Hall, Courtney --- "The Green Wall Street: Neo-Liberal Environmental Governance and the Nature Repair Market" [2024] UNSWLawSocCConsc 9; (2024) 18 UNSW Law Society Court of Conscience 53

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THE GREEN WALL STREET:

NEO-LIBERAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NATURE REPAIR MARKET

Courtney Hall^*

I Introduction

Dubbed the ‘Green Wall Street’ by Minister for the Environment and Water, Tanya Plibersek, the Nature Repair Market (‘NRM’) is the federal government’s latest experiment in market-based environmental governance.^[1] The NRM aims to generate private investment in ecological conservation through the allocation of tradable certificates to landholders who undertake projects that enhance or protect biodiversity.^[2] While the involvement of private actors in biodiversity governance is not a new phenomenon, market-based environmental policies routinely fail to strike the intended balance between ecological protection and socio-economic development.^[3] This is particularly so where governments’ rush to the market is not attended by an adequate superstructure of environmental policy. Although last minute amendments to the Nature Repair Market Bill have ruled out the use of biodiversity certificates as an environmental offsetting tool, the intention for the NRM to operate alongside Australia’s legislative offsetting hierarchy remains a cause for concern.^[4]

This article will review the commitments of the NRM to argue that the federal government’s latest experiment in environmental policy falls short of effectively balancing environmental protection and socio-economic development.^[5] The first part will situate the NRM within the body of environmental reform provided for by the federal government’s ‘Nature Positive Plan’.^[6] Viewed in the context of concurrent reforms to the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (‘EPBC Act’), this part will address the observable strengths of the NRM as a means of inviting private investment in ecological conservation. The second part will review the passage of the Nature Repair Act, to consider how subsequent amendments to the NRM Bill equally strengthened and confused the objectives of the NRM. This section will also consider the risks posed by the NRM if used as a biodiversity offsetting scheme. Finally, the article will compare the NRM to similar reforms introducing biodiversity offsetting in Finland’s Nature Conservation Act.^[7] This comparison draws attention to international models of neo-liberal environmental governance, to demonstrate ways of soliciting private investment in biodiversity conservation without selling nature to save it.

Although not directly comparable to the NRM, these reforms provide an instructive model for the effective implementation of experimental market-based conservation policies.

II THE NATURE REPAIR MARKET

A Creating the Market

The Nature Repair Act 2023 (Cth) came into effect in December 2023, establishing a framework for a national and voluntary biodiversity market. The NRM is a core instrument of the slate of environmental reforms introduced through the Nature Positive Plan (‘NPP’). The stated objectives of the NPP are to deliver environmental protection laws that are ‘nature positive’, make it easier for private companies to ‘do the right thing’, and restore integrity and trust to the systems of environmental law.^[8] The NRM intends to further these objectives by issuing tradable certificates to private companies who undertake projects which enhance or protect biodiversity.^[9] The NRM capitalises on the corporate social responsibility movement by monetising conservation through its biodiversity certification and trading framework.^[10] Whether stacked, swapped, or sold, it remains unclear how these certificates will be used by private investors to secure commercial benefit.

The Clean Energy Regulator (‘CER’) has been given responsibility for administering the scheme and establishing processes for the operation of the market. The CER currently administers the Carbon Farming Initiative, the centrepiece of Australia’s Carbon Credit Unit Scheme.^[11] Unlike the NRM, the Carbon Credit Unit Scheme is controversially an offsetting scheme, inviting participants to trade carbon credits in order to compensate for emissions or meet compliance requirements.^[12] As such, the CER will have to implement a distinct methodology of assessment so as not to confuse the regulation of the NRM with the Carbon Farming Initiative.

B Soliciting Private Investment

The greatest strength of the NRM lies in its ability to provide a means for private actors to invest in conservation without ownership over the proposed site.^[13] From this perspective, the NRM is an instrument to realise aspirations which see the private sector as the trustee of Australia’s ecological conservation where the government cannot foot the bill to do so. Indeed, the PwC report which buttressed the Minister’s announcement of the NRM, speaks of ‘unlocking’ an estimated $137 billion injection into the protection of Australia’s environment by 2050.^[14] However, the private sector’s ability to deliver the stated outcomes of the NPP significantly depends on the integrity of the NRM scheme as well as the scale and motivation of private sector demand.

