The Perils and Politics of Criminological Research and the Threat to Academic Freedom

Mike Presdee* **and Reece Walters†**

Introduction

The study of crime and deviance is of significant political and social concern. Whether it challenges existing notions of social order or critiques government policy and practice, criminological research does not take place in a political vacuum (Jupp 1989; Hughes, 1996). It is a sensitive enterprise, which often questions the role of the 'state' and its relationship to its citizenry. This genre may provide unwelcome views to those governments which seek confirmation of their political agendas (Garland 1997). Hogg and Brown (1998) refer to government attempts to regulate public debate and suppress dissenting views of existing state policy as part of the 'uncivil politics of law and order' (at 1-2). In this process, power is exerted to control or regulate the production of knowledge (Foucault 1977).

The reluctance of governments to entertain criticism or opposing views is of critical concern, given the changing nature of funded research. O'Malley (1997) points out that criminological research is becoming more market driven. Political changes demanding a cost-effective public sector have placed pressure on universities to be business or even profit oriented institutions. Criminologists are finding themselves working in environments which demand greater efficiency and output, where tenure is more difficult to obtain and where university 'managers' are placing pressure on academics to engage in contract research in an attempt to promote entrepreneurialism whilst generating financial growth (O'Malley 1997:270). The increasing pressure to conduct government evaluations or consultancies under contract (as other sources of funding diminish) places criminologists in a position of service provider to the state or 'client'. Contractual arrangements between the two parties set a variety of boundaries around the research to be completed. These arrangements regulate the nature of information to be gathered, the way the research will be reported and the form of dissemination. It is our view that these burgeoning contractual arrangements between criminologists and the state are sites for potential contestation.

This article will focus on government acts of intimidation or what has more commonly been referred to as the 'policing of knowledge' (Brusten 1981). It is more concerned with the suppression of academic freedom, the contractual ambiguities of contemporary crimi-

* Reader, School of Social and International Studies, University of Sunderland. 1-4 Thornhill Park, Sunderland SR2 7J7, England.

† Lecturer, Institute of Criminology, Victoria University of Wellington. PO Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand.

nological research and the ways in which independent scholarship is controlled or influenced by funding bodies than the specifics of the original crime prevention research which will form the basis of our case study (discussed below). We wish to address a range of questions in this article. For example, to what extent do governments use commercial contracts as a means of regulating criminological research? How should academics react to governments that threaten legal action or attempt to suppress critical findings? Will the increase in market-driven and market funded criminological research produce more 'information gathering' for government and less critique of government policy and practice? We are hopeful that our case study may spark further debate by addressing some of these questions as well as identifying some lessons for future criminological inquiry.

Case Study

'Fight to put contract research in public realm - Criminologists risk gag for 'touching raw nerve with State';

This headline appeared in *The Australian*'s Higher Education section of February 7 1996 (Smellie 1996a). The newspaper report described the attempted suppression by the South Australian Attorney-General's Department of two papers that were presented at the 1996 Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology conference. The papers entitled 'Mixing Policy and Practice with Politics: The Pitfalls of Community Crime Prevention' by Mike Presdee and Reece Walters and 'Telling Stories of Crime in South Australia' by Mark Israel were alleged by the South Australian Attorney-General's Department in correspondence sent to the conference's convenors, to contain material that was 'potentially' in breach of a contract dated 9 August 1993 between the presenters and the South Australian Government.

The Crown Solicitor for the South Australian Attorney-General assumed, without having read the abstracts or the papers' contents, that they constituted a contractual breach of the aforementioned agreement. Therefore, on the basis of the title alone, the Crown Solicitor wrote:

'Remedies are available to enforce and protect the rights of the South Australian Government and it appears that as Victoria University of Wellington has arranged this conference, any such remedies may be enforceable against the University' (Correspondence dated 25 January 1996).

Correspondence (including 17 pages of Hansard and commentary) sent to the conference convenors only days before by the manager of the South Australian Crime Prevention Unit attempted to discredit the research alleged to be linked to the proposed papers. It stated 'I believe the above mentioned papers are based on this research [Review of the South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy], and hence I suggest it would be in the best interests of the ANZSOC [sic] Conference for you to discuss this matter with me' (Milbank 1996).

