TERRORISM IN AUSTRALIA



BRIGADIER M. H. MacKENZIE-ORR

WO of the addresses that were given to the criminal justice conference, went beyond what might be considered the normal perameters of the criminal justice system. The papers were those concerned with "Terrorism in Australia" and with "Computer and White Collar Crime". The former was given by Brigadier M. H. MacKenzie-Orr who is Head of the Protective Services Co-ordination Centre in Canberra.

Mac MacKenzie-Orr was born and educated in England and, following National Service in the British Army, made the army his career. He had a regular commission by the time that he was 22 years of age and thereafter he saw service in such diverse areas as Germany, Belgium, Cyprus, Aden, Hong Kong, USA, Northern Ireland and Oman as well as in Australia

It is difficult to imagine how he found the time for the necessary study, but he has the most impressive list of qualifications including Master of Science, Chartered Engineer, member of the Forensic Science Society, member of the British Institute of Management, member of the Royal Aeronautical Society, member of the Institute of Electronic and Radio Engineers, Fellow of the Institute of Explosive Engineers and Fellow of the Institute of Quality Assurance. He has also completed many technical service courses as well as courses on computer science and technology and senior management. With the passage of time, he has specialised increasingly in defence against the use of explosives. His service has seen him appointed an officer of the Order of the British Empire and a recipient of the George Medal.

With such a background, he was more than well equipped to address the conference on *Terrogism in Australia*. His paper undoubtedly opened the eyes of all delegates who attended. It is with pleasure that we avail ourselves of his permission to reproduce the paper here.

Increase in kidnappings in Beirut and the deaths of many victims, and the USA "Irangate" affair discloses:

- Failure of trying to do deals with terrorists. Their sponsors are without influence on many groups.
- Failure of negotiations with ruthless terrorists (Terry Waite) who insist on demands being met and who revise demands almost mischievously.
- Relative impotence of threat/use of military force in resolving situation.

Luckily, unlikely that Beirut scenario will be repeated in Australia

- No deep ethnic, religious or material differences.
- Distance from centres of terrorist activities.
- General material well-being.
- Australian character.

There has been a strong trend towards the use of bombs, kidnappings and assassinations as the principal terrorist tactics — a trend which is expected to continue.

However, the threat can change rapidly and governments must be prepared to meet other forms of attack.

- Hijack Air Afrique Airliner lone terrorist, Lebanese, ex-Jewish prison camp inmate.
- Nadi Hijack lone terrorist with flick knife and gelignite.
- Attacks on Rome and Vienna Airports suicidal terrorists with modern automatic weapons and military grenades.

Australian definition of terrorism — "Acts or threats of violence of national concern, calculated to evoke extreme fear for the purpose of achieving a political objective in Australia or in a foreign country".

THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE AND POTENTIAL FOR TERRORISM

Australia has not been immune, with some 35 terrorist incidents occurring here in the past 15 years. The more significant incidents include the wounding and kidnapping

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of the Indian Defence Attache in 1977, the bombing of the Sydney Hilton in 1978, the murder of the Turkish Consul-General and his bodybuard in 1980, the bombings of the Israeli Consulate-General and the Hakoah Club in 1982, and the bombing of the Turkish Consulate in Melbourne on 23rd November, 1986. All were attacks against foreign interests in Australia, but some have involved Australian citizens.

The current threat to Australia is assessed to be low. It needs to be borne in mind, however, that Australia has close historical and political ties with a number of nations, including Israel, which are under high threat and which have substantial interests in this country. These interests may well be seen by terrorist groups as attractive targets, as has happened in the past. Some overseas terrorist groups are believed to have supporters in this country, although they are few in number. (Recent immigrants from the Middle East and Asia (Sikhs, Kashmiris and Tamils)). We have a population of 110,000 Muslims, of whom some 70,000 live in NSW. They doubtless enjoy the Australian lifestyle and many have done so for a number of generations.

POTENTIAL TARGETS IN AUSTRALIA Internationally Protected Persons and Holders of High Office

The Commonwealth has international obligations for the protection of internationally protected persons visiting Australia and for the protection of persons holding high office. If they are well protected, related alternate targets may be chosen — eg minor officials or diplomats.

