Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series |
Last Updated: 10 March 2009
The Anthropocene, Autopoiesis and the Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link: Addressing Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
Rosemary Rayfuse, University of New South Wales
Citation
This paper was presented at the Fourth J.W.H. Verzijl Memorial Symposium on “The Legal Regime of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction: Current Principles and Frameworks and Future Directions”, held at the University of Utrecht, 21 November 2008.
Abstract
The Earth has entered the anthropocene era; the era in which human activities have begun to have a significant global impact of the Earth’s climate and ecosystems. Covering more than 60% of the Earth’s surface, the oceans comprise a complex, dynamic and vast component of the Earth’s ecological system, second in size only to the global atmosphere. The oceans are a major provider of ecosystem services, food, mineral and other resources, and a major medium for global transportation and communication. Nevertheless, while once thought inexhaustible, unlimited and capable of supporting any human activity or use, it is now clear that the oceans are exhaustible and that increasing and intensifying human activities and uses are pushing the oceans to the limits of their carrying capacity.
The Law of the Sea Convention establishes a legal order for the oceans intended to ‘facilitate international communication, [and] promote peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilisation of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment’. However, particularly as regards areas beyond national jurisdiction, the law of the sea regime is fragmented both sectorally and geographically, leaving a large range of governance, regulatory, substantive and implementational gaps which serve to limit its effectiveness in securing a sustainable future for the oceans in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The new reality of the context in which the legal regime for areas beyond national jurisdiction operates is one of increasing and increasingly unbridled human activity resulting in damage, both potential and real, from over-use, over-consumption and over-exploitation. This new reality has altered the fundamental balance between the context in which the law of the sea operates and the law of the sea itself. New legal developments are being called for to re-establish that equilibrium.
1. The Anthopocene, Autopoiesis and the Law of the Sea
The Earth has entered the anthropocene era; the era
in which human activities have begun to have a significant global impact of the
Earth’s climate and ecosytems. According to the International Geosphere
Biosphere Program, ‘human activities are now
so pervasive and profound in
their consequences that they affect the Earth at a global scale in complex,
interactive and accelerating
ways’ and ‘have the capacity to alter
the Earth System in ways that threaten the very processes and components, both
biotic and abiotic, upon which humans
depend’.[1]
Covering more than 60% of the Earth’s surface, the oceans comprise a
complex, dynamic and vast component of the Earth’s
ecological system,
second in size only to the global atmosphere. The oceans are a major provider of
ecosystem services, food, mineral
and other resources, and a major medium for
global transportation and communication. Nevertheless, while once thought
inexhaustible,
unlimited and capable of supporting any human activity or use, it
is now clear that the oceans are exhaustible and that increasing
and
intensifying human activities and uses are pushing the oceans to the limits of
their carrying capacity.
The Law of the Sea Convention
(LOSC)[2] establishes a
legal order for the oceans intended to ‘facilitate international
communication, [and] promote peaceful uses of
the seas and oceans, the equitable
and efficient utilisation of their resources, the conservation of their living
resources, and
the study, protection and preservation of the marine
environment’.[3]
However, particularly as regards areas beyond national jurisdiction, the law of
the sea regime is fragmented both sectorally and
geographically, leaving a large
range of governance, regulatory, substantive and implementational gaps which
serve to limit its effectiveness
in securing a sustainable future for the oceans
in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Moreover, the legal regime for areas
beyond
national jurisdiction is undermined by enforcement gaps resulting,
inevitably, from the basic international law rules relating to
treaty
application, and adherence to the principle of flag state jurisdiction.
Recurring regulatory and enforcement failures, now
compounded by new challenges
such as those posed by climate change, seriously threaten the realisation of
those objectives and lead
inexorably to calls for the law to develop to
‘fill the gaps’.
International law has been described as an
autopoietic system,[4]
or one in which the elements of the system ‘interact with each other in
such a way as to continually produce and maintain the
elements and the
relationships between
them’.[5] An
autopoeitic system seeks not to generate something other than itself, but rather
to generate the elements of itself through processes
internal to and shaped by
it in order to maintain a stable organised state over a long period of time.
Sometimes mistakenly interpreted
as requiring ossification, autopoiesis more
accurately requires the law to change and adapt to new realities and new
contexts, just
as these realities and contexts must change and adapt to the new
laws. In other words, the law is shaped by the context in which
it operates
while that context is shaped by the law which operates within and upon it. Thus,
while self-referential in that existing
law must be perpetuated, international
law is also self-generating in that the law must, through the processes internal
to it, evolve
to meet the new realties of the international context in which it
exists and operates.
The new reality of the context in which the legal
regime for areas beyond national jurisdiction operates is one of increasing and
increasingly unbridled human activity resulting in damage, both potential and
real, from over-use, over-consumption and over-exploitation.