Beginning with the latter consideration, the design of the NRM contemplates certificate demand from three sources: companies wanting to make philanthropic investments in biodiversity, companies intending to use certificates for a future offset, and governments.^[15] Leaving aside integrity concerns surrounding the government’s role as purchaser of NRM certificates for the moment, government demand for NRM certificates is effectively illusory since they could already conserve biodiversity through considered regulation and acquisition.^[16] As Megan Evans observes, the assumption that private actors are willing and otherwise unable to invest in biodiversity remains untested.^[17] Consequently, demand for participation under the NRM relies on the possibility that certificates can be used to obtain a material benefit.

III How The Market Could Crash

A Creating Confusion through Amendment

To ensure passage of the Nature Repair Market Bill through the Senate, the government was forced to strike a deal with the Greens and crossbenchers, resulting in two key amendments to the Act.^[18]

First, the Act no longer refers to the NRM as a ‘market’.^[19] This change in title is not reflective of any alteration to the market mechanisms which animate the NRM. In fact, current resources published by the Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water still describe the NRM as a market and refer to it as such.^[20] Although presumably intending to drive home the restorative purpose of the market, the NRM’s last minute name-change embodies forms of technical confusion experienced by the market so far. This confusion is further reflected in the interchangeable use of the term’s ‘credit’ and ‘certificate’ in the federal government’s press releases immediately preceding the NRM Bill.^[21] Where credits represent some measurable biodiversity gain which can be traded to offset a biodiversity loss, NRM certificates are an assurance of gain arising from inputs which bring specific kinds of biodiversity benefit.^[22] As such, biodiversity certificates are not fungible like other credit-based certifications and therefore cannot be used to offset a biodiversity loss elsewhere.

Second, s 76C was inserted into the Act, prohibiting the use of NRM certificates for virtually any ‘environmental offsetting purpose’.^[23] This amendment directly responds to sustained criticism that the Bill tacitly allowed proponents to purchase certificates for the purpose of satisfying other legislatives requirements to offset environmental impacts caused by development.^[24] Although lauded as a win by environmentalists, the ruling out of offsets also significantly decreases the anticipated pool of demand for biodiversity certificates. Nonetheless, the Senate Committee’s view that a place for biodiversity offsetting should be considered with the legislative ‘offsets hierarchy’ of the NPP Plan hints at an intention for the NRM to work within the federal government’s evolving offsetting framework.^[25]

B Biodiversity Offsetting and the NRM

Like offsets generally, biodiversity offsetting aims to compensate for losses of biodiversity components at an impacted site by generating ecologically equivalent gains elsewhere.^[26] From this perspective, biodiversity gains are not a standalone objective, but form part of a larger regulatory bargain which rationalises environmental destruction as permissible in achieving ‘no net losses’ of biodiversity value.^[27] The traces of this bargain can be seen in relation to the definitional standard adopted by the Nature Repair Act, namely, that eligible projects need only ‘enhance or protect’ (emphasis added) biodiversity.^[28] This approach effectively locks in current rates of baseline decline contrary to the environmental outcomes pursued by the scheme.

The EPBC Act’s current offsets policy requires that all reasonable efforts be made to avoid and mitigate impacts on protected matters, and that the proposed offset meet strict like-for-like requirements.^[29] Nonetheless, the offset policy was a centrepiece of critique in the Independent Review of the EPBC Act for its contribution to baseline environmental decline and piecemeal approach to governance.^[30] In response to this review, the NPP also provides for the creation of a National Environmental Standard for offsets, which aims to provide certainty and confidence in the application for environmental offsets.^[31] Although such reforms are urgently needed to mitigate further baseline decline, these amendments do not identify themselves with or make provision for co-operation with the NRM.

The Nature Repair Act’s prohibition on the use of certificates as offsets might not spell the end of uncertainty in the market. With the federal government set to introduce final reforms offsetting and restoration contribution under the EPBC Act, some commentators anticipate the reintroduction of NRM biodiversity offsets before the end of the year.^[32] This predication aligns with an understanding of NRM as an experimental form of environmental governance which requires sustained testing and attention to make it workable for investors and the environment. With the federal government continuing to finalise the methods and criterion against which eligible projects will be assessed, the NRM is not expected to launch until January 2025. In this period, the scale of demand for biodiversity certificates in an offset-less NRM may prove determinative in understanding the future of the offsetting under the scheme.

