealth Parliament or a Royal Commission from gathering information for the
purposes of their proceedings.
The legislation reflects the need for the
ATSB to act as independently as possible in the interests of transport safety
and provides considerable protection against the disclosure and inappropriate
use of OBR information and restricted information. However, the
Parliament or a Royal Commission can access OBR information and Restricted
Information and are not subject to the ‘hurdles’ that civil or
criminal courts are subject to. This is in recognition of the fact that
Parliamentary and Royal Commission proceedings are inquisitorial (as opposed to
adversarial) in nature and that both the Parliament and Royal Commissions have
wide powers to gather evidence for their own investigations. Parliament and
Royal Commissions, therefore, reserve the right to call upon the ATSB to assist
in providing evidence to their inquiries, especially when the manner in which
ATSB conduct their investigation is the focus of such inquiries for
accountability purposes.
Nevertheless, in assisting with such inquiries,
the ATSB would explain the confidentiality issues and restrictions normally
applicable to the disclosure and use of such information. Members of those
inquires would be requested to carefully consider the potential domestic and
international safety implications resulting from the disclosure of that material
before making a determination about whether it was necessary to disclose that
information for the purpose of the inquiry.
Part 7
– Miscellaneous
Clause 64
Immunity
This clause makes it clear that a person is not liable
for anything done (or omitted to be done) in good faith, when exercising powers
under the Bill. This clause reflects the common law position and is merely
enacted to avoid doubt.
Clause 65 Certification by Executive Director
of staff member’s involvement in investigation
This clause
allows the Executive Director to certify that a specified person who is or was a
staff member, was involved in a particular investigation. This
certification will serve the purpose of exempting a current or former staff
member from complying with a court direction that is not a coroner’s
direction (see Clause 66) to give evidence in court proceedings. Note that this
provision is discretional and where, for example, a staff member has been
a material witness to an occurrence, it would be possible for the Executive
Director to not issue a certificate under this clause, so that the staff
member may be compelled to appear at the relevant court proceeding.
Clause 66 Staff members etc. not compellable as
witnesses
Subclause 66(1) provides that where the Executive
Director has issued a certificate under Clause 65, the current or former staff
member specified in the certificate is not obliged to comply with a court
direction to give evidence relating to an investigable matter.
It is
considered important, in the interests of maintaining trust and a free flow of
safety information, that any current or former staff member who is
involved, or has been involved, in the investigation of a transport safety
matter (including those having access to OBR and restricted information),
should maintain a ‘distance’ from the judicial system, the focus of
which is primarily on blame or liability. It was considered appropriate to
include former staff members in this provision to ensure that the
confidentiality of sensitive information, including OBR and restricted
information, is maintained in the interests of transport
safety.
Subclause 66(2) exempts a staff member from giving
expert opinion in civil or criminal proceedings in relation to any matter
relating to transport safety. For example, a particular staff member may be
considered to be a subject expert in materials failure analysis. As such, a
court could not compel that a staff member to appear in a criminal or
civil proceeding simply by virtue of their expertise (refer also to Explanatory
Memorandum comments at Clause 65). Note that this provision applies to current
staff members only as it was not considered appropriate to place such
restrictions on former staff members simply because of their technical
expertise about aspects of transport safety rather than their direct involvement
in an investigation under this Bill.
Subclause 66(3) provides
that coronial inquiries are excluded from the operation of this clause. In other
words, staff members cannot be exempted from attending coronial proceedings.
Every effort has been made in the legislation to separate safety
investigations from legal processes. However, it is accepted that coroners have
a legitimate role to play in determining the ‘manner and cause of
death’ and that the cause of death is not legally limited to providing
simplistic explanations such as ‘death from traumatic injuries sustained
as a result of an aircraft accident’. The legal role of coroners is not
entirely dissimilar to that of the Executive Director. Both conduct
inquisitorial inquiries, which are not bound by formal rules of evidence. Both
are empowered to investigate to determine the underlying reasons for a death and
to make recommendations to ensure that accidents resulting in death and injury
do not recur. It was therefore considered appropriate to assist coroners when
requested to do so. Such assistance also ensures that the coroner is provided
with unbiased information about the circumstances of a fatal accident.
Note that even where a staff member is compellable to give
evidence for purposes of a court proceeding, disclosure of OBR and restricted
information in providing evidence to a coroner or to other courts will still
be subject to the restrictions under Part 6 of the Bill.
Clause
67 Attendance fees where staff members attend coronial
inquiry
This clause provides that a staff member requested to
appear in a coronial inquiry to give expert opinion, or who is the subject of a
certificate issued by the Executive Director under Clause 65, must be reimbursed
for the expenses of that attendance.
Clause 68 Legal
representation for staff members at coronial inquiry
This clause
provides that a staff member requested to appear in a coronial inquiry to
give expert opinion, or who is the subject of a certificate issued by the
Executive Director under Clause 65, is entitled to legal representation at that
inquiry. Normally, witnesses have no automatic right to legal representation at
a coronial inquiry, although coronial legislation in some jurisdictions may
allow such representation with the leave of the coroner. This clause will ensure
that the staff member may be represented by a lawyer without the leave of
the coroner. Legal assistance at coronial inquiries will allow investigators to
focus on their role as an assistant to the coroner in providing expert opinion,
or as a witness, and not in defending the findings of the investigation to legal
representatives with interests other than transport safety. This will also
ensure that the focus of the coroner’s inquiry is not drawn away from
transport safety to issues of blame and liability by legal representatives of
other parties who may be at the coronial inquiry for the purpose of preparing
the groundwork for a case in subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.