This new reality
has altered the fundamental balance between the context in which the law of the
sea operates and the law of the
sea itself. New legal developments are being
called for to re-establish that equilibrium. In the enforcement context, this
requires
careful consideration of the manner in which the law can more
adequately protect the interests of the international community in
areas beyond
national jurisdiction by requiring states to comply with their specific treaty
obligations and other generally accepted
international norms and by addressing
situations where a state is unwilling or unable to do so.
2. The Disingenuousness of the Genuine Link
The legal framework for enforcement of international
law in areas beyond national jurisdiction is premised on the principle of flag
state jurisdiction. The high seas are open to all
states[6] and every
state has the right to sail ships flying its flag on the high
seas.[7] While on the
high seas ships are generally subject only to the jurisdiction of the state
whose flag they fly.[8]
The rules on nationality of ships govern the jurisdictional linkage between a
flag state and ships flying its flag. Originally conceived
of as a means of
ensuring adequate and effective control and supervision of ships by states whose
flag they fly,[9] these
rules somewhat disingenuously call, on the one hand, for the existence of a
‘genuine link’ yet, on the other hand,
require no content to that
link other than mere
registration.[10] In
doing so they present a range of difficulties for those seeking to attach legal
requirements to and consequences for the granting
of a flag beyond the mere
requirement to provide a vessel with documents to the effect that flag has been
granted.[11] Indeed,
these rules, coupled with the rule of flag state jurisdiction, establish what
is, arguably, the most significant enforcement
gap in the legal regime for the
high seas.
While not actively encouraging it, the reality is that the rules
on nationality of ships do nothing to discourage the practice of
flagging ships
to avoid the application of international obligations. Thus, ships may
deliberately flag in a state not party to relevant
treaty obligations. This
practice has been well documented in the use of ‘flags of
convenience’ to avoid controls relating
to vessel source pollution or to
avoid the application of conservation and management measures established by
regional fisheries
management organisations (RFMOs). Even where a state is party
to a relevant treaty, it may become a flag of choice as a ‘flag
of
non-compliance’ due to its failure to adequately implement its treaty
obligations either through a lack of political will
to regulate activity, or
through lack of financial and technical expertise, or lack of infrastructure to
promote and, if necessary,
enforce compliance.
The rules on nationality of
ships have been described as ‘an axis of the law of the sea’,
‘a well-defended preserve
of the sovereignty of the states’ and a
fundamental rule on which ‘inter-state relations concerning activities at
sea
depend’.[12]
Be that as it may, they provide no incentive for vessels to comply with
internationally agreed rules and standards, no incentive
for flag states to
ensure their vessels comply with those international obligations, and no
guidance as to how this compliance can
be effected or enforced in situations
where a flag state is unwilling or unable to exercise its jurisdiction in
respect of its vessels.
Attention has therefore become focused less on the rules
for the granting of nationality and the requirements of establishing the
‘genuine link’, and more on articulating the precise duties and
responsibilities incumbent on states who chose to grant
their flag.
3. Developing Flag State Responsibilities
For every right there is a concomitant duty. While
states may have the right to grant their flag, the public order of the oceans
and
the principles of equality of user and due
regard[13] require the
exercise of a reciprocal duty to effectively control their vessels and exercise
jurisdiction over them in situations
where the actions of their vessels
interfere with the interests of other states. In theory, only those vessels over
which the flag
state is exercising effective control can enjoy the freedom of
the high seas and its concomitant advantages. Where flag states fail
in their
duty to exercise their responsibility and jurisdiction effectively, then
arguably they may be internationally responsible
to other states which then
acquire a reciprocal right to rectify the situation. The first task, therefore,
lies in determining the
precise content of the requirement of effective control,
or the content of the responsibilities incumbent on flag states.
Prima
facie, the content of flag state responsibilities will depend on the treaty
obligations to which a state has subscribed and the level and
efficacy of its
domestic implementation of the relevant treaty standards or obligations. By way
of example, in its 2006 report, the
High Seas Task
Force[14] suggests a
number of general criteria that should be addressed in determining whether a
flag state is a responsible flag state in
respect of its fisheries related
obligations. The first set of criteria relate to whether a state is a party to
the global fisheries
agreements, the LOSC, the Compliance
Agreement[15] and the
UN Fish Stocks Agreement
(FSA).[16]
Ratification of these treaties will provide prima facie, although not
conclusive, evidence of responsibility. The presumption of responsibility will,
however, be rebutted by instances of
non-compliance.