When the conference convenors did not submit to the demands of the South Australian Government arguing 'I see it neither as my role nor as my responsibility as Convenor of the above Conference to scrutinise all papers submitted to ensure their compliance with external contractual obligations' (Morris 1996), the South Australian Attorney-General's Department moved swiftly and sent legal documentation to Victoria University of Wellington, necessitating the involvement of that university's vice-chancellor.

This event marked a watershed for the conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology: never before had a government department, let alone a foreign

government, threatened legal action against presenters, the Society itself (including its members) and the host university. If the Vice-Chancellor of Victoria University of Wellington had acceded to this request it could be argued that Vice-Chancellors of all universities would be responsible for the contents of all the papers presented at every conference held throughout Australia and New Zealand. As a result Vice-Chancellors could be forced to act as censors in the very arena that many would consider as the fount of freedom of thought. As such, the actions of the South Australian Government constituted a substantial attack on academic freedom and showed clearly how the State could interfere with and seek to control research processes and findings.

The convenors of the 1996 Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology conference invited representatives of the South Australian Government to present their concerns at the conference. Initially the Attorney-General's Department in Adelaide agreed but eventually withdrew only days before the conference started. In its place the convenors held a special plenary session on academic freedom chaired by Professor Carson (Vice-Chancellor of Auckland University) and Professor Young (Victoria University of Wellington). The plenary session explored some of the current issues facing criminologists engaged in commercially contracted research.

In his opening address to the plenary session attended by over 150 conference delegates Professor Carson presented the New Zealand Education Act which protects academic freedom and the rights of university staff to disseminate research and engage in public debate. Furthermore, Professor Carson commented:

'Academic freedom in the field of Criminology is perhaps even more problematic and more important than quite a few areas of academic endeavour because it's touching the State at a raw nerve...Almost automatically, if we are studying crime we are messing around with some of the most powerful constructs the State has at its disposal' (Smellie 1996).

Professor Warren Young (Victoria University of Wellington) told the plenary session that Criminologists should safeguard against loss of copyright and intellectual property by carefully negotiating such matters prior to signing contractual agreements. However, Professor John Braithwaite (Australian National University) took a different view. He told the plenary that social science researchers were constantly faced with governments having 'carte blanche over intellectual property' and that criminologists needed to be 'buccaneers' when it came to publishing their research. Braithwaite further added:

'I say, 'You can try and stop me and you can probably take away the report, but that would be foolish because I will go to the press and get the report out in a much better way' (Smellie 1996).

These sentiments were widespread in the plenary with academics condemning the actions of the South Australian Government and others that attempt to suppress the dissemination of independent research.

Similar threats had preceded the submission of the final evaluation report, which had reviewed the South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy (see discussion below). As O'Malley (1997) has pointed out, '[E]valuation, that most technical of the operations of crime prevention, thus again proves to be highly political. Perhaps nowhere has this been more visible than in the struggles that emerged over the evaluation of the South Australian crime prevention programme' (O'Malley 1997:269). It is our intention here to present some of the details involved in the review of the South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy to illustrate some of the struggles in which criminological researchers must engage when they criticise state policy. In doing so, we acknowledge that not all governments are out to sup-

press the truth, as well as suggesting that not all academics produce good work. Yet we are concerned that the increase in contract research, concomitant with the state's rejection of criticism in times of accountability (see Hogg & Brown 1998) is likely to produce more examples of conflict between researcher and funding bodies. We aim here to reveal something of the process, which is not evident in the end product of evaluation research. This case study highlights the sometimes intimidating mechanisms of the state when faced with critical research.

Background of the research

In August 1993 La Trobe University was contracted by the South Australian Attorney-General's Department to review that state's Crime Prevention Strategy, a Labor Party policy launched in 1989. The final report, 'Policies And Practices Of Preventing Crime: A Review Of The South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy', was authored by Mike Presdee and Reece Walters. Mark Israel was sub-contracted by La Trobe University to write a 'special project' on media and crime that was included as an appendix to the final report. The final report was submitted in draft form to the Crime Prevention Unit (CPU) in June 1994. The CPU agreed to provide 'feedback' to the authors within one week, but this never occurred. The 300 page draft report contained 66 conclusions and 33 recommendations and examined crime prevention for Aboriginal peoples, the prospects and problems with inter agency or partnership models, the role of the 'community' in local crime problems, public perceptions of safety in the streets of Adelaide, the relationship between young people and police, the development and progress of 500 crime prevention programs, the impact of dry area legislation in South Australia, and crime and the media. The report described a range of barriers to developing and implementing localised crime prevention plans (see Presdee & Walters 1994). It report included a detailed analysis of the policy development practices of the CPU, the body responsible for managing the state's crime prevention strategy. It is here that the evaluation unveils a range of political processes and sensitivities relating to government decision-making and management (see Presdee & Walters 1997).