Last year more than 300 such persons visited Australia. Only a small percentage of these visitors had special protective security arrangements made for them because of the perceived risk.

- · Rajiv Ghandi
- Chaim Hertzog
- The Pope.

Diplomats

Sixty-six countries are represented in Canberra by diplomatic missions, of which 50% are assessed as at risk of violence to some degree.

Eighty-five countries altogether have representation in Australia. The number of foreign diplomatic and consular staff and their families in Australia which we are responsible for protecting is approximately 2,000.

Responsibility for the protection of persons covered by the Vienna Convention is vested in the Australian Federal Police, supported by State Forces.

Our own Head of State, Head of Government and Ministers.

Multinational Companies and Executives

A great number of companies in Australia are operated or managed by parent companies based in the USA, Britain. France etc.

Senior executives of such companies have been, and are, obvious targets for assassination or kidnapping eg Buckholts of Siemen's Germany; Besse of Renault, France.

The Government can take no specific measures to protect these senior executives. State Police Forces do provide advice if requested through their Crime Prevention Units.

Most companies accept responsibility for protection of their senior executives. Growth of private security in USA — 1985 \$14b Police, \$21b private security.

Vital National Installations

Installations which, in the event of their loss through terrorist action, would:

- 1. cause serious economic harm to the nation, and/or
- 2. the installation is one in which the Commonwealth and one or more States have substantial interests and responsibility.

Designated VNIs under (1):

- Bass Strait oil and gas platforms offshore and onshore processing plant at Longford.
- North West Shelf offshore gas platform and onshore plant at Karratha.

Designated VNI under (2):

• Gas treatment plant at Moomba, South Australia.

AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATION

There is no crime of terrorism in Australia. Acts of terrorism are regarded as offences against existing laws, ie murder, kidnapping, arson, assault. Terrorism describes the motive for criminal acts. However, in order to fulfil international obligations and to protect, inter alia, those most vulnerable to terrorism, the following acts are in force:

- Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963
- Crimes (Protection of Aircraft) Act 1973
- Crimes (Hijacking of Aircraft) Act 1972
- Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Act 1976
- Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons) Act 1976.

Other Commonwealth legislation which underpins the legal aspects of Australia's response to terrorism is:

- Crimes Act 1914
- Defence Act 1903.

THE AUSTRALIAN POSITION ON TERRORISM

Australian Governments have adopted a firm stance against terrorism both domestically and internationally at all relevant forums.

In co-operation with the States and Terrorities, the Government has taken steps to ensure that all Police Forces, the Defence Force and other authorities have the necessary capabilities to deal with the threat of bombings, assassinations and other possible terrorist incidents. We have comprehensive crisis management arrangements to permit a co-ordinated response to an incident occurring anywhere in Australia or affecting Australia's interests overseas.

National co-operation is achieved through a Standing Advisory Committee on Commonwealth/State Co-operation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV). This Committee includes representatives from Commonwealth departments and agencies and State and Territory Governments and Police Forces. The Commonwealth Government continues to provide funds each year to the States to purchase specialised counter-terrorist and protective security equipment and to develop levels of expertise beyond those required for normal law enforcement duties.

I shall have more to say on these matters later.

REVIEW OF COUNTER-TERRORIST CAPABILITY

In December, 1985, the Government initiated a review of the counter-terrorism capabilities in Australia. The recommendations were accepted by Cabinet in October, 1986.

The review concluded that Australia had an effective national counter-terrorism capability, that the co-operation between States and the Commonwealth and the interaction between Police Forces was good, and that the crisis management machinery was sufficiently well-developed to deal with a terrorist incident anywhere in Australia.

The review emphasised the importance of intelligence and the security-checking mechanisms now in place with several foreign security services which provides information on the movement of terrorists in time to prevent their entry into Australia. There is always the risk that refugees from war zones may include sleepers who can be persuaded or coerced to support terrorist activities.

The review recommended that current entry requirements for visitors to Australia to obtain visas should be maintained. The Government is to take this recommendation into account in any future examination of the visa system

Note: Following the bombing campaign in Paris, in September, 1986 during the Abdullah trial, France now requires visas for all visitors except the European community.

Action is being taken to enhance the protection of Commonwealth explosives and weapons as recommended by the review.

Aviation Security

- JTF on aviation security at Australian airports.
- Mascot is not Athens.