The second set of
criteria relate to whether a state is party to or cooperating with the relevant
RFMO/regional arrangement. A responsible
flag state will be expected to
implement the obligation to cooperate by ratifying any relevant regional
agreements or participating
in regional arrangements. Indeed, the FSA stipulates
that in order to have access to a fishery any state with a real interest in
that
fishery must either be a member of the relevant RFMO or cooperate with it
and comply with its measures. Without getting into the vexed question
of what
constitutes a real interest, for present purposes, suffice it to say that this
would include any state whose vessels fish
in any way or at any time in the
relevant fishery. Also relevant will be whether the flag state requires its
vessels to comply with
the conservation and management measures of the RFMO and
whether the flag state itself complies with the obligations of membership
or
cooperation. A responsible flag state will do both. Whether a member of an RFMO
or not, a flag state which does not ensure that
its vessels comply with the
regional conservation and management measures or which does not comply with its
own obligations to implement
the measures adopted, will prima facie be an
irresponsible flag state.
The third set of criteria relate to whether the
flag state has domestic measures in place which meet the internationally agreed
minimum
standards to ensure it exercises effective control over its vessels
including measures to establish a register of fishing vessels,
licensing and
fishing authorisation requirements, vessel and gear marking standards, standards
for verification of catch and effort
data, and a working MCE regime. The absence
of a formal regulatory system will be prima facie evidence of lack of
responsibility although this presumption will have to be rebuttable in the case
of developing states which lack
management and other capacities. In such cases
it will be relevant to enquire whether technical or other assistance has been
requested
or not, requested and provided, requested but not provided, or offered
and rejected. By the same token, the presence of a formal
regulatory system will
be prima facie evidence of responsibility. However, this, too, will be
rebuttable in the case of a state which demonstrates a consistent pattern
of
failure to utilize its powers to control its vessels. In this respect, it will
be necessary to go beyond the HSTF guidelines to
investigate whether a flag
state has in place a working and effective system to sanction wrongdoing by its
vessels which provides
for punishment sufficient to discourage future violation
through, for example, withdrawal of fishing or seafaring authorisation.
Positive
inferences as to the efficacy of the system will be drawn where the measures
have, in fact, discouraged violations. Adverse
inferences will be available
where the state’s vessels continue to engage in IUU activities.
A
similar analysis applies in respect of other activities in areas beyond national
jurisdiction. For example, in the shipping context
it is first necessary to
identify whether a state is party to the various ILO and IMO conventions on
crewing, working and construction
standards and those relating to protection of
the marine environment from vessel source pollution and dumping. Participation
in these
agreements will be prima facie evidence of responsibility.
However, the presumption that a flag state is responsible is a rebuttable one.
While states may generally
be taken to intend to fulfil their international
obligations, the continuing incidence of problems relating to substandard
shipping
is testament to their inability or unwillingness to always do so. It is
therefore necessary to examine the regulatory structures
in place in the flag
state to ensure compliance by its vessels with these internationally agreed
standards and to assess the assiduousness
of their implementation to determine
their efficacy.
Nevertheless, it is trite law that treaties are only binding
on their parties. As will be immediately apparent these criteria appear
to do
nothing to overcome the patchwork of different levels of responsibility and
differing obligations incumbent on each state as
a result of their differing
treaty relations. Indeed, it could be argued that these criteria go no further
than simply re-articulating
the requirement that states should comply with their
treaty obligations and the logical consequence that failure to do so constitutes
a breach of international law. Unfortunately, this does little to advance the
articulation and understanding of the substantive content
of flag state
responsibilities. In particular, where a flag State is not party to all (or
indeed any) of these international agreements
difficult questions arise as to
the precise responsibilities incumbent on it. In other words, it is necessary to
determine whether
there are any flag state responsibilities which are binding on
all states as a matter of customary international law.
In the high seas
fisheries context, it is arguably uncontroversial to suggest that there are two
fundamental customary flag State
duties: the duty to cooperate in the
conservation and management of marine living resources, and the duty to
effectively control
vessels flying your flag. The difficulty lies in defining
the precise content of these customary rules.
With respect to the duty to
cooperate, under the LOSC cooperation requires the establishment, where
appropriate, of sub-regional
or regional fisheries
organisations.[17] For
parties to the FSA the duty to cooperate means not only the duty to establish
RFMOs but also that only members of RFMOs or non-members
who agree to abide by
the conservation and management measures adopted by those RFMOs can access the
fishery concerned.[18]
States that do not agree to abide by RFMO measures must refrain from fishing. If
they do not they have breached their duty to cooperate.
The difficult question
here is whether the duty to cooperate or refrain can now be regarded as a
rule of customary international law binding on all states.