C Dangers and Detriments of NRM Offsets

In light of the possibility that biodiversity offsets will reappear in forthcoming environmental law reform, it remains relevant to consider the appropriateness of offsets within the NRM’s scheme of market-based governance.

Since, biodiversity certificates record activities as opposed to specific outcomes for particular ecosystems, NRM projects cannot meet the like-for-like requirements required for an offset.^[33] As a result, if certificates are made eligible to meet offsetting compliance obligations, they will inevitably be in short supply, thus limiting the number of possible trades in the market.^[34] The outcome might replicate the NSW Biodiversity Offset market, where demand for offsets vastly exceeds supply, resulting in an excess of conservation payments despite the absence of a suitable offset.^[35] Further and in the alternative, allowing NRM certificates to circumvent the like-for-like requirements would undermine the premise of reform to the offset framework as well as misalign the NRM from its stated conservation goals.^[36]

Additionally, offsetting schemes have frequently made headlines for the failure of their oversight bodies to ensure integrity and accountability. None more so than the CER whose maladministration of the Australian Carbon Market has seen it been described as ‘a case study in poor governance’.^[37] The Chubb Review found direct links between the lack of administrative transparency and the CER’s inability to deliver real reductions to greenhouse emissions in accordance with the scheme’s stated objectives.^[38] While the proposal for the CER to administer the NRM is presumably based on attested similarities between the scheme and Australian Carbon Credit Units, the recommendations from the Chubb Review have not yet been implemented by the CER. Until the structural overhaul of the CER is complete, it is contrary to the objectives of the NRM that the CER be given additional administrative responsibilities in a field that does not align with their regulatory expertise.^[39]

Finally, it still remains to be seen whether the federal government intends to use the NRM as a convoluted way of saying ‘biodiversity offsets’. As mentioned above, the fumbling of technical terminology when announcing and implementing the NRM brings into question the real meaning of ‘Nature Positive’ with the NPP. ^[40] If this criticism was to be defeated in the context of the NRM, organisations generating or purchasing certificates must contribute to active ecological restoration.^[41] But since offsets are already a legal requirement under EPBC Act, the potential to use NRM certificates as offsets denies progress towards meaningful investment in environmental restoration and protection. Ultimately, the big picture is that the federal government cannot greenwash the flaws of the NRM to look like a silver bullet.

IV Lesson From Finnish Market-Based Conservation Policy

Despite the NRM’s claims to originality, the market-based conservation model proposed by the NRM falls within a broader international trend towards experimental environmental governance.^[42] The transition from government to governance embodies a neoliberal mode of resource management which believes in ‘selling nature to save it’.^[43] Furthermore, experimental environmental policy also displays a resounding tendency to ignore basic policy knowledge developed through interdisciplinary consolation with scientific and economic experts.^[44]

Nonetheless, Finland’s gradual incorporation of biodiversity offsetting into their Nature Conservation Act (‘NCA’) provides a model for overcoming conflict between stated policy objectives in the institution of market-based environmental policy.^[45] Preceding the reform, stakeholder consultation over the institution of a biodiversity offsetting scheme reproduced a similar conflict of objectives as seen in the NRM. Through these consultations, the objectives of biodiversity offsetting were characterised as two-fold; first, as a market mechanism for manifesting corporate social responsibility and second as a framework for biodiversity conservation.^[46] When balancing these objectives, the NCA gives primacy to the latter, requiring that applicants bear all costs in biodiversity assessments.^[47] In addition, proponents may only meet the assessable standard of reimbursement where the project is ‘very important to the public interest’ and there is ‘no economically feasible alternative’.^[48] In this way, the Finnish reforms provide an instructive example of how to effectively implement experimental environmental governance regimes amidst values conflict.