Clause 69 Staff members may exercise powers under State and
Territory laws
This clause clarifies the Parliament’s intention
to allow staff members to exercise powers conferred upon them on a case
by case basis under any State or Territory legislation that relates to transport
safety, provided that such the State or Territory does not impose an obligation
either expressly or impliedly on the staff members to perform the
relevant functions. Note that transport is defined in the Bill to include
air, sea or rail transport. There may be occasions when State authorities
request the Executive Director to conduct an investigation into a transport
safety matter where that transport safety matter does not fall within the
Executive Director’s constitutional jurisdiction to investigate. For
example, a State or Territory rail accreditation authority may request that the
Executive Director conduct an investigation into an accident of a suburban
(intrastate) train. In such cases, the Commonwealth officers can exercise
investigation powers under relevant State or Territory legislation if approved
by the Executive Director.
Clause 70 Compensation for
acquisition of property
This clause provides for compensation for
acquisition of property where compensation is required for constitutional
reasons.
Clause 71 Regulations
This clause allows
regulations to be made where required or permitted by this Bill, or where
necessary or convenient for the purposes of the Bill.
TRANSPORT
SAFETY INVESTIGATION (CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS) BILL 2002
The
Transport Safety Investigation (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2002
accompanies the Transport Safety Investigation Bill 2002.
NOTES
ON CLAUSES
Clause 1 Short title
This clause provides
the proper title of the Bill.
Clause 2
Commencement
This clause provides that the Bill commences on
receipt of Royal Assent. Note that the actual amendments contained in the
Schedule do not commence until the Transport Safety Investigation Bill 2002
(the main Bill) commences.
Clause 3
Schedules
This clause means that the amendments made by the main
Bill to other legislation are set out in the Schedule.
Item 1 provides that Part 2A (Investigation of Accidents etc.) of
the Air Navigation Act 1920 will be removed from that Act in its
entirety. Subject to the transitional arrangements (see item 2), all
investigations of aviation safety occurrences are to be conducted under the main
Bill once it commences.
Item 2 provides for the transitional
arrangements for any aviation investigation that has been completed or is under
investigation at the time that Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920 is
repealed. This includes investigations that have completed or yet to be
completed, and investigations that have been discontinued before the repeal.
Such investigations will continue to be covered by the provisions of the
repealed legislation. All investigations that commence on the date that the main
Bill becomes effective will be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
the main Bill.
Air Services Act 1995
Item 3
amends paragraph 8(1)(c) of the Air Services Act 1995 to reflect the new
arrangements under the main Bill regarding aviation safety, by replacing the
reference to the ‘Bureau of Air Safety Investigation’ with a
reference to the ‘Executive Director of Transport Safety
Investigation’.
Item 4 provides for an additional paragraph 6(1)(ca) relating to
cooperation to be inserted in the Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act
1990. This amendment was included to ensure consistency with similar clauses
contained in the Air Services Act 1995 and the Civil Aviation Act
1988 (as referred to in the notes on Item 3 and Item 5 in this Explanatory
Memorandum).
Item 5 provides an amendment to paragraph 9(3)(a) of the Civil
Aviation Act 1988 to reflect the new arrangements under the main Bill
regarding aviation safety, by replacing the reference to the ‘Bureau of
Air Safety Investigation’ with a reference to the ‘Executive
Director of Transport Safety Investigation’.
Item 6 deletes the reference to ‘Air Navigation Act
1920, subsection 19CU(1)’ from Schedule 3 of the Freedom of
Information Act 1982 (the FOI Act). Schedule 3 of the FOI Act provides a
list of secrecy provisions contained in various Acts. Any information covered
by the specified secrecy provisions is automatically exempt in accordance with
Section 38 of the FOI Act.
Note that Subsection 19CU(1) of Part 2A of
the Air Navigation Act 1920 refers to any part of a report or document
that was given to the Secretary under Subsection 19CT of that Act. Other
information collected under Part 2A of the Air Navigation Act 1920 is
currently subject to various confidentiality provisions contained in Part
2A.
Item 7 inserts a reference to the new confidentiality
provisions contained in the main Bill into Schedule 3 of the FOI Act, thereby
making any information covered by the new provisions automatically exempt from
release under the freedom of information legislation. The information referred
to in this item includes on-board-recording (OBR) information and
restricted information. The wider application of the FOI exemption is in
compliance with Australia’s international obligation to protect
information collected in the course of no-blame safety investigations.
Item 8 repeals paragraph 425(1)(ea) which provides that the
Governor General may make regulations for and in relation to the investigation
of, and reporting on, casualties affecting ships, or entailing loss of life on
or from ships. Repeal of this paragraph would effectively repeal the
Navigation (Marine Casualty) Regulations 1990, which were made under
paragraph 425(1)(ea). Provisions in relation to the investigation of safety
occurrences relating to ships and marine navigation will be covered under the
main Bill when it commences.
Item 9 repeals Subsection 425 (1AAA)
which provides that Section 2 –(Application) of the Navigation
Act 1912 does not apply in relation to the investigation of, and reporting
on, casualties affecting ships, or entailing loss of life on or from ships.
This allowed investigations to be conducted into incidents involving vessels to
which the Act did not apply but for this paragraph. For example, if a ship to
which the Act applied was in collision with a ship to which the Act did not
apply, the Inspector of Marine Accidents would investigate and regard both
vessels as coming under the provisions of the Regulations. This paragraph is
redundant as the safety investigation of ships and marine navigation will be
covered under the main Bill when it commences.