EXISTING COUNTER-TERRORISM MACHINERY

A framework for implementing counter-terrorist measures is set out in a National Anti-Terrorist Plan (NATP). Other national plans — National Anti-Hijack Plan (NAHP) and National Anti-Mail Bomb Plan (NAMBP) aim to preserve innocent life.

The NATP explains the responsibilities of Governments in managing a terrorist incident and provides a basic structure for co-ordinating the response to a terrorist incident anywhere in Australia.

Political management of response to terrorist activities is the joint responsibility of the Commonwealth and the State/Territory where the incident occurs. However, distinctly separate responsibilities exist:

Commonwealth Responsibilities

- Protection of VIPs and diplomatic/consular officials.
- International relations.
- Protection of Commonwealth persons/property (including airports, aircraft and passengers).
- Demands by terrorists on the Commonwealth.
- Public Relations on Commonwealth interests.
- Provision of Defence Force Aid.
- Training by HQ ADF of SAS Squadron for offshore response, including assault.

- Provision of other resources requested by States. State Responsibilities
- Jurisdictional
- Provide policy guidance for Police Commander.
- State Resources (Emergency Services).

Each of the eight Police Forces has a specially trained group capable of responding to a terrorist incident. These groups have special training and equipment provided by the Commonwealth and have developed special procedures to implement the National Anti-Terrorist Plan. However, they would probably only be used for an emergency assault to save lives in imminent danger. The TAG of the SAS Regiment has a much higher level of capability and would be made available to deal with a serious or protracted terrorist incident.

Police have no capability for offshore assault and limited capabilities to deal with protracted siege hostage situations.

Co-operation between Governments is through the Standing Advisory Committee for Commonwealth/State Co-operation for Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV), which was set up in 1979 after the February 1978, Hilton bombing. It meets at six-monthly intervals and is presented with the current intelligence picture by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO).

The importance of timely and accurate intelligence in countering politically-motivated violence cannot be too highly stressed.

In Australia, ASIO prepares national threat assessments in close co-operation with Police Forces and intelligence agencies of friendly nations who provide information on activities of known terrorist groups. Following the briefings, SAC-PAV decides what training, equipment and exercises are necessary to maintain an adequate level of counter-terrorism capability.

Advice on the terrorist threat is given to Government through the Special Interdepartmental Committee on Protection Against Violence (SIDC-PAV), which meets monthly and which recommends the level of counterterrorist alert. It can meet at very short notice if intelligence suggests rapid action is necessary.

JOINT CRISIS MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE IN COMMONWEALTH

- Duty Minister in Crisis Policy Centre (CPC) one of four Cabinet Ministers nominated by Prime Minister.
- State Duty Minister in State Crisis Centre (SCC).
- Police Commander in Police Operations Centre (POC).
- Police Forward Commander in PFCP.
- Intelligence feeding into POC and CPC.
- Media links between each command node.

FUNCTION OF CPC

Act as the Commonwealth focal point for the formulation of policy and the co-ordination of the Commonwealth's response.

STRUCTURE OF CPC

- Duty Minister.
- Minister's Executive Committee Head Protective Security Co-ordination Centre, Officials from Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Attorneys-General.

- Support Group policy advisers and execution of policy.
- Intelligence Group intelligence briefs.
- Media Liaison Group press arrangements.

Within the Support Group are representatives from all departments represented on SIDC-PAV and, importantly, ACOPS from HO ADF, with a small staff including DSAF and a communications cell.

MEASURES IN HAND TO IMPROVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Communications

An improved, secure data, telex, facsimile and telephone system for use between CPC, SCC and POC is to be acquired. First equipment will be provided to Police Forces in FY 1988-89.

Consultations with State Police Forces are proceeding to improve and hasten the flow of information and intelligence from the POC to the Commonwealth's CPC in Canberra. The Police Forces have well-planned procedures for handling hostages on release and trained negotiators to preserve life by negotiation with terrorists.

FUTURE PROBLEMS AND GROWING COST OF SECURITY

Bombing incidents have been increasing worldwide (eg in France some months ago during the Abdullah trial) and will probably be the most likely form of terrorist incident in Australia in the future. It is also most likely to involve innocent victims.