With
respect to the duty to effectively control vessels, the LOSC requirement to
‘effectively exercise jurisdiction and
control’[19]
includes the requirement for flag states to maintain a register of ships under
their control. However, many states exempt fishing
vessels from these
requirements. Article 18 of the FSA makes clear that states shall only authorise
their vessels to fish on the
high seas where they can exercise flag state
responsibilities effectively. Both the Compliance Agreement and the FSA provide
more
detail as to what this effective exercise of flag state responsibilities
entails; for example, they oblige flag states to ensure
through various means
such as vessel registers, fishing authorizations and refusal of their flag to
known IUU vessels, that their
vessels do not engage in activities that undermine
the effectiveness of RFMO measures. The FSA goes further and obliges flag states
to establish schemes for, inter alia: licensing, national register of
authorised vessels, vessel and gear marking, vessel reporting and recording,
verification of catch
data, monitoring control and surveillance (MCS),
regulation of transhipment, and ensuring compliance with RFMO
measures[20]
A
comprehensive review of state practice and opinio juris to definitively
ascertain the customary status of these obligations is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, a cursory review
of state practice by both members and
non-members of
RFMOs[21] would seem
to suggest that, at the very least, flag states might now be considered, as a
matter of customary international law, to
have a duty to maintain a vessel
register the contents of which are publicly available. Registration requirements
should involve,
at a minimum, verification of provenance and ownership of the
vessel in order to ensure that known IUU vessels or vessels operated
by known
IUU operators are not admitted to the register. Arguably too, all flag states
are now obliged not to accept vessels onto
their register if they are not
willing and/or able to exercise effective control over them. This willingness
should be evidenced
by acceptance and implementation in the domestic law of the
flag state of relevant internationally agreed conservation and management
measures, the establishment of an effective licensing regime which issues
authorisations to fish only upon verification of a vessel’s
aptitude to
comply with relevant measures and the identification of the persons responsible
for the vessel’s operation, and
the existence of a national regulatory
framework for monitoring, control and enforcement (MCE). This MCE framework
should include
binding requirements on the reporting of fishing data by vessels,
requirements to monitor vessels through the use of vessel monitoring
systems
(VMS) and observer programs, at-sea and in-port inspection, and regulation of
transhipments. In addition, it should provide
for a system of sanctions adequate
in severity to act as an effective deterrent, including the revocation of
authorizations to fish.
A similar analysis can be made with respect to the
rules relating to marine pollution. Take, for example, the case of high seas
dumping.
Dumping is defined, inter alia, as ‘any deliberate
disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at
sea’.[22]
Dumping is regulated under the LOSC which, in addition to its general
obligations with respect to prevention of marine pollution
and protection of the
marine environment, sets out more specific obligations in respect of dumping.
Article 210 of the LOSC requires
all states to adopt national laws, regulations
and other measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment
by dumping. These laws, regulations and measures are to ensure that
dumping is not carried out without the permission of the competent
national
authorities and, for dumping within the territorial sea, the exclusive economic
zone or on the continental shelf (including
the outer continental shelf), the
express prior approval of the relevant coastal state. The national laws,
regulations and measures
adopted must be no less effective than internationally
agreed global rules and standards, to prevent, reduce and control pollution
from
dumping.
These internationally agreed global rules and standards are found
in a number of global and regional treaties, the most important
of which for
present purposes are the 1972 London Dumping
Convention,[23] and
its 1996 London
Protocol.[24] Under
the 1972 Convention dumping of certain wastes and other matter listed in two
annexes (the ‘black list’ and the
‘grey list’) is either
outright prohibited or requires a special prior permit. Dumping of all
non-listed wastes and other
matter requires a general prior permit. Under the
Protocol, the dumping of all wastes or other matter except those specifically
listed
is prohibited and dumping of those listed substances is subject to
stringent permitting and environmental assessment requirements.
Eighty-two
states are party to the London Convention while 28 states are party to the
London Protocol, which replaces the London
Convention for states party to both.
Prima facie, only these states are bound by the respective treaty
regimes. However, it has been argued that the London Convention and the London
Protocol may both have much broader application. Article 210 of the LOSC
requires states to adopt global rules and standards for
the control of dumping,
and to re-examine them from time to time. The ongoing revision of the London
Convention and the adoption
of the London Protocol might be said to fulfil this
requirement such that, with the coming into force of the LOSC, all states
parties
to the LOSC are now bound by the obligations contained in the most
recent document, the London Protocol, or at the very least by
the provisions of
the London
Convention.[25] In
addition, it has been asserted that ‘there is no evidence of any non-party
[to the London Convention or the London Protocol]
dumping significant wastes at
sea, or asserting a freedom to do so beyond that implied in the LOSC and various
global and regional
instruments’.[26]
Admittedly, neither states nor individuals would be likely to publicise any
unregulated or unlawful dumping activities they engage
in. However, if this is
correct, then in the absence of any state practice evidencing an assertion of a
right to the contrary, it
would appear arguable that the prohibition exists as a
matter of customary international law. The issue is not, however, entirely
free
from doubt.
Clearly, in developing the concept of flag state
responsibilities, the real challenge is to find a commonality of rules which are
applicable to all states. In the absence of any authoritative
articulation of the content of flag state responsibilities which are binding as
a matter
of customary international law, the best that can be said is that the
precise content of these customary obligations remains vague
and insufficiently
developed to provide the basis for a clear and uncontroversial determination of
rights and obligations. These
substantive gaps when coupled with the rules on
nationality of ships and flag state jurisdiction significantly hamper effective
protection,
preservation, conservation and management of areas beyond national
jurisdiction and the global application of enforcement mechanisms.
