Gjerris, Mickey; Sandoe, Peter --- "Ethical Perspectives in Animal Biotechnology" [2007] ALRCRefJl 10; (2007) 91 Australian Law Reform Commission Reform Journal 37

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Ethical perspectives in animal biotechnology

* By Mickey Gjerris and Peter Sandøe

Animal biotechnology has developed rapidly over the past 20–25 years. Today the two main technologies typically included in definitions of modern animal biotechnology are genetic modification and cloning.

With animal cloning the goal is to reproduce as much of the genetic make-up from the original animal as possible. Ideally cloning would be to produce a copy.

On the other hand, genetically modified or, as they are often called, transgenic animals represent the attempt to use advanced biotechnologies to produce animals with a specific genetic alteration. There exist several kinds of transgenic animals. For example, animals may have had their genome modified by having genes knocked-out or copied, or they may have had genes not normally found in that species inserted into their genome. These genes can come from another species or be artificial constructs.

The technologies can be used for a variety of purposes but they are mostly used within basic and medical research. Here the animals are utilised to gain a better understanding of basic biological questions and to gain a better understanding of serious human diseases. However, there are also attempts made to utilise the technologies within agriculture with the purpose of increasing productivity, reducing environmental impact and improving animal welfare.

Both cloning and genetic modification are new technologies that still are in their infancy and both struggle with low efficiency and animal welfare problems. It is therefore difficult to assess the importance that the technologies will eventually have in different areas. But there can be little doubt that the influence of the technologies will grow in the coming years. And as this happens the ethical concerns that the technologies give rise to will become more and more urgent.¹

The ethical concerns

To gain a picture of the ethical questions facing us in the light of the modern animal biotechnologies, we have divided these into the three main areas that are typically found in the literature. These areas, and the most important issues within each of them, are discussed below. The areas are: risks to humans and the environment; risks to animal welfare; and risks to animal integrity.

Humans and the environment

Concerns about potential risks to humans and the environment figure prominently in many discussions. Risks to humans are most often equated with risks to human health presented by medical products or food derived from biotech animals. There is substantial literature discussing what risks should be taken into consideration when such products are evaluated. In the medical area it is usually suggested that risk assessments ought to follow the approach by which newly developed drugs are conventionally tested. In the food area risks arising from changes in amino acids leading to allergenicity, toxic effects or changes in nutritional value will set important parameters.² Until now only food products from cloned animals and their progeny have been developed far enough to initiate serious attempts at conducting risk assessment. These assessments suggest that there are no new risks to human health related to such products,³ but it should be noted that the research is limited.

Another area where the knowledge about the potential risks is less clear is the area of xenotransplantation. Here questions about the risk of transferring diseases from pig donors to human recipients are unresolved. Especially important is the question whether there is a significant risk that the porcine endogenous retrovirus (PERV), which lies dormant in the pig genome, might become active following transfer to the human body. There is no doubt that this could cause very serious health problems for humans, and the situation is often compared with the history of AIDS and SARS, but there is no agreement about how this risk should be evaluated. ⁴

There are also potential risks to the environment. The concern here is that biotech animals might escape and breed with wild populations, thus spreading their genes in an uncontrollable environment. The most cited example here is that of transgenic fish—for example, salmon with genetic alterations that allow for faster growth. The concerns in this area can either be about the indirect consequences this might have for humans (in this case economic losses for the fishing industry) or direct concerns about the animals and the wider ecosystem. Whether one is concerned about this particular application of the technology because it constitutes a risk to human interests or because it constitutes a risk to other species or the integrity of the ecosystem, there is no doubt that the risk that transgenic animals will escape and evade human control and confinement is a socially important issue.⁵

Finally, it should be mentioned that there are concerns about the use of biotech animals being a step on to a slippery slope to unacceptable uses of biotechnology on humans. Although present uses of such animals mainly aim at gaining basic scientific understanding of molecular biology and studying human diseases, it is clear that the more skilled we become at applying biotechnology to animals the easier it will be to apply the same technologies to humans. What will prevent technologies from moving from the animal to the human sphere is not the technical limitations but rather an ethical objection; and people concerned about the slippery slope are worried that ethical objections will eventually have to give in to the technical possibilities. ⁶

Animal Welfare

Biotech animals have so far mainly been used within basic biological research and as disease models. Often the goal is to produce animals that either under or over express certain genes, or that express a mutated, disease-causing human gene. In all these cases normal body function in the organism is in some way disrupted. Modifications can involve any part of the animal genome, and the effects on the animal’s phenotype range from those that are lethal to those that have no detectable effect on the health of the animal. It is therefore impossible to generalise about the welfare effects of genetic modification. With cloning the goal is either to gain knowledge about basic reproductive mechanisms or to produce a genotypic copy of an existing animal. The welfare effects of cloning have been severe, but it is hoped that further development of the technology will lessen the impact.7

The effects that occur from using biotechnology on animals can be divided into two main categories: the intended and the unintended. Welfare problems stemming from intended genetic change are hard to avoid, since the very point of inducing the change is to affect the animal. Thus, the mouse carrying the human Huntington’s disease gene will inevitably suffer welfare problems as it develops the disease, including rapid progressive loss of neural control leading to premature death. Unintended effects are connected with the present inaccuracy of the technology and our insufficient understanding of the function of different genes in different organisms. Both of these kinds of factor operate to create the rather unpredictable nature of genetic modification at the phenotypic level.