The Commonwealth has provided about \$10m over the last six years to fund the acquisition of specialised equipment for State Police Forces and for training and exercise programmes to develop and maintain the required level of expertise. In this financial year, the majority of the equipment vote for SAC-PAV (approximately \$1.3m) will be spent on bomb response equipment.

In the world of commerce, the provision of protective security arrangements against terrorism is the responsibility of individual companies. For example, three companies operating vital national installations in the important energy field have spent, or plan to spend, approximately \$7m on security measures at their operating plants and offshore platforms.

As a comparison, in the USA costs for 1985 were:

- Private Sector \$21b
- Public Sector \$14b.

Stricter controls and precautions against theft of explosives will have to be instituted by mining and engineering companies if we are going to reduce the availability of explosives which may be used in a terrorist bombing campaign. Fiji hijack explosives from emperor Gold Mine. Regularly used for fishing by mine employers.

RELATIONSHIP WITH AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) also has a highly skilled and well-equipped counter-terrorist force with a role to support Police Forces responding to incidents of terrorism. Training includes:

- Planning and exercise writing.
- Briefing techniques.
- Weapons handling.
- Command, control and co-ordination.

The ADF cannot be used in a counter-terrorist situation where force may be needed until necessary procedures have been completed Governor-General-in-Council.

The Government is taking steps to resolve a number of legal matters to streamline procedures for Defence Force Aid to Civil Authorities. Necessary because current rules devised for quite different circumstances. (Eureka Stockade).

The provision of Defence Force Aid is governed by:

- Call Out "Authority to Commit"
- Requisition "Move to Immediate Area"
 Request "Direction to Act".

It is the responsibility of CDF to move ADF units anywhere in Australia. CDF could anticipate "Call Out", but might require a political decision to agree to such a move.

PRINCIPLES OF DEFENCE FORCE AID TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

- Primacy of civil power.
- ADF use as a last resort.
- Use of minimum force.
- ADF members remain under military command.

AVIATION SECURITY

International experience is that airports and international aviation are prime targets for terrorist attack.

In Australia, terrorist threat to airports and aviation is assessed as low, but you will note that 100% screening of domestic flights is now in place in Australia.

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Our security arrangements fully meet all the standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), but note FAA approval of Karachi Airport security just prior to attack.

Security needs at airports are under constant review. Bomb and weapon search procedures are being reviewed.

Current system of issuing passes for access to security areas also being looked at.

Broader aspects of physical security at airports is to be improved following the recommendations of a Joint Task Force led by the former Department of Aviation assisted by the former Department of the Special Minister of State and the AFP.

Policing at airports is presently Australian Federal Police responsibility. AFP has permanent uniformed presence at nine of the 12 international airports.

AFP also has plain clothes officers at airports dealing with drugs, corporate crime and other matters concerned with Commonwealth Law enforcement.

In any terrorist incident, the current AFP role is one of management until arrival of State Police.

This raises problems of co-ordination between AFP and State Police in an incident. We are therefore investigating the possibility of transferring the uniformed policing duties, including counter-terrorism and protective security, at airports to State Police Forces and discussions are under way with Commissioners.

CONCLUSIONS

Australia recognises that no-one is immune from terrorism and that adequate preparations are needed to respond effectively to terrorist incidents when they occur.

We must, however, not lose a sense of proportion and base our arrangements for countering terrorism on worst case scenarios. Our arrangements are based on a sober and rational assessment of the current threat and risk assessments in Australia.

We have the ability to upgrade measures quickly when the intelligence assessment of the threat warrants it.

Australia should continue to support, in both the letter and the spirit, the principles of those international conventions to which we are a signatory and continue to urge all other signatories to support those principles by their practical application.

Australia should continue to enhance, wherever possible, its existing bilateral arrangements in the areas of intelligence exchange and political and diplomatic dialogue with all countries, and should convene a regional meeting (a Southwest Pacific Neighbourhood Watch perhaps) to draft an agenda for co-operation in these fields.

NOTE:

- 1. a. The Age of Terrorism by Walter Laqueur Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 15SBN 0297 79115X, price £17.95.
 - b. Holy Terror, The Inside Story of Iranian Terrorism by Amir Taheri Hutchinson, ISBN 0.09 165970.1, Price £12.95.





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