4. Ensuring Flag State Responsibility
A plethora of measures have been developed by states
to persuade flag states to ensure their vessels comply with international rules
and to address the enforcement challenges posed by the unwilling or unable flag
state. Importantly, while these measures are only
binding on states parties to
the relevant treaty regime, in their operation these measures are intended to
– and often do –
influence and affect the behaviour of non-party
states as well. By way of illustration, and for simple reasons of familiarity,
the
discussion here focuses primarily on measures adopted in the high seas
fisheries context through RFMOs as illustrative of the challenges
faced.
A
now commonly used method in a number of treaty bodies including in the IMO and
RFMOs is that of naming and shaming, particularly
through the use of
‘negative lists’ of non-compliant vessels. Whether in the fisheries
or the shipping context, blacklisting
on a negative list can result in adverse
consequences for listed vessels such as denial of flag or denial of port access.
For example,
under various RFMO schemes, member states are to take certain
actions against listed vessels regardless of whether the vessel is
flagged in a
member or non-member state. These actions generally include: refusing to grant
their flag to listed vessels; refusing
to issue licences to fish in waters under
national jurisdiction; refusing authorisation of catch landing or in-port
transhipment;
ensuring that fishing support, cargo vessels and mother-ships
flying their flag do not participate in any transhipment operations
with listed
vessels; and prohibiting chartering of listed vessels. Beyond this, states are
to discourage their importers, transporters
and other sectors to refrain from
any transactions with or transhipments from listed vessels. Due process
mechanisms have been adopted
to allow states to explain, contest and thereby
possibly avoid the inclusion of their vessels on the lists.
However, while
these lists are useful in identifying individual offending vessels and in
revealing patterns of flag state behaviour
they are subject to limitations. The
tyranny of consensus decision-making in RFMOs means that member (unlike
non-member states) states
can block the listing of their vessels, despite cogent
evidence to the contrary. Procedural rules, possibly anathema to the principle
of sovereign equality of states, are therefore required to ensure that member
states cannot block consensus vis-à-vis their
own vessels. In addition,
listed vessels, once identified, may simply move into another RFMO area or
change their name and register
to avoid detection. RFMOs have therefore adopted
the practice of making their lists publicly available and transmitting them to
other
RFMOs. In 2007 the five tuna RFMOs agreed to establish a common IUU list
while others have agreed to reciprocal recognition of each
other’s lists.
RFMOs have also moved to adopt ‘positive’ lists, or registers
of fishing vessels authorised to fish in a regulatory area.
Unauthorised vessels
are deemed to be IUU vessels. However, in some cases the requirement to
authorise only applies to specific gear
type or to fishing vessels greater than
24 meters in length. Smaller vessels, still capable of fishing on the high seas,
refrigerated
transport vessels and other supply vessels may not be included and
can therefore be used in the practice of laundering catch. In
addition,
authorisations are not necessarily linked to quota. In other words, states are
free to authorise vessels with capacity
far in excess of that needed to take
allocated quota. This lack of capacity control does nothing to reduce the
likelihood of overfishing.
Moreover, as with negative lists, problems of
consistency and application can arise as between the different lists adopted by
different
organisations. The FAO is currently examining the feasibility of and
modus operandi for a global record of fishing vessels which will serve as
a single record of all fishing, refrigerated transport, and supply vessels.
The
actual use to which the record will be put remains to be seen.
Controls, and
in some cases bans, on transhipments either as between vessels of member states
or between vessels of member states
and non-member states are also increasingly
frequent. Controls may include the requirement to establish a record of carrier
vessels
and conditions for at-sea transhipment such as flag state authorisation,
notification procedures and the use of on-board observers.
However, monitoring
and controlling at-sea transhipments are notoriously difficult and the
regulations easily circumvented thereby
allowing catch laundering. Even the
presence of third-party observers may be insufficient deterrent if the
observer’s role
is limited to catch data recording for scientific purposes
or if transhipment occurs outside the regulatory area beyond the jurisdictional
area of the observer. Some RFMOs therefore now require transhipment to take
place only within designated member state ports after
advance notification to
the port state of the precise details of the catch to be transhipped, including
total weight to be landed
and the port and time of landing.
Port state
measures have therefore also become increasingly popular. Under customary
international law, port states are entitled
to control access to their ports and
persons and activities within their territory, subject only to exception in the
case of force majeure or in cases specifically agreed to in treaties.
However, a natural corollary of the right to control is the right not to
control.