A Incrementalism, Public Consultation and Embracing Experimentation

As a relative later-comer to forms of market based environmental governance, Finland had the opportunity to learn from failed implementations of biodiversity offsetting in other countries. With this in mind, the Finnish government pursued an incremental approach to implementing biodiversity offsetting based on the accumulated experiences of other jurisdictions.^[49] This approach frames the success of biodiversity offsetting as a matter of interdisciplinary consolation, rather than political agenda setting.^[50] Through a statement-based public hearing process, draft implementation frameworks were refined from initially instituting a mandatory market to later creating a voluntary offsetting framework.^[51] The voluntary framework developed through a shared appreciation of the risk that mandatory offsets could transform the ‘polluter pays’ principle into a ‘license to trash’.^[52] Consensus on this point could only be achieved through the application of a flexible policy construction process that accommodated for multiple understandings of the problem, and focused on shared ambitions rather than conflict over the details of implementation.^[53]

Taking a lesson from Finland’s incremental approach to biodiversity offsetting, when implementing the objectives of the NRM, the government should implement consultation practices that recognise the experimental nature of the scheme. Many submissions to the Senate Standing Committee Inquiry into the NRM Bill noted the government’s failure to outline the cooperation of NRM with offset reforms.^[54] Having left the public virtually in the dark on this matter, at the time of consultation, many submissions were forced to make recommendations on the contingency that NRM certificates are intended to be used as offsets. While this omission may be intended to afford some flexibility in the operation of the NRM, it nonetheless impedes proper public consultation that would otherwise produce stronger public policy.

B Robust Environmental Policy Architecture

In addition to strong consultation, the existing body of environmental governance in Finland supports stakeholder confidence in the integrity of experimental market-based reforms. Under the direction of European Union environmental legislation and directives, Finland has maintained sustained investment in protecting biodiversity, leading to its recognition as a global leader in environmental policy.^[55] In this regard, public confidence in the integrity of Finland’s approach helps stimulate demand for participation in the biodiversity offset scheme. Additionally, regulation of the offset market is directed towards the development of regional dialogues between specialist offset surveyors and administrative units applying for a permit.^[56] Thus, by introducing the biodiversity offset scheme alongside other successful environmental policies and taking an integrated approach to its regulation, Finland has been able to secure public support for the reforms.

In the Australian context, the success of NRM both in its proposed form and as a tool for offsetting is contingent on the proper implementation of other EPBC Act reforms under the NPP. Considering the Samuel Review’s findings that the current EPBC Act is not fit for purpose, public trust in the NRM cannot be established until systemic reform is made to our existing environmental governance framework.^[57] This would demand the prioritisation of reforms directed towards the institution of an independent Environmental Protection Agency, and the creation of legally enforceable National Environmental Standards for offsetting. These reforms go to the heart of the NPP's commitment to better environmental outcomes, faster decision-making and heighted accountability and naturally premise the effectiveness of the NRM.^[58] In sum, if the Australian government wishes to make meaningful progress towards the advancement of biodiversity outcomes, they must first tidy the house.

V Conclusion

Once broken down into its constitutive commitments, it is clear that the NRM is not fit for purpose. Although its focus on incentivising and sourcing private finance in environmental conservation is laudable, if the NRM is to work alongside offsetting reforms, it will do so at the expense of achieving the stated objectives of the NPP. The federal government would be wise to take instruction from Finnish reforms implementing similar forms of environmental policy. As such, until systemic reforms to the EPBC Act are properly implemented, the government must curb its ambition and rethink the implementation of the NRM.

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^* Courtney Hall is a Bachelor of Arts/Laws student at the University of New South Wales. The author would like to thank Chlarisse Bala and Kate Townsend for their support and encouragement, as well as the editorial team for their thoughtful feedback.

¹ Tanya Plibersek, ‘Speech to Udayana University on Environmental Markets’ (Speech, Udayana University, 1 September 2022) <https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/plibersek/speeches/speech-udayana-university-environmental-markets>; Nature Repair Act 2023 (Cth) (‘Nature Repair Act’).

^[2] Department of Clean Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (Cth), Nature Positive Plan: Better for the Environment, Better for Business (Report, December 2022) 22 (‘Nature Positive Plan’).

^[3] Megan C Evans, ‘Backloading to Extinction: Coping with Values Conflict in the Administration of Australia’s Federal Biodiversity Offset Policy’ (2023) 82(2) Australian Journal of Public Administration 228 (‘Backloading to Extinction’). See also Graeme Samuel, Independent Review of the EPBC Act – (Final Report, October 2020) (‘Samuel Review’).

^[4] Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 (Cth) (‘NRM Bill’).

^[5] For an excellent paper on political responses to ecological crises in Australia, see Matt McDonald et al, ‘Ecological Crises and Ecopolitics Research in Australia’ (2024) Australian Journal of Politics and History.