Using cabinet papers and departmental documentation as well as extensive interview data, the evaluation pieced together the vagaries of government policy-making and managerial uncertainties that had led to community frustration and despair (Presdee & Walters, 1997). The authors charted the processes of political and bureaucratic policy-making and critically concluded that the development and management of government policy had impacted significantly on the way that policy was delivered and received. This was seen as a central and therefore vital element of the research. The final report conveyed this effect by identifying the despondency of community workers and other key people involved with the South Australian crime prevention strategy. One crime prevention officer employed to deliver local crime prevention plans is quoted as saying:

'The CPU ran the professional line until they finally came clean about the strategy, that is, the CPU finally admitted their lack of knowledge and this was a first for them. They should have been up front from the outset rather than leaving communities on their own without support' (Presdee & Walters 1994:32).

Quotations such as these, supported by the words of CPU staff describing their own managerial confusion and ill direction, appear throughout the final evaluation report (see Presdee & Walters 1994:20-60). However it was the description, through the use of cabinet papers, of the creation of government policy, and the revelation of how public servants set about manipulating the powerful and setting their own policy agendas, that proved the most disturbing in the corridors of power. The report conjured up powerful images of policy making processes, in its now well known description of the 'Red Dot Day' (Presdee & Walters

1994, 1997), minutely describing how the most powerful committee ever assembled in South Australian law enforcement circles, huddled around pieces of butchers' paper scattered over the floor, placed sticky red dots alongside issues they thought were important. The report concluded 'the results of this 'parlour game' approach to planning resulted in a rather predictable outcome' (Presdee & Walters 1994:54) which included the identification of 'corrections' as the key area for crime prevention. More than anything else, it drew aside the cloak of bureaucratic and governmental secrecy to reveal that in places of power, bureaucratic advice is sometimes driven by a flimsy of pragmatic practices. The evidence that enabled a full description of the 'emperor's clothes' was in the report for all to read.[1]

Submitting the draft report

Within 24 hours of the draft report's submission (15 June 1994), the Chief Executive Officer of the South Australian Attorney-General's Department formally wrote to the then Deputy Vice-Chancellor of La Trobe University, Professor Kit Carson, requesting an urgent meeting to discuss an alleged breach of contract as well as a range of 'management issues' relating to the evaluation. In response Professor Carson wrote directly to the Acting Attorney-General (current Premier), The Hon J Olsen and stated:

I am surprised by this peremptory invitation to attend a meeting with such a goal, given that there has been no previous correspondence on these matters. I am doubly surprised that the invitation is based on an incomplete draft report, especially in view of the fact that a meeting which had been arranged between the authors and the Crime Prevention Unit to discuss the draft report was apparently cancelled by the Crime Prevention Unit at the last minute without explanation (Carson, 24 June 1994).

Within hours of this letter reaching the acting minister's office, the Chief Executive Officer of the Attorney-General's Department phoned Professor Carson, adopting a more conciliatory tone than that which was evident in his early correspondence. He followed up his phone call with a letter on the same day:

The Attorney-General (Mr K T Griffin) is anxious to resolve these matters as soon as possible. He does not however, believe it appropriate to begin to deliver voluminous written materials to each other, but prefers to address the issues around the table (Kelly, 24 June 1994).

The (over) reaction of the Attorney-General's Department to a draft evaluation report demonstrated the sensitive and defensive nature of this particular department, one which clearly did not express an anxiety to 'resolve matters' but instead to threaten those connected to the research in the interests of seeing the report's content either changed or suppressed. Radzinowicz (1994) has identified these Government practices of tampering with independent research as governments 'setting the agenda.... in relation to the administrator's (and ultimately the Minister's) conception of what kind of knowledge is needed' (Radzinowicz 1994:101).

Discussing the draft report

On 29 June 1994 a meeting between the Attorney-General's Department (Chief Executive Officer, Crown Solicitor, Attorney-General's Chief of Staff, CPU Manager) and La Trobe University was held at the Attorney-General's offices in Adelaide.