To encourage adoption of port state controls international agreements
have been developed to provide an agreed minimum content to
the rights of port
states to act in support of internationally agreed measures, although nothing in
these agreements prevents states
from adopting more stringent measures should
they desire to do so. Having originally found their application in the shipping
context,
measures requiring aspects of port state control are increasingly being
adopted in a number of RFMOs.
Post state measures have the potential to be
very effective, indeed, perhaps too much so in that their introduction can lead
vessels
to seek port in states which have not adopted the controls. The
phenomenon of ports of convenience has been tackled in the shipping
context by
the introduction of regional MOUs on port state control which seek to harmonise
the measures taken. In the shipping context
vessels generally follow common
routes and use common ports on a regular basis so monitoring in this way can be
reasonably, albeit
not wholly, effective in identifying and detaining
substandard ships. In the fisheries context, however, vessels may tranship at
sea or off-load in ports of states not party to the relevant RFMO scheme. The
banning of at-sea transhipment and the imposition of
conditions on landing goes
some way to alleviating this. Nevertheless, the existence of ports of
convenience and the proliferation
of inconsistent, unharmonised RFMO port state
control schemes poses a real threat to the efficacy of RFMO measures. For this
reason
efforts are underway to develop a global legally binding agreement on
port state measures. However, even when adopted, without global
adherence, the
phenomenon of ports of convenience will still persist.
Increasingly
intertwined with port state measures, the use of trade-related measures such as
catch documentation and certification
schemes as well as export and import
controls or prohibitions is becoming more widespread. The purposes of
certification schemes
are to create negative incentives to deter non-compliance
with measures adopted by RFMOs by removing the profitability of non-compliant
behaviour, to create positive incentives to comply by removing competitive
advantages arising from non-compliance, and to provide
information on the amount
of fish in trade and which countries are involved to enable more effective
management and enforcement decisions
to be taken. Catch certifications are
issued at the point of harvesting and cover all fish to be landed or
transhipped. They thus
enable landings and trade flows to be monitored and make
it possible to restrict access to markets for fish taken in contravention
of
RFMO measures. These schemes are linked with port state control in that they
require vessels to provide prior notification of
landing, including a
declaration that the vessel has not been engaged in IUU fishing which must also
be confirmed by the flag state.
Failure to make the appropriate declaration will
result in denial of port access and if there is evidence that the catch was
taken
in contravention of RFMO measures then the port state must not allow it to
be landed or transhipped.
Despite the apparent attractiveness of these
certification schemes, their efficacy in combating IUU fishing has been somewhat
limited
by their inter partes application and by their circumvention by
landing in non-party ports. Technical shortcomings include double counting of
catch, inadequate
application to all catch and all species, and the ever present
practice of fraudulent
reporting.[27] In
general, catch documentation schemes have proven more effective than mere trade
documentation schemes, and a number of RFMOs are
considering replacing the
latter with the former. To be truly effective these schemes should apply to all
sectors of the fleet regardless
of size or gear, all forms of product (live,
fresh, frozen, traded, for domestic consumption) and all stages of the catching,
landing,
transport, processing, trading and marketing chain. The introduction of
electronic documentation will also reduce the potential for
fraud, improve the
speed at which information can be exchanged, and reduce the compliance burden on
legitimate operators and regulatory
authorities.[28]
However, there remains a need to harmonise the various RFMO schemes to make
their application by port states more streamlined and
therefore both more
attractive and more effective.
At-sea measures allowing for direct
enforcement by one state against vessels of another state also exist. The LOSC
provides for non-flag
state enforcement in cases of piracy, slave trading
unauthorised broadcasting, and stateless vessels. Other treaty and customary
regimes allow for non-flag enforcement in cases of illicit drug trafficking,
self defence, intervention in the case if accidents
at sea, and in support of
sanctions and blockades adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. In the fisheries
context, non-flag state boarding and inspection is
provided for in a number of bilateral
treaties[29] and RFMO
schemes[30] as well as
Articles 20-22 of the FSA. However, these schemes only operate inter partes
or as against stateless vessels. Of course consent to boarding, inspection
and arrest can always be given by a flag state in ad hoc cases. However,
there appears as yet to be no recognised general right of non-flag at-sea
enforcement in the absence of flag state
consent.
5. The Wages of Sin: Bearing the Consequences of Irresponsibility
It will be immediately apparent that all of the
measures described above relate to measures that are to be taken by a flag state
or
by another state either in respect of or against individual vessels or
private persons (be they individual or corporate) in particular
situations of
non-compliance. However, the rights of high seas access and use are granted by
the LOSC not to individuals but to states.
The purpose of defining the primary
rules binding upon flag states and assessing a flag state’s performance
therewith must,
presumably, be to determine the consequences that attach to a
failure to comply with those rules not just in respect of individual
vessels but
also as against the state qua state.