^[6] Nature Positive Plan (n 2) 21.

^[7] Nature Conservation Act (1096/1996) (‘Nature Conservation Act’).

^[8] Nature Positive Plan (n 2) iii.

^[9] ‘Nature Repair Market’, Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (Web Page) <https://www.dcceew.gov.au/environment/environmental-markets/nature-repair-market> (‘NRM Factsheet’).

^[10] Edward Fosu et al, ‘Do Environmental CSR Practices Promote Corporate Social Performance? The Mediating Role of Green Innovation and Corporate Image’ (2024) 12 Cleaner and Responsible Consumption 1.

^[11] Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 (Cth).

^[12] For an illustrative example of carbon offsetting controversy, see criticisms of Taylor Swift’s private jet use and carbon footprint: Lola Mendez, ‘Taylor Swift Claims She Offsets Her Travel Carbon Footprint – How Does That Work?’, BBC (online, 14 February 2024) <https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20240213-taylor-swift-private-jet-flight-travel-carbon-footprint>. See also ‘Australian Carbon Credit Unit Scheme’, Clean Energy Regulator (Web Page, 5 September 2024) <https://cer.gov.au/schemes/australian-carbon-credit-unit-scheme>.

^[13] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 March 2023, 2583 (Tanya Plibersek).

^[14] PwC, A Nature-Positive Australia: The Value of an Australian Biodiversity Market (Report, 2022) 3.

^[15] Polly Hemming, Rod Campbell and Richard Dennis, Shorting the Environment: Submission to the Proposed Voluntary National Biodiversity Market (Report, September 2022) 7.

^[16] Polly Hemming and Roderick Campbell, Beyond Repair? Comment on the Draft Nature Repair Market Bill (2023), (Report, March 2023) 21–5.

^[17] Megan Evans, Submission to Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (Cth), National Biodiversity Market (16 September 2022) 4.

^[18] Lisa Cox, ‘Labor and Greens Strike Deal to Establish Nature Repair Scheme’, The Guardian (online, 5 December 2023) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/05/labor-and-greens-strike-deal-to-establish-nature-repair-market>

^[19] For a schedule of the amendments to the made by the Senate to The Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 (Cth): see <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fsched%2Fr7014_sched_992a04d1-49d0-4c34-a20a-bb1d8f903de0%22>.

^[20] NRM Factsheet (n 9).

^[21] Evans (n 17) 2; Compare references to ‘credits’ and ‘certificates’ in Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s twitter remarks against the federal government’s same day announcement of the NRM in @AlboMP (Anthony Albanese) (X, 23 August 2022 1:34pm AEST) <https://x.com/AlboMP/status/1563006827528601601 >; Anthony Albanese and Tanya Plibersek, ‘Biodiversity Certificates to Increase Native Habitat and Support Australian Landholders’ (Media Release, 26 August 2022).

^[22] Environmental Defenders Office, Submission No 39 to Senate Standing Committees on Environment and Communications, Parliament of Australia, Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 and Nature Repair Market (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2023 [Provisions] (1 June 2023) 9 (‘EDO Submission’).

^[23] Nature Repair Act (n 1) ss 76C, 7 (definition of ‘environmental offsetting measure’ and ‘environmental offsetting purpose’).

^[24] Australian Land Conservation Alliance, Submission No 38 to Senate Standing Committees on Environment and Communications, Parliament of Australia, Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 and Nature Repair Market (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2023 [Provisions] (1 June 2023) 5–6 (‘ALCA Submission’).

^[25] Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications, Parliament of Australia, Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 and Nature Repair Market (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2023 [Provisions] (Report, December 2023) 13 [2.33].

^[26] Martine Maron et al, ‘Faustian Bargains? Restoration Realities in the Context of Biodiversity Offset Policies’ (2012) 155 Biological Conservation 141.

^[27] Ibid 146.

^[28] Nature Repair Act (n 1) s 7 (definition of ‘biodiversity project’).

^[29] Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (Cth), Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 Environmental Offsets Policy, (Policy, October 2012) 7.

^[30] Samuel Review (n 3).

^[31] Nature Positive Plan (n 2) 1, 21–2.