To deal properly with both intended and unintended effects on animal welfare it is important to monitor the animals and, when severe effects occur, to take action to alleviate or end the suffering of the animals. Within laboratory animal science it will be considered part of good practice to find ways to conduct experiments so as to minimise the discomfort and suffering imposed on the animals and to define so called humane endpoints, ie points at which animals have to be euthanised. ⁸

There is wide agreement about the need to limit the discomfort and suffering imposed on animals. However, from a philosophical perspective it may be questioned whether the only focus should be on avoiding pain and other kinds of suffering in animals (and perhaps promoting positive experiences). For it may be argued that animal welfare is also about the extent to which the animal is allowed to fulfil its species-specific potential, regardless of its subjective experience.

Very often this broader perspective on animal welfare will point to an additional group of considerations that have to be taken into account when we reflect on animal welfare. Concern about the animal’s opportunity to engage in certain kinds of behaviour does not prevent one from caring about its subjective experiences. Nevertheless, occasionally, these two kinds of consideration are difficult to reconcile in practice. Considerations within a narrow perspective in which the subjective experiences of the animal alone matter might be outweighed by the other considerations in the broader perspective.⁹

Some of those engaged in the ethical debate regarding transgenic animals will go a step further and argue that welfare is not all that matters in our dealing with these animals. They may defend the view that we should also consider animal integrity.

Integrity

Integrity means wholeness or fullness. In the literature two notions of animal integrity are prominent. The first is based in a biological understanding, the second in a phenomenological understanding. The first stresses the genetic integrity of the animal and therefore focuses on the importance of not changing animal genomes to suit human purposes. The obvious objection to concerns about the violation of genetic integrity through gene technology is that the genome of an animal species is in constant flux both because of the naturally occurring evolutionary forces and through other and well-established breeding practices such as conventional selective breeding. A difference between genetic changes induced by natural selective forces and human-induced changes can be stated, but it is difficult to argue for a relevant difference between introducing genetic changes with modern biotechnology and introducing changes with older, conventional methods. ¹⁰ This fact has led some to conclude that transgenic animals raise no new, or additional, ethical concerns. Others claim that this alone gives us reason to re-examine conventional breeding methods with a more critical eye than hitherto. ¹¹

The second notion of integrity is based on an experience of the animal as an inviolable whole. Animal integrity can thus be understood as an inherent limit in the relationship between humans and nature—a 'red line' that governs what is ethically acceptable for humans to do to animals. Integrity here derives from an experience and understanding of animals as beings that in and of themselves set up an ethical requirement of non-interference. This demand may be violated only if the reasons are adequate from an ethical perspective. Integrity signifies a difference between the knowledge of the animal that we have through our understanding of its usefulness to humans and the knowledge we have when we conceive of the animal independently of our needs. A cow is a producer of hide, milk and meat; it holds no surprises when experienced from the perspective of human need. But when experienced in a non-reductionist perspective, the cow amounts to more than that. Respecting the integrity of animals is thus the polar opposite of wholesale reification of the animal as a natural resource. ¹²

Endnotes

1. M Gjerris, A Olsson and P Sandøe, ‘Animal Biotechnology and Animal Welfare’ in Ethical Eye—Animal Welfare (2006) Council of Europe, 89.

2. National Research Council and Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, Safety of Genetically Engineered Food: Approaches to Assessing Unintended Health Effects (2004).

3. US Food and Drug Administration (2008): Animal Cloning: A Risk Assessment. USFDA, Rockville

4. S Martin, R Wilkinson and J Fisherman, ‘Genomic Presence of Recombinant Porcine Endogenous Retrovirus in Transmitting Miniature Swine’ (2006) 3 Virology Journal 91.

5. PEW Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Future Fish: Issues in Science and Regulation of Transgenic Fish (2003).

6. L Kass, ‘The Wisdom of Repugnance,’ The New Republic, 2 June 2007.

7. G Vajta and M Gjerris, ‘Science and Technology of Farm Animal Cloning: State of the Art’ (2006) 92 Animal Reproduction Science 210.

8. A Olsson and P Sandøe, ‘Ethical Decisions Concerning Animal Biotechnology: What is the Role of Animal Welfare Science?’ (2004) 13 Animal Welfare139.

9. M Gjerris, A Olsson and P Sandøe, ‘Animal Biotechnology and Animal Welfare’ in Ethical Eye—Animal Welfare (2006) Council of Europe, 89.

10. B Rollin, Bad Ethics, Good Ethics and the Genetic Engineering of Animals in Agriculture’ (1996) 74 Journal of Animal Science 535.

11. M Gerris and P Sandøe, ‘Farm Animal Cloning: The Role of the Concept of Animal Integrity in Debating and Regulating the Technology’ in M Kaiser and M Lien (eds), Ethics and the Politics of Food: Preprints of the 6. Congress of the European Society for Agricultural and Food Ethics (2006), 320.

12. Ibid.

* Mickey Gjerris is Associate Professor at the Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment at The University of Copenhagen. Peter Sandøe is professor at the Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment at The University of Copenhagen.