With respect to individual
instances of flag state failure, according to the 2008 Report of the UN
Secretary General on Oceans and
Law of the Sea ‘there is now a prevailing
view that fishing vessels on the high seas which are not effectively controlled
by
their flag states are liable to sanctions by other states, should they happen
to contravene international conservation and
measures’.[31]
Application of the general rules on state responsibility suggests that where a
flag state has failed to ensure compliance by its
vessel with its international
obligations then any injured state may take action against that particular
vessel. This would include
coastal states whose rights in their exclusive
economic zone have been adversely affected through, for example, pollution
originating
in the high seas or overfishing of straddling and highly migratory
stocks. In the fisheries context this would also include members
of an RFMO
whose interests in the stocks regulated have been adversely affected by the
activity in question. Port states, too, would
be placed to take action on the
basis of their sovereign right to control access to their ports and the
activities and persons within
their territory.
What is not yet resolved is
the issue of standing of other non-specifically affected states to take action
on the basis of protection
of the interests of the international community as a
whole. In the pollution context Article 218 of the LOSC gives port states the
right to institute proceedings against vessels voluntarily in their ports in
respect of any discharge from such vessels which has
taken place on the high
seas, although this right is subject to the right of flag-state pre-emption
should a flag state intervene
to take over the
matter.[32] However,
no similar jurisdictional entitlement appears yet to be recognised in the high
seas fisheries context. Neither does there
appear to be scope for its
application in the case of environmental damage to the high seas water column
and its resources occasioned
by seabed activities either on the outer
continental shelf or in the Area.
With respect to the broader question of a
consistent pattern of failure by a flag state, it will be recalled that all
states are
under an obligation to exercise their high seas freedoms with due
regard for the interests of other states. These interests include
not only the
rights of all states to access and use, but also the corollary rights to not
access or use, as well as the interests
of the international community as a
whole in the protection and preservation of the marine environment and
conservation and sustainable
use of its resources. A consistent pattern of
failure by a flag state to meet its responsibilities would arguably constitute a
breach
not only of those particular responsibilities but also a breach of the
requirement of due regard articulated in Article 87 of the
LOSC and an abuse of
right contrary to Article 300 of the LOSC. In other words, while not entirely
free from doubt, a consistent
pattern of failure may be open to invocation by
any and all states.
Regardless of which states have standing to
invoke, the question remains as to the consequences for a flag state that flow
from a
consistent pattern of failure to effectively control its vessels.
Certainly, the irresponsible flag state may be subject to public
humiliation
through naming and shaming and even diplomatic protests. Port states may close
their ports to vessels of irresponsible
flag states or otherwise deny port
services. Other states may adopt non-discriminatory trade measures or other
sanctions designed
to persuade the recalcitrant flag state to see the error of
its ways. RFMOs may remove vessels from the register of authorised fishing
vessels or deny quota to member flag states who fail to effectively control
their vessels. Each of these approaches has been taken
in at least one RFMO or
treaty body and could well be implemented in others.
More controversially,
it is now being suggested that since states have the right to grant their flag,
they also have the right not
to grant their flag and the correlative duty to
decline to do so unless they are both willing and able to effectively control
their
vessels. Grant of flag, followed by a consistent pattern of failure to
effectively control could therefore result in a denial of
the right for that
state’s vessels to use the high seas. In other words, while a state would
not lose its right to grant flag,
the grant of flag by an irresponsible flag
state or by a state which subsequently fails in its obligation to effectively
control
it vessels would not be opposable to other states and its vessels would
not enjoy the protection of the flag state – at least
until such time as
other states were satisfied that the flag state had taken steps to remedy its
failings. There is no doubt that
this is a serious consequence to be resorted to
only in extreme circumstances. However, at some stage the logical consequence of
developing the concept of legally binding flag state responsibilities must be
admitted.
6. Conclusion: Addressing the Enforcement Gaps in the Legal Regime for Areas beyond National Jurisdiction
At a general level, enforcement gaps in the legal
regime for areas beyond national jurisdiction can be identified as a lack of
effective
compliance and enforcement mechanisms and institutions and a lack of
standing of states and international organisations to protect
the interests of
the international community as a whole. Despite the adoption of an increasing
number of creative and complex enforcement
measures, problems persist as a
result of the inability or unwillingness of flag states to effectively control
their vessels.
There are many who eschew the development of more law while
others, far more knowledgeable and competent than this pretender, have
expended
considerable energies analysing existing deficiencies and divining, designing
and discussing new and ever more creative
measures to deal with these
enforcement gaps. Recent suggestions include a range of measures such as
taxation, anti-corruption, labour,
human rights and eco-labelling schemes that
states could be required to adopt to control either their vessels or the
interaction
of their nationals with vessels flagged in other states. Essentially
these measures seek to deny individuals the economic advantages
gained from the
offending activity to reduce the incentive to engage in the activity and the
likelihood of its recurrence.