^[32] Patrick O’Connor, ‘Can The Government’s New Market Mechanism Help Save Nature? Yes – If We Get The Devil Out The Detail’, The Conversation, (online, 6 December 2023) <https://theconversation.com/can-the-governments-new-market-mechanism-help-save-nature-yes-if-we-get-the-devil-out-of-the-detail-218713>.

^[33] Martine Maron and Megan Evans, ‘The Government Hopes Private Investors Will Help Save Nature. Here’s How Its Scheme Could Fail’, The Conversation (online, 26 October 2022) <http://theconversation.com/the-government-hopes-private-investors-will-help-save-nature-heres-how-its-scheme-could-fail-193010> .

^[34] Ibid.

^[35] Audit Office of New South Wales, Effectiveness of the Biodiversity Offsets Scheme (Performance Audit Report, 30 August 2022) 2.

^[36] EDO Submission (n 22) 12.

^[37] Adam Morton, ‘Australia’s Carbon Credit Scheme “Largely a Sham”, Says Whistleblower Who Tried to Rein It In’, The Guardian (online, 23 March 2022) <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/mar/23/australias-carbon-credit-scheme-largely-a-sham-says-whistleblower-who-tried-to-rein-it-in>.

^[38] Ian Chubb et al, Independent Review of Australian Carbon Credit Units (Final Report December 2022) 2 (‘Chubb Review’).

^[39] EDO Submission (n 22) 21.

^[40] Eleanor J Milner-Gulland, ‘Don’t Dilute the Term Nature Positive’ (2022) 6(9) Nature Ecology & Evolution 1243, 1244.

^[41] Martine Maron, Megan Evans and Sophus zu Ermgassen, ‘“Nature Positive” Isn’t Just Planting a Few Trees – It’s Actually Stopping the Damage We Do’, The Conversation (online, 21 September 2023) <http://theconversation.com/nature-positive-isnt-just-planting-a-few-trees-its-actually-stopping-the-damage-we-do-213075> .

^[42] Regarding the market’s originality, see Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 March 2023, 10:45 (Tanya Plibersek, Minister for the Environment and Water of Australia).

^[43] Kathleen McAfee, ‘Selling Nature to Save It? Biodiversity and Green Developmentalism’ (1999) 17(2) Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 133, 135.

^[44] Steven Dovers and Karen Hussey, Environment and Sustainability: A Policy Handbook (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2013) 22.

^[45] See Nature Conservation Act (9/2023) ch 11 (amendments introducing voluntary ecological compensation).

^[46] Heidi Lehtiniemi et al, ‘Pulling Biodiversity Offsetting in Different Directions – Stakeholder Frames in the Preparation of the Finnish Nature Conservation Act’ (2023) 283 Biological Conservation 110137, 3.

^[47] Nature Conservation Act (n 7) s 107.

^[48] Ibid ss 106, 104.

^[49] Thomas Molnár Karlsson and Kamilla Karhunmaa, ‘“Better than Doing Nothing” – Constructing Support for Biodiversity Offsetting in Finland’ (2023) 18(2) Critical Policy Studies 1, 10.

^[50] Florence LP Damiens, Libby Porter and Ascelin Gordon, ‘The Politics of Biodiversity Offsetting across Time and Institutional Scales’ (2021) 4(2) Nature Sustainability 170, 14.

^[51] Lehtiniemi et al (n 46) 2.

^[52] Karlsson and Karhunmaa (n 49) 9.

^[53] Ibid 10.

^[54]See ALCA Submission (n 24) 5–6; Biodiversity Council, Submission No 53 to Senate Standing Committees on Environment and Communications, Parliament of Australia, Nature Repair Market Bill 2023 and Nature Repair Market (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2023 [Provisions] (1 June 2023) 2–4.

^[55] Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Finland 2021 (Report, December 2021) 1.

^[56] Hanna Kalliolevo et al, ‘Considerable Qualitative Variability in Local-Level Biodiversity Surveys in Finland: A Challenge for Biodiversity Offsetting’ (2022) 68 Journal for Nature Conservation 126194, 7.

^[57] Samuel Review (n 3) 1.

^[58] Frances Medlock and Rachael Walmsley, ‘Urgency and Ambition More Important than Ever for National Nature Law Reform’, Environmental Defenders Office (Web Page, 27 July 2023) <https://www.edo.org.au/2023/07/27/urgency-and-ambition-more-important-than-ever-for-national-nature-law-reform/>.