Some of the detail relating to this meeting is worth documenting in order to gain a sense of how this department approached the entire issue. In doing so we concur with Hughes (1996) that there are lessons to be learnt for future criminological researchers by opening up and revealing the difficulties encountered when researching crime and criminal justice.

The meeting commenced with the Chief Executive Officer of the Attorney-General's Department handing out a seven-page document outlining the various 'concerns' with the draft report. He emphasised that it was a paper for the purpose of that particular meeting and was, therefore, not to leave the building, claiming that it was a 'working document'. He explained that the Attorney-General's Department was still in the process of considering their response to the draft report and did not want a working paper to 'prejudice their position'. The La Trobe University contingent (Deputy vice-chancellor [Research], co-authors Presdee and Walters and La Trobe University's solicitor) considered this to be totally unacceptable. The evaluation team had submitted a draft report as required and was awaiting feedback in order to finalise its work. Instead, senior state officials were alleging breach of contract and convening urgent meetings and then denying the researchers the opportunity to take away the government's concerns and carefully consider them.

La Trobe University representatives were invited to take a few minutes to read seven pages of script and then return the document after giving their response. The document included broad statements about areas not covered in the report and a number of alleged 'factual inaccuracies'. During La Trobe University's 'reading time', the Chief Executive Officer of the Attorney-General's Department interrupted to discuss 'an alleged breach of confidentiality' - something which he had raised in early correspondence but had withdrawn from this meeting's agenda. He accused one of the researchers of breaching confidentiality clauses in the contract by granting the Chief Executive Officer of South Australian Aboriginal Affairs access to preliminary research findings within the previous week. The current meeting had been in session less than 15 minutes and this attack (complete with legal threats) was clearly outside the boundaries of the agenda, yet the opportunity to threaten and plant seeds of legal challenge were seized upon. Members of the La Trobe University contingent expressed their discontent with this action and motioned towards the door suggesting that if the tactics mentioned above were to persist then the matter would be best settled in the courtroom. The Chief Executive Officer of the Attorney-General's Department began to explain that he had been 'misunderstood', he was simply trying to clarify a matter involving confidentiality clauses.

The meeting lasted ninety minutes and involved the Attorney-General's Department highlighting what it considered were deficiencies in the evaluation report. La Trobe University representatives listened to the 'feedback' choosing not to enter into lengthy discussion. Given that La Trobe University representatives were not permitted to take away the written concerns and consider them at length, it was deemed inappropriate to have to defend allegations 'on the run' without time to consult.

The meeting concluded with the Attorney-General's Department agreeing to provide a detailed account (to which the Review Team could have access) of all 'factual inaccuracies' in the report and alleged breaches of contract. The deadline for submitting the final report was re-negotiated from 30 June 1994 to 15 July 1994. This meeting had been a crude attempt by the Crown Solicitor to frighten the report's authors and by doing so alter its findings. It was an intimidating structure that could have worked because of its sheer brutality, but in this case because the authors united around the integrity of their findings, it failed.

The period between the meeting mentioned above and the deadline for the final report (notably, 16 days) was also a time closely monitored by the state. The researchers were requested to amend 'factual inaccuracies' in their draft report but their access to information and government personnel was highly regulated. All communication from the researchers was directed to the manager of the CPU. For almost a year the researchers had been liaising

daily with all members of the CPU, yet without reason the Attorney-General's Department insisted that all queries be directed to the CPU's manager, and other CPU staff became unreachable during this period. Moreover, all requests by the researchers for additional information were required to be put in writing. In other words gaining access to information became 'highly procedurized and personalised' (Hughes 1996:69) as a means of controlling external inquiry (Lee 1993).

The final report was submitted on the due date and the Attorney-General's Department remained silent for four weeks. On 22 August 1994 the evaluation report was tabled in the South Australian Parliament whereupon allegations of breach of contract were made by the Attorney-General. Press statements were released by the Attorney-General and media interviews held with public servants, all attempting to discredit the report. Whilst La Trobe University had spent four weeks after the submission of the final report continuously writing to the South Australian Attorney-General's Department requesting payment and receiving no reply, it now appeared that the Attorney-General's Department was orchestrating a plan to release the report and have it receive as much bad press as possible.