There is no doubt that denying economic
advantage can be a key element in controlling the activities of individuals,
whether in the
shipping, fishing or any other context. However, to ensure
adequate protection of the legitimate interests of all states in areas
beyond
national jurisdiction it may now be necessary to attach real consequences not
just to the activity of individuals but to that
of flag states as well. This may
require the development of new law. In this respect, developments of globally
applicable regimes
for port state measures, a global register of vessels and
global MCS frameworks will help. In the end, however, it may simply require
states brave enough to test the waters of international dispute settlement to
clarify the content of generally accepted international
norms and the bounds of
state responsibility for protection and preservation of the marine environment
and the conservation and management
of the marine living resources in areas
beyond national jurisdiction.
[1] International
Geosphere Biosphere Program (2001), Global Change and the Earth System: A
Planet Under Pressure, IGBP Science No. 4 The Role of
Population
[2] United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982 (LOSC), 21
International Legal Materials 1245
(1982)
[3] LOSC
preamble
[4] A.
D’Amato, ‘International Law as an Autopoietic System’ in R.
Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty
Making (Springer: 2005) 335-399
[5]
‘Autopoiesis’ www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/t.quick/autopoiesis.html.
[6] LOSC Art
87
[7] LOSC Art
90
[8] LOSC Art
92(1)
[9] R. Rayfuse,
Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff,
2004) at 28-29
[10]
LOSC Art 91
[11]
See, eg, The Grand Prince case, (Belize v France), 125 International
Law Reports 273 (ITLOS, 2001) and the M/V Saiga (No. 2) case (St
Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea) 120 International Law Reports 144
(ITLOS, 1997)
[12]
T. Treves, ‘Flags of Convenience Before the Law of the Sea Tribunal’
6 San Diego International Law Journal (2004-2005) 179-189 at
189
[13] LOSC Art
87
[14] High Seas
Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas,
Appendix 4 (March 2006), available at http://www.high-seas.org.
[15]
1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Measures, 33 International Legal Materials 968
(1994)
[16] 1995
Agreement for the implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,
Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks 24 International Legal Materials 1542
(1995)
[17] LOSC
Art 118
[18] FSA
Art 8
[19] LOSC Art
94
[20] FSA Arts.
18-19.
[21]
See, e.g., R. Rayfuse, ‘To Our Children’s Children’s
Children: From Promoting to Achieving Compliance in High Seas
Fisheries,’
20(3-4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 2005, 509-532 at
525-527.
[22] LOSC
Art 1(5)
[23] 1972
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, London, 29 December 1972. Into force
30 August 1975. 1976 UKTS 43, (the
London
Convention)
[24]
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter of 29 December 1972,
London, 7 November 1996. Into
force 24 March 2006. [2006] ATS 11 (the London
Protocol)
[25] L.
de la Fayette, ‘The London Convention 1972: Preparing for the
Future’ 13(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law
(1998) 515-536 at
516
[26] P. Birnie
and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment (2d) (2002) at
421
[27] See, eg,
C. Roheim and J.G. Sutinen, “Trade and Marketplace Measures to Promote
Sustainable Fishing Practices” ICTSD
Natural Resources, International
Trade and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper No 3, International Centre
for Trade and Sustainable
Development and the High Seas Task Force, Geneva,
Switzerland (2006) available at http://www.high-seas.org/ and C. Roheim,
“Seafood Supply Chain Management: Methods to Prevent Illegally-Caught
Product Entry into the Marketplace”.
Paper prepared for IUCN World
Conservation Union – US for the project PROFISH Law Enforcement,
Corruption and Fisheries Work,
(2008) available at
<http://www.illegal-fishing.info/item_single.php?item=document & item_id=555 & approach_id=16>
[28]
M. Lack, “Catching on? Trade-related measures as a fisheries management
tool” Traffic International, Cambridge, UK (2007)
available at http://www.traffic.org/fisheries/;
[29]
See, e.g., U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding on Effective
Cooperation and Implementation of United Nations General Assembly Resolution
46/215 of December 20, 1991, (3 December
1993).
[30]
See, e.g., Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock
Resources in the Central Bering Sea (16 June 1994), 34 ILM 67 (1994),
Art. XI; Convention on the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North
Pacific Ocean (11 February 1992) 22 Law of the Sea Bulletin 21-29, Arts.
IV and V. See, also, Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (24 October 1978), 1135 UNTS 369, Art. XI(5);
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (20 May
1980), [1982] ATS 9, Art. X; International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (14 May 1966), 673 UNTS 63, Art IX(3); Convention on the
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean
(5 September 2001), 40(2) ILM 277, Arts. 25 and 32;
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South
East Atlantic (20 April 2001) 41(2) ILM 257, Art.
16(3).
[31] Report
of the Secretary General on Oceans and Law of the Sea (Advanced and unedited
text) UN Doc a/63/50 (2008) para
249
[32] LOSC Art
228
AustLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLRS/2009/2.html