

'People's Power' Revolution

In this concluding part of the study of revolutionary causation, contingent causation is followed through to the *uprising* in February 1986, and to the institution of the *revolutionary government* after. We examine a number of issues. The first concerns the *functionalization* value of Marcos's ideology, called the 'democratic revolution' or 'revolution from the center'. In chapter 6 it is analyzed in terms of what a *revolution* means and in relation to *sovereignty*. And we conclude that it is a contradictory theory, but was meant to camouflage the Marcos regime's corrupt priorities. The second, in chapter 7, describes how the regime exacerbated the preconditions set out in part 2, above. It is meant to illustrate contingent causation further--to unravel 'the individual circumstances . . . [which] would have contributed more or less to the outbreak of revolution and shaped its consequential changes'. Thus, thirdly--as chapter 8 shows--in the ensuing struggle for sovereignty, the comparative strength of *ilustrado* leadership and plebeian leadership is depicted. The latter had become dramatically strong during the regime. As the regime was foundering, however, it merely enabled the neo-*ilustrados* to regather and resume their leadership in state-oriented relations. In other words, just as Marcos had succeeded in supplanting the *ilustrada's* weakened leadership with his own in the early 1970s and into the 1980s, so now, with the increasing alienation of the people from his regime, the *ilustrados* were in turn able to deflect the revolutionary struggle of the masses in their favor. And the cause? What we have said in chapter 4, above, still applies: from habitual acquiescence or fear and dependence attitudes . . . they . . . came to regard the elites' guidance and leadership as both natural and proper. As a result, plebeian leadership once more was defeated.

Following the assassination of former senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983 and the *coup d'etat* of Enrile and Ramos in February 1986, the *ilustrados* were back in power. We make the following findings:

1. That the death of Aquino enabled the *ilustrados* to regain for their class(es) its(their) domination of the masses in state-oriented relations;

2. Consequently, what started as a revolutionary struggle by the masses under plebeian leadership turned into a 'reformist' movement led by the elites. The swing of power to the Left had been 'intercepted' by another right-wing faction;

3. With the collapse of the Marcos regime in the wake of the February Uprising, the new *ilustrado* government of Cory Aquino's (the widow of Benigno's) systematically--yet no less deceitfully--excluded the masses from any meaningful participation in the government's policy-making and decision-making institutions;

4. In so doing, the aftermath of the Uprising was not a revolutionary 'new beginning' in the least, but a throwback of the pre-martial law state-oriented and folk-charismatic relationships, where the *ilustrada* had been dominant and secure; and

5. In all this, 'sovereignty' (both legal and coercive) and 'authority as positive opportunity' were resumed by the *ilustrada*, and 'authority as negative authority' remained with the *ilustrado* faction which happened to have been 'voted' into office by the people.

It can then be concluded that unless the masses produced an effective plebeian leadership, the *ilustrada* would always be able to sustain their ascendancy by alternating its factions in power, now liberal-democratic, next constitutional-despotic, and back again to liberal-democratic, and so on. And so in the struggle for sovereignty, a logical condition of *origination* is such leadership. It is the *historical cause* in revolutionary causation which, lacking in the 1986 Uprising, dysfunctionalized the ends of revolutionary struggle in the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s.