Despite the report's authors calling for public debate on its contents, there has been none to date. The South Australian Attorney-General (Trevor Griffin) who inherited the strategy from the previous Labor Government has described the report as not providing a 'comprehensive process and outcome evaluation of the Crime Prevention Strategy as expected. It provided little analysis of crime prevention issues...' (Griffin 1995:10).

The previous Attorney-General in South Australia (Chris Sumner) referred to it as an 'ideological waste of time' (Penberthy 1994). Irrespective of the Attorney-General heeding some of the recommendations contained in the report, his department has remained adamant that the document constitutes a contractual breach and, therefore, has refused to settle the outstanding amount of $72,358 owing to La Trobe University. It is understood that La Trobe University has not pursued the amount for reasons pertaining to legal costs. However, legal advice given to La Trobe University suggests that the report does not breach the contract between the two parties and the South Australian Government are legally obliged to pay (Topsom 1995). Yet a state of deadlock has arisen since.

A question must be asked, if (as legal opinion suggests) this evaluation is not in breach of contract and has delivered its report on time, why is a State government refusing to settle? By not settling for alleged contractual reasons, the Attorney-General's Department can continue to discredit the value of the report. But again, why do this when the report contains much information for future crime prevention policies? Because the report reveals and challenges the ambiguous processes and practices of the public servants responsible for the development and implementation of the South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy. How can one report provoke such response? Why does the South Australian Attorney-General's Department continually attempt to muzzle the dissemination of a report's content that they claim was a failure, a waste of time and tells them nothing about crime prevention? We argue that evaluation reports, which produce the 'wrong answers', are always susceptible to official and/or legal ramifications from funding sources.

Criminological research has the potential to unearth government decision-making and the policies which result. These discoveries often reveal more about government processes of discretionary power than the subject of review. As the South Australian Attorney-General has said, his government's attempts to suppress the report were 'protecting the state's interests' (Smellie 1996b).

General Discussion

All that we have described in micro-detail above, shows state mobilisation of power as part of the process of the policing of knowledge (Brusten 1981). We don't believe the above case study is a one-off incident. We see it as a useful starting point for exploring wider themes about contract research and academic freedom or as Chomsky urges, 'to seek out an audience that matters...a community of common concern in which one hopes to participate' (1996:61). We also aim to raise questions about the changing nature of criminological research, which includes the growth of private consultancies, and explore the possible sites of tension that may arise from these new forms of knowledge production.

As mentioned, we would argue that our case study is not uncommon. It included most of the features consistent with contractual research including rigorous researcher and commissioner protocols, monthly reporting and management meetings with government officials, detailed discussions of research methods both prior to and during their implementation, as well as the submission of two written interim reports. We argue that our case study provides an illustration of the state's policing of certain forms of knowledge, notably that which challenges government decision-making. This policing has given rise to a long struggle between researchers and those who hold power, over what counts as knowledge and truth (Stenson & Cowell 1991; May 1993). As Foucault has identified, the 'art of governing' or 'to govern' not only involves the protection of principality or territory but also the governing of 'things', the day-to-day events (such as research and processes of management) that influence, or are capable of influencing, the economy of the state (Foucault 1978:89-91).

Evaluation work itself necessarily involves the production of new knowledges and truths about specific social policies that have emanated from within the deepest layers of the political processes. Attempts by bureaucrats to reduce evaluation to simply the scientific administration of things, is an attempt to disguise the true research nature of such work and its ability to produce new knowledges about policy making and policy practices. The resulting social policies are no more than the offspring of political processes themselves and as a result come laden with the political struggles and issues of the day. Evaluation of such policies often unearths this true relationship between politics and policy which is why servants of the state may seek to control the production, distribution and consumption of emerging new knowledges about their world of policy making and practice. When researchers create new criminological understandings of these processes through their evaluative work, or when they have succeeded against all odds in truly evaluating policies, then those in power may seek to control totally the distribution and consumption of these new knowledges and question the production process itself.

We see it as our duty as researchers to inform other criminologists of the existing strategies of state bureaucracies as they seek to appropriate research, in order for criminologists as a group to recognise the powerful mechanisms of control by which state agencies seek to capture and hold onto research. Researching and publishing 'sensitive' areas of social science is always susceptible to government rebuke and/or official challenge (Lee 1993). However, criminologists have a responsibility to engage in public debate and to publish their work (Jupp 1989).

