

He relied on the case of *Saundry and Secretary, Department of Social Security* (1988) 16 ALD 200 as authority for the proposition that there was an entitlement to pro rata bonuses, rather than the fully accumulated amounts that were declared. Alternatively, he requested that the bonuses that accrued prior to the change in the guidelines (prior to July 1997) be exempted.

He also relied on the case of *Varcoe and Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services* [2000] AATA 1002 for authority that the proceeds of the policy be treated as an exempt lump sum, except for net earnings after July 1997. In that case the Tribunal used its power under s.8(11)(d) to split the bonuses received.

The Department argued that the life insurance policy did not fall within the definition of income in s.8 or the definition of financial assets and income streams provided by s.9. Consequently it could not be considered to generate an income contemporaneously with the policy's existence, despite growth in the capital. Therefore it was not until maturity that income could be assessed and under s.1073 the lump sum is treated as though received over a 12-month period.

The Department argued that the discretion in s.8(11)(d) should only be exercised in a manner consistent with the aim of the legislation. The Department argued that the Tribunal exercised its power incorrectly in the case of *Varcoe* by directing that only the income accrued during the period that Mr *Varcoe* received the pension be assessable. In the alternative the Department argued that *Varcoe* could be distinguished as *Davies* had prior warning of the treatment of the lump sum and there was no evidence of financial hardship.

Findings

The Tribunal considered s.1073 and concluded that the total accumulated bonuses should be assessed as income, irrespective of the period during which the bonuses accumulated, or whether the person was receiving social security payments.

In relation to the case of *Varcoe*, the Tribunal agreed that there is an inequality in the treatment of lump sum superannuation payments and lump sum payment on maturity of age insurance policies, but found that this has arisen 'within the historical context of the development of superannuation schemes investment products and changes in departmental policy'.


The Tribunal did not agree that it was appropriate to treat as income only bonuses accrued after July 1997. It found that the discretion allowed for in s.8(11)(d) should be applied in situations described by the notes attached to the subsection. For example, where there was a lottery win, a legacy or bequest or a one-off gift. The Tribunal found these examples related to unexpected amounts not the type of product that was the subject of this appeal.

The Tribunal found that the life insurance policy was 'not of the character contemplated by section 8(11)(d) and consequently the amount received was not "an exempt lump sum"'.

Formal decision

The AAT affirmed the decision of the SSAT.

[R.P.]



Jurisdiction: absence of claim

TAYLOR and SECRETARY TO
THE DFaCS
(No. 2002/989)

Decided: 23 October 2002 by
M.J. Carstairs.

A claim for mobility allowance (MOB) by Taylor on 27 September 2001 was granted with payments to start from that date. She then sought arrears on the basis that she had made MOB claims 7 and 12 years previously. After a search of its records a Centrelink delegate refused arrears as there was no evidence of earlier MOB claims. On review, the authorised review officer (ARO) decided he had no jurisdiction as there had been no decision concerning MOB at those earlier times. The SSAT reached the same conclusion for the same reason.

Taylor informed the AAT she had made the first claim while at the Rivendale Community Centre, and was later told there that it had been refused. She had told the SSAT that seven years ago she had filled in and posted the forms for MOB herself, and had received a decision rejecting the claim.

In response the Secretary stated that:

- Taylor had lodged DSP claims on 7 April 1992 and 28 February 1995;
- the information she provided with both claims suggested she would not have been qualified for MOB at those times;

- these was no record on its paper files or computer records of MOB claims before 27 September 2001;
- if a letter had been sent to Taylor rejecting a MOB claim about 1995 there would have been a record of it in Centrelink's computer; and
- if such a notice had been sent, Taylor's appeal against the decision was out of time and arrears of MOB would not be payable.

The AAT noted that in *Ward v Nicholls* (1988) 20 FCR 18 the Federal Court had held that the AAT had power to review a decision declining jurisdiction. Further, both the ARO and the SSAT had made substantive decisions that a MOB claim had not been lodged before 27 September 2001. More importantly, the Centrelink delegate had declined payment on that basis.

Section 1040(1) of the *Social Security Act 1991* provided that a person who wants to be granted a MOB must make a proper claim. Sections 1041 and 1042 provided that the claim must be in writing in an approved form and lodged at an office of the Secretary or other approved place. Sections 1038 and 1039 provided that MOB was not payable before the date of claim.

The AAT was satisfied on the basis of the extensive searches made by Centrelink that the Secretary or his agents received no claim. In the absence of such a claim the combined effect of the above provisions was that no payment of MOB could have been made.

Formal decision

The AAT set aside the decision that there was no jurisdiction, and affirmed the Centrelink delegate's decision that MOB was not payable.

[K.deH.]

[Contributor's Note: All the decision makers in this matter couched the decision in terms of paying arrears, whereas the actual decision is the commencement date under ss.1038 and 1039.]