Firstly we must recognise that there will always be demands by the state for 'operational' research whilst discarding 'critical' research as unscientific. This false dichotomy becomes the first point of struggle for researchers who find their work emptied of true content from the very beginning. This dichotomy is often incorporated into the process of everyday control mechanisms practiced by the state in order to systematically tamper with the truth and the processes of the production of knowledge. The research contract itself reflects this proc-

ess of control as the state may seek to determine the research instruments themselves, restrict the publication of results, and attempt to appropriate all that is produced including ideas and analyses, all being contractually owned by the state, to be discarded or censored at will. Here the research contract becomes no more than the legalisation of state interference and is always the first formal mechanism of the oppression of the truth. As Cullingworth identified three decades ago, government contracts often make up this oppression of the truth: '[T]he freedom of the social researcher - and hence the scientific nature of his work - is largely illusory if he is entirely constrained by terms of reference laid down by a public authority...and by deadlines set by a financial time-table' (Cullingworth 1969:13). Furthermore, Radzinowicz (1994) has expressed concern about the state of criminological research, particularly the 'attitudes of authorities to the freedom of access to information and the freedom to interpret and publish findings' he argues are 'prerequisites for any really incisive and honest research' (Radzinowicz 1994:103).

Moreover, as Manfred Brusten has pointed out, as well as the formal sanction of restrictive contracts there are many informal sanctions used by the state to influence the processes of distribution and consumption of critical research work. These include, giving researchers a bad reputation whilst constructing a negative image of that type of researcher, making administrative difficulties, making the researchers wait and repeat their demands many times before reacting, putting pressure on the heads of department in which the researcher is working to exert influence on the subordinate researcher, suspecting the researcher of activities which might lead to formal prosecution and suspecting secret information in the files of the researcher (Brusten 1981).

All these strategies were brought to bear in the case we have described above and as such acts as another episode in the long history of attempted suppression of deviant knowledge. There are in the end only two fail-safe strategies to avoid getting into conflict with state bureaucracies. The first is to do research that they are not interested in. The second is to do research that they think is either harmless or the most valuable to them. All else will trigger both the formal and informal procedures by which the defensive social controls of criminological endeavours takes place (Brusten 1981).

Conclusion

Finally, we are concerned that criminological research is losing its critical edge. Instead we are seeing the continual emergence of administrative, uncritical and politically safe research. Academic research must reflect a commitment to intellectual authority and to our obligation as 'critic and conscience of society' (Haskell 1996). Yet, the increase in contract research, which legally binds academics to provide information to clients or stakeholders, is capable of restricting academic freedom. Research which moves beyond the boundaries of state contracts (which are becoming increasingly more detailed with complex clauses about confidentiality, copyright and intellectual property), is likely to draw the sort of challenges which we have described above.

The lesson to be learned from the above case study was that in the end the South Australian State apparatus was unable to maintain control outside its domain and was unable to mobilise state power Australia wide. We believe that criminologists must maintain intellectual property and academic freedom when they undertake contract research. This may jeopardise the winning of a contract, yet it is important for universities to market their unique attributes of independence, diversity and critique. Attempts to convert academic departments into profitable entities or business units must co-exist with a commitment to uphold Academe as a place of freedom of thought. Researchers who uphold this tradition,

and challenge government policy, are likely to encounter the struggles we have identified above. Whilst we endorse mechanisms and protocols which are likely to limit tension between state agencies and researchers, in many ways tensions are unavoidable in a political climate that promotes government sensitivities to all forms of criticism. We argue that it is important for criminologists to publish their work, to engage in public debate and to allow their research to be scrutinised. If academic criminological researchers are to become nothing more than information gatherers for governments, and are not prepared to critique the role of the state for fear of losing future contracts, then we argue that we reduce ourselves to co-conspirators in the policing of knowledge.

Notes

1. We use the expression 'for all to read' yet the final evaluation report 'Policies and Practices of Preventing Crime: A Review of the South Australian Crime Prevention Strategy, was never published. In late 1994 the Crime Prevention Unit released it to 'relevant' people who contacted the Attorney-General. Even after its tabling in Parliament there were restrictions over access. According to the Manager of the CPU speaking on South Australian radio in January 1996, the report can now be obtained by members of the general public at a cost of $1 per page - the report is 304 pages in length, so we must, therefore, question the extent to which it is truly a 'public